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On the argument of learned counsel for the parties, the first question that arises for consideration is whether Article 174(1) is applicable to a dissolved Assembly?

A plain reading of Article 174 shows that it stipulates that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. It does not provide for any period of limitation for holding fresh election in the event a Legislative Assembly is prematurely dissolved. It is true that after commencement of the Constitution, the practice has been that whenever either Parliament or Legislative Assembly were prematurely dissolved, the election for constituting fresh Assembly or Parliament, as the case may be, were held within six months from the date of the last sitting of the dissolved Parliament or Assembly. It appears that the Election Commission's interpretation of Article 174 that fresh elections for constituting Assembly are required to be held within six months from the date of the last sitting of the last session was very much influenced by the prevailing practice followed by the Election Commission since enforcement of the Constitution. At no point of time any doubt had arisen as to whether the interval of six months between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next session of the Assembly under Article 174(1) provides a period of limitation for holding fresh election to constitute new Assembly by the Election Commission in the event of a premature dissolution of Assembly. Since the question has arisen in this Reference and also in view of the fact that Article 174 on its plain reading does not show that it provides a period of limitation for holding fresh election after the premature dissolution of the Assembly, it is necessary to interpret the said provision by applying accepted rules of interpretations.

Moreover, it may be noticed that if the suggestion put forth during the course of the debate that the House of Parliament should sit for eight to nine months in a year was accepted, it would not have given sufficient time for holding fresh elections in the event of premature dissolution of either Parliament or Legislative Assembly and it would also have led to a breach of Constitutional provisions. This also shows that what is contained in Article 174(1) is meant only for an existing and functional House. In a further scenario, if the suggestions during the debate for reducing the intervening period from six months to three months were accepted, it would mean that after premature dissolution of the Houses of People or the Legislative Assembly, fresh elections have to be held so that House of People or Legislative Assembly could hold their first sitting within three months from the date of last sitting of the dissolved Parliament or Legislative Assembly as the case may be. This would also have not allowed sufficient time for holding election for constituting either House of People or a Legislative Assembly. T his shows that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the provisions contained in Article 174 were meant for a living and existing Legislative Assembly and not to a dissolved Legislative Assembly.

Passages relied upon by the learned counsel are extremely inappropriate in the Indian context for holding elections for constituting either House of the People or the Legislative Assembly. As is clear from the passages themselves, under British Parliamentary system, it is the exclusive right of the Monarch to dissolve the Parliament and the Monarch by the same proclamation also provides for the election and meeting of its successor, which is not the case under the Indian Constitution. Under the Indian Constitution, the power has been entrusted to the Election Commission under Article 324 to conduct, supervise, control and direction and, therefore, the British convention cannot be pressed into service. In our democratic system, the Election Commission is the only authority to conduct and fix dates for fresh elections for constituting new House of People or Legislative Assembly, as the case may be. However, it is true that in the year 2000, Electoral Commission has been constituted in England by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, but the conventions sought to be relied upon are prior to the year 2000 and the Election Commission also does not have the power to fix dates for holding elections for constituting the House of Commons. Therefore, the British conventions cannot be said to be reflected in Article 174. Yet another reason why the British convention for fixing a date for newly constituted Parliament cannot be applied in India is that under British Parliamentary system, there is a continuity of Parliament, whereas in India once the Parliament gets dissolved, all the business which is to be transacted comes to an end and the House of People cannot be revived.
The State organ vested with the right to dissolve Parliament must express its will to do so in a manner which accords with the Constitution, and the relevant laws. The primary consequence of dissolution is that House of People or the Legislative Assembly, as the case may be, legally ceases to exist and cannot perform its legislative functions. Such pre-mature interruption of the life of the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly as the case may be, amongst others factors affects it as a body as well as its individual members likewise its work is also abruptly ended, subject to prescribed exclusions, if any. Any further meeting of the ex- members has to be considered an ordinary meeting of citizens, and not an official session of the Legislative Assembly or House of People in the legislative capacity.