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There seems to be no scope for considerations of a wide and general nature about the objects attempted to be achieved by a piece of legislation when interpreting the clear words of the enactment. As has been repeatedly laid down by courts, both Indian and English, the intent and object have to be gathered primarily from the plain words of the statute. It is clear that the observations in Mullas Commentary on Hindu Law, quoted above, relate only to what was attempted to be achieved by section 6 of the Act. Section 6 of the Act is the only provision of the Act which deals with the devolution of interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property on the death of a male Hindu after the commencement of the Act. The other sections apply equally to all Hindus as defined in the Act whether governed by the Mitakshara or Dayabhaga law. They also apply to Jains and Sikhs who are, as already observed, Hindus according to the definition of the term "Hindu" found in the Act. It is not possible to conceive of separate intents of a general provision of the Act with regard to separate groups of persons governed by separate schools of Hindu law. The only way of indicating any such separate intention is to make a special provision for a separate school of law as we find in section 6 of the Act or in section 17 of the Act, which contain special provisions respecting persons governed by special branches of personal law. Section 8 of the Act, which is invoked on behalf of the assessee, is one of the general provisions applicable to all Hindus. Therefore, observations made about the provisions of section 6 of the Act cannot be appropriately used in interpreting section 8 of the Act at all.

Section 6 of the Act contains the extent to which sentiment in favour of the retention of the original Hindu law relating to succession to or devolution of the Mitakshara coparcenary property found legislative expression. It confines the operation of the original law of Mitakshara coparcenary property to cases where the deceased governed by the Mitakshara law had an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property and regulates only the devolution of such interest in that property. We do not think that any support can be sought from the provisions of section 6 of the Act in interpreting the very different provisions of section 8 of the Act. The two sections deal with different subject-matter. One deals with the devolution of an "interest" in a Mitakshara coparcenary property and the other with the devolution of "property" itself of a male Hindu, falling outside the purview of section 6 of the Act upon the death of a male Hindu intestate.