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1. We are in these cases concerned with the validity of the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 by which the Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969, (in short `the Janmam Act') was included in the 9th Schedule under Article 31-B of the Constitution. These petitions earlier came up for consideration before a Bench of two Judges of this Court and the Bench felt that matter should be heard by a larger Bench since the case involved substantial questions of law pertaining to the interpretation of the Constitution. The order is reported in Manjushree Plantation Ltd. and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others 1989 (3) SCC 282. Consequently, the matter came up before a Constitution Bench of five Judges on 14th September, 1999, and the Court felt that the impact of the judgment in Waman Rao and others etc. v. Union of India and others 1981 (2) SCC 362 be considered by a larger Bench so that apparent inconsistencies therein could be reconciled and the question whether an Act or Regulation which, or a part of which, was or had been found by this Court to be violative of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 would be included in the Ninth Schedule or whether it was only a constitutional amendment amending the Ninth Schedule that damaged or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution that could be struck down. The order is reported in (1999) 7 SCC 580. The matter was then placed before a Constitution Bench of nine Judges. The fundamental question which came up for consideration was whether on and after 24th April, 1973, when the basic structure doctrine was propounded, was it permissible for the Parliament under Article 31-B to immunize legislations from fundamental rights by inserting them into the Ninth Schedule and also its effect on the power of judicial review of the Court. The Bench laid down certain parameters for the application of the basic structure doctrine propounded in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru etc. v. State of Kerala and another (1973) 4 SCC 225 and later explained in M. Nagraj & Others v. Union of India & Others (2006) 8 SCC 212. The Court set at rest some of the inconsistencies which were brought in by Waman Rao's Case by analyzing the judgment from Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar (1952) SCR 89 to Kesavananda Bharati (supra) and then to Waman Rao's case (supra). The Court held that the theory of basic structure is applicable to the laws included in the Ninth Schedule also. The Court declared Article 31-B valid and held if there is any violation, restriction or encroachment upon the fundamental rights, guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, the State must justify its action on the touch stone of the doctrine of basic structure of the Constitution. The judgment is reported in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by L.Rs. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1. Coelho Principle:

3. Petitioner has also submitted that the rule of law, rule of equality and separation of powers have been held to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution and by the inclusion of the Janmam Act in the Ninth Schedule those rights have been abrogated violating the basic structure of the Constitution.

4. The Constitutional validity of the Act has already been upheld by this Court in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. and another etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 SCC 133, except that the provisions of Section 3 (Vesting Section) in so far as it relates to the transfer of forest area, in Janmam Estate, was held to be not a measure of agrarian reforms and hence would not get the protection of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. In that connection, reference may also be made to the Ceiling Act which was also included in the Ninth Schedule. The Ceiling Act, however, was not earlier made applicable to the Janmam Estate in the Gudalur Taluk, but was later made applicable and certain proceedings had started in respect of determination of ceiling of land held by either the janmies or the lessees. The stand of the State of Tamil Nadu is that those janmies who have been given ryotwari pattas under the Janmam Act became pattadars/land owners and the provisions of the Ceiling Act have also been made applicable.

First stage: We have to first examine whether the provisions of Janmam Act included in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (34th Amendment Act 1974) is violating any of the rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, and if our answer is in the affirmative, our further enquiry would be whether the violation so found has abrogated or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. On such examination, if our answer is in the affirmative, the result would be invalidation of the Act to the extent of its violation. Petitioner, therefore, cannot succeed merely by establishing that any of his fundamental rights have been violated but he has to further show that the violation has the effect of abrogating the basic structure of the Constitution. Once it is established, the onus shift to the State to justify the infraction of the fundamental right, and if they fail, still State can show, that such infraction has not abrogated or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. Violation of fundamental right, may not, therefore, ipso facto, violate the basic structure doctrine, but a law which violates the basic structure invariably violates some of the rights guaranteed under Part III, but not vice versa. A law which infringes a basic feature of the Constitution cannot be validated under Article 31B, by inserting it in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution.

11. Right not to be deprived of property, save by authority of law is no longer a fundamental right but only a constitutional right which has never been treated as part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Hence the contention that Section 3 violates Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution is without any basis. Petitioner has, therefore, not succeeded in establishing that, the Act or its provisions have violated any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to them and, therefore, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the first test laid down in Coelho's case (supra). Consequently, the question whether the Janmam Act and its provisions have violated the basic structure of the Constitution does not call for examination. Our judicial journey should end here, and we are least concerned with the violation of any constitutional or statutory rights, inadequacy of compensation etc. Assuming that in our onward journey, we carry with us a bundle of right's violations, which are fundamental, then the question is whether those violations, have the effect of abrogating or destroying the basic structure of the Constitution.