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We are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants. The doctrine is now well established that "the acts of the officers de facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding, as if they were the acts of officers de jure" (Pulin Behari v. King Emperor). As one of us had occasion to point out earlier "the doctrine is founded on good sense, sound policy and practical expedience. It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and the protection of public and private interest. It avoids endless confusion and needless chaos. An illegal appointment may be set aside and a proper appointment may be made, but the acts of those who hold office de facto are not so easily undone and may have lasting repercussions and confusing sequels if attempted to be undone. Hence the de facto doctrine" (vide Immedisetti Ramkriashnaiah Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.

"The question whether the judges below be properly judges or not. can never be determined, it is sufficient if they be judges de facto. Suppose a person were even criminally convicted in a Court of Record, and the Recorder of such Court were not duly elected, the conviction would still be good in law, he being the judge de facto".

In Seaddling v. Lorant, the question arose whether a rate for the relief of the poor was rendered invalid by the circumstance that some of the vestry men who made it were vestry men de facto and not de jure. The Lord Chancellor observed as follows:

In Cooley's 'Constitutional Limitations', Eighth Edition, Volume II p. 1 355, it is said, "An officer de facto is one who by some colour or right is in possession of an office and for the time being performs its duties with public acquiescence, though having no right in fact. His colour of right may come from an election or appointment made by some officer or body having colourable but no actual right to make it; or made in such disregard of legal requirements as to be ineffectual in law; or made to fill the place of an officer illegally re-moved or made in favour of a party not having the legal qualifications; or it may come from public acquiescence in the qualifications; or it may come from public acquiescence in the officer holding without performing the precedent conditions, or holding over under claim of right after his legal right has been terminated; or possibly from public acquiescence alone when accompanied by such circumstances of official reputation as are calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke official action on the supposition that the person claiming the office is what he assumes to be. An intruder is one who attempts to perform the duties of an office without authority of law, and without the support of public acquiescence. No one is under obligation to recognise or respect the acts of an intruder, and for all legal purposes they are absolutely void. But for the sake of order and regularity, and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in security of private rights, the acts of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose by the State or by some one claiming the office de jure, or except when the person himself attempts to build up some right, or claim some privilege or emolument, by reason of being the officer which he claims to be. In all other cases the acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of third parties. There is an important principle, which finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of officers de facto cannot be questioned collaterally."

We do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel that the de facto doctrine is subject to the limitation that the defect in the title of the judge to the office should not be one traceable to the violation of a constitutional provision. The contravention of a constitutional provision may invalidate an appointment but we are not concerned with that. We are concerned with the effect of the invalidation upon the acts done by the judge whose appointment has been invalidated. The de facto doctrine saves such Acts. The de facto doctrine is not a stranger to the Constitution or to the Parliament and the Legislatures of the States. Art. 71(2) of the Constitution provides that acts done by the President or Vice President of India in the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office shall not be invalidated by reason of the election of a person as President or Vice President being declared void. So also Sec. 107(2) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 (Act 43 of 1951) provides that acts and proceedings in which a person has participated as a Member of Parliament or a Member of the Legislature of a State shall not be invalidated by reason of the election of such person being declared to be void. There are innumerable other Parliamentary and State Legislative enactments which are replete with such provisions. The Twentieth Amendment of the Constitution is an instance where the de facto doctrine was applied by the Constituent body to remove any suspicion or taint of illegality, or invalidity that may be argued to have attached itself to judgment, decrees sentences or orders passed or made by certain District Judges appointed before 1966, otherwise than in accordance with the provision of Art. 233 and Art 235 of the Constitution. The Twentieth Amendment was the consequence of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., that appointments of District Judges made otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Arts. 233 and 235 were invalid. As such appointments had been made in many States, in order to preempt mushroom litigation springing up all over the country, it was apparently thought desirable that the precise position should be stated by the Constituent body by amending the Constitution. Shri Phadke, learned counsel for the appellants, argued that the constituent body could not be imputed with the intention of making superfluous amendments to the Constitution. Shri Phadke invited us to say that it was a necessary inference from the Twentieth Amendment of the Constitution that, but for the amendment, the judgments, decrees etc. of the District Judges appointed otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Art. 233 would be void. We do not think that the inference suggested by Shri Phadke is a necessary inference. It is true that as a general rule the Parliament may be presumed not to make superfluous legislation. The presumption is not a strong presumption and statutes are full of provisions introduced because abundans cautela non nocet (there is no harm in being cautious). When judicial pronouncements have already declared the law on the subject, the statutory reiteration of the law with reference to the particular cases does not lead to the necessary inference that the law declared by the judicial pronouncements was not thought to apply to the particular cases but may also lead to the inference that the statute-making body was mindful of the real state of the law but was acting under the influence of excessive caution and so to silence the voices of doubting Thomases by declaring the law declared by judicial pronouncements to be applicable also to the particular cases. In Chandra Mohan' case (Supra) this Court held that appointments of District Judges made otherwise than in accordance with Art. 233 of the Constitution were invalid. Such appointments had been made in Uttar Pradesh and a few other States. Doubts had been cast upon the validity of the judgments, decrees etc. pronounced by those District Judges and large litigation had cropped up. It was to clear those doubts and not to alter the law that the Twentieth Amendment of the Constitution was made. This is clear from the statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill which was passed as Constitution (20th Amendment) Act. 1966. The statement said: