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In other words it is clear that under section 21 individual rights of workmen have been taken away and rights have been conferred upon recognised Union in respect of Items Nos. 2 and 6 of Schedule IV only and the same is conferred on the representative of the employees entitled to appear under section 30 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. In terms of section 22 members of an unrecognised Union have the right to discuss with the employer or any person matters relating to his discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of services and suspension and also to appear on behalf of his/its members in the undertaking in any domestic or departmental enquiry held by the employer. Thus even members of an unrecognised Union have the right to represent the members of an unrecognised Union.

10. Section 20 appears under the Chapter of obligation and rights of recognised Union, other Union and certain employees. Sections 20 and 21 of the Chapter deal with recognised Unions and section 22 deals with unrecognised Unions. In other words these are the rights given to recognised Union and unrecognised Union.

Reading of section 20(1) shows that the Act restricts the office-bearers, in terms of the rules framed to represent the Union or member or any employee amongst others in any domestic enquiry. Section 20(2) sets out that where there is a recognised Union in terms of section 20(2)(b), an employee is precluded to appear, act or allowed to be represented in proceedings under the Central Act except in proceedings which pertains to his termination in any manner or suspension. It is, therefore, clear that there should be proceedings initiated under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Domestic enquiry is not the subject matter of any proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act except in a reference challenging the order of dismissal/termination or other punishments. Therefore what has to be examined is whether section 20(1)(d) is capable of being read as to restrict the right of representation provided in terms of Model Standing Order or certified standing order under the provisions of this Standing Orders Act.

Therefore, it is clear that Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act stands by itself in so far as matters pertaining to conditions of services enumerated in the schedule, in an industrial establishment. The M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act on the other hand is an Act to prevent unfair labour practices on the part of employer and employee. The M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act also gives recognition to what is known as recognised Union and for that purpose confers certain rights on a recognised Union which rights cannot be exercised by an unrecognised Union. However, both recognised and unrecognised Union can exercise their rights in respect of those matters which are not made exclusive to the recognised Union. If this be the case then in that instant the rights of representation which a workman is entitled to under the provisions of the Standing Orders Act cannot be taken away. Standing Orders is a contract of service having statutory flavor. Breach of them would by itself amount to an unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act. In these circumstances, the right conferred on the delinquent employee under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act and the Model Standing Orders framed thereunder and the provisions of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act will have to be read in tandem. So read all that can be said is that in respect of the rights which are conferred on the recognised Union an employee cannot ventilate his grievance in respect of the right on his own and such a right can only be ventilated by the recognised Union. In so far as the domestic enquiry is concerned the expression used is "such officers as may be authorised" where the workman has sought to be represented by recognised Union. So read it must mean that for the purpose of section 21 and section 23 partly in terms of section 20 it is those office-bearers alone who can represent the recognised Union. In so far as Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 20 the expression to appear on behalf of any employee or employees in any domestic or departmental enquiry held by the employer must be read to mean in a case where an employee wants to be represented by a recognised Union then in such an event by the officer bearers whose names are spelt out under Rule 18. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 20 does not take away right of the workman to be represented by a fellow employee. If this be so read, it also does not take away right to be represented by an office-bearer other than those notified under Rule 28. At the highest it can be said that the rule is permissive and not exclusive. It can supplant the Standing Orders, it cannot supplement them.

14. The Standing Orders Act is an Act to define with precision certain conditions of employment. These conditions of employment are what are known as Certified Standing Orders. In the absence of certified standing orders as we have seen, it is the Model Standing Orders which apply to the establishment. In other words, regarding the conditions of service the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is a special legislation. The provisions of M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act do not exclude the provisions of the Standing Orders Act, in respect of the conditions of service covered by the Model Standing Orders or certified standing orders, they being statutory conditions of service they will have overriding effect until amended as per law. Under the provisions of M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P Act by rules framed, the Government has been empowered to notify such office bearer who can represent a workman. Ex facie if not read harmoniously it would mean that the standing orders framed under the State or the Central Rules would stand modified. This cannot be so construed. The Central Rules will not stand modified as the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act is a State Act. What would stand modified at the highest if the argument is accepted would be the State Rules. In other words where the Appropriate Government is the State Government, the position would be if the two Acts are not read harmoniously then only those office bearers as prescribed in Rule 18 of M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P Act can represent the workman where the appropriate Government is the State Government but in so far as the establishment where the Central Government is an Appropriate Government any office bearer can represent the workman at an enquiry. This is not what either the Industrial Standing Orders Act or Rules framed there under and/or the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act and the Rules framed there under contemplate. As pointed out already the provisions of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act confer certain right on a recognised Union. It is in respect of these rights that the representation by an Union can be so read. In matters where it is not the exclusive authority to represent the workman the provisions of the Standing Orders Act, rules framed thereunder or certified standing orders must prevail. If so read together the two Acts can be read harmoniously. Where the legislature has conferred certain rights on a workman and has not excluded the provisions of one Act from the other the legislative's intent must be given effect to. In the instant case, it can be given effect to if they are read harmoniously. Rule 18 which restricts only certain categories of office bearers to represent a worker at a domestic inquiry can be read to mean to be applicable only in those cases or instances where Union has been conferred an exclusive right of representation. In other cases where individual rights are conferred the provisions of the standing orders, the rules framed thereunder or the certified standing orders framed must prevail. An act of misconduct by very nature is an individual dispute. It does not become a collective dispute unless so raised. The sole right in such matters is not vested in a recognised Union or in an unrecognised Union. Therefore, in so far as the individual disputes are concerned, the provisions of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, the rules framed thereunder and the Standing Orders Act will prevail over Rule 18 of the rules framed under the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the office bearer of a Union has no right of representing the delinquent employee in a domestic enquiry merely because he happens to be a lawyer.