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21. The fact that the owner of the property and her husband had shifted /migrated to Bangkok, Thailand is not at all in dispute. The defendant admits this in his written statement (paras 4.2 and 4.8) by making the averment that after creating the said tenancy the landlady shifted to Bangkok and she started to reside out of India. That apart, the defendant himself placed on record an original returned envelope posted by Advocate Mr. Parijat Sinha addressed to Smt. Phoolawanti w/o Mr. Surjit Singh Ghogar r/o 12 Soi Lookkhet, Lane No. 29, Bangkok, Thailand. Further, the defendant also placed on record a letter dt. 27.01.1996 addressed by Advocate Mr. Parijat Sinha to Smt. Phoolawanti w/o Mr. Surjit Singh Ghogar r/o 12 Soi Lookkhet, Lane No. 29, Bangkok, Thailand. Further, there is yet another document filed by the defendant, which is copy of a letter dt. 28.02.1995 addressed by Advocate Kawal Nain to Advocate Mr. Sunanda Roy thereby informing the latter, inter alia, that Mrs. Phoolawanti had not passed away. This document, filed by the defendant himself, at the third page thereof would show that landlady/owner had appended her signature as 'Phoola Wanti'. This document (para 1) reflects the address of 'Mrs. Phool Wanti' as 12 Soi Lookkhet, Lane No. 29, Bangkok, Thailand. That apart, on record there is a reply dt. 21.09.1987 written by Mr. A.N. Sinha addressed to 'Sardar Surjit Singh Goghar', 160, Shampangh Street, Bangkok, Thailand and a bare perusal thereof would reflect that this reply was in response to the termination notice dt. 11.09.1987 (Ex. P-3). Defendant (DW1) in his cross-examination admits that his father had indeed replied to the termination notice Ex. P-3, but he was unaware of the contents thereof. The bottom line of this is that the pleadings, evidence, several correspondences and the other documents on record unimpeachably show beyond any shadow of doubt that the landlady/owner of the property as also her husband had migrated/shifted to Bangkok, Thailand and were residing there. On this aspect, there is no dispute whatsoever from either of the sides. Now, this is a very important circumstance in the background of the fact that the plaintiff himself is a resident of Bangkok having shifted there with his parents when he was hardly 05 years old, as stated by him in his cross-examination; and further that the plaintiff, a resident of Bangkok, consistently shows his parents' names (who too had shifted to Bangkok), which are phonetically similar to that being propounded by the defendant (and as per the defendant too the owner and her husband had shifted to Bangkok after making the tenancy in Mr. A.N. Sinha's favour).

43. It was argued that by conduct and by implication a fresh tenancy came into existence in defendant's favour. It was argued that three rent receipts Ex. DW1/4, Ex. DW1/7 and Ex. DW1/9 coupled with three rent bills Ex. DW1/3, Ex. DW1/6 and Ex. DW1/10 and letter dt. 04.09.1993 Ex. DW1/1, all issued by Mr. R.P. Lakra, are consistently using the terms 'rent', 'rent receipt', 'rent bill' and 'tenant' and thus by necessary implication there was creation of fresh tenancy in defendant's favour by conduct and by implication. This Court is not inclined to accept this line of argument. Firstly, the moot question is whether Mr. R.P. Lakra, being a attorney, was authorized to transfer an interest in immovable property of the owner. I find no such evidence on record. There is no such pleading to this effect. The defendant has not led in evidence any material, much less pleaded, to show that Mr. R.P. Lakra, being the attorney, had the authority to transfer an interest in immovable property of the owner. Rather, averments in paras 4.5, 4.7 and 6.3 of the amended written statement would suggest that Mr. R.P. Lakra had the authority to 'collect' the monies described as 'rent', but not to travel to the extent of creating transfer of an interest in the immovable property. Further, para 4.8 of amended written statement would suggest that 'creation' of tenancy or transfer of interest in immovable property was within the domain of the owner and not the attorney. Assertions in defendant's evidence by way of affidavit would also show that Mr. R.P. Lakra's authority was to 'collect' monies paid as 'rent' and not to create transfer of an interest in immovable property of owner. It may be mentioned here that the defendant was given a suggestion in his cross-examination that Mr. R.P. Lakra had no authority from the owner to permit him to continue as tenant, and which suggestion he of course denied. There is another letter dt. 27.01.1996 filed on record by the defendant addressed to Ms. Phoolawanti at Thailand. In this letter, Advocate Mr. Parijat Sinha writes to Ms. Phoolawanti to clarify whether Mr. R.P. Lakra still continues as her attorney. Therein he further informs her that 'upon hearing from you in this matter, I shall be happy to further inform you about the details of the nature of representations made by said Mr. Lakra on and for your behalf'. It is apparent that by way of this letter it was being complained to the owner that her attorney was exceeding his authority, brief and limits. The inference that one gets from this is that he transgressing his authority, may be to illegally 'transfer' owner's interest in the immovable property to someone else. An attorney without a specific authority to transfer an interest in immovable property of an owner cannot do so. The point therefore is that it only goes to show that the authority of attorney Mr. R. P. Lakra was limited and not over- expansive and extensive. The onus is squarely upon the defendant to show and prove by way of positive evidence that to begin with the authority of attorney Mr. R.P. Lakra was extensive and over-expansive to the point of transferring an interest in immovable property. The defendant has miserably failed to prove this. There is another reason to doubt this assertion of the defendant. It is an admitted fact that vide letter dt. 11.09.1987 (Ex. P-3) the owner had served a notice of termination upon Mr. A.N. Sinha. Given this background, it is doubtful whether the owner would have entered into a fresh contract for a fresh tenancy in favour of a new tenant in August, 1992 and that too at a measly sum of Rs. 600/- per month. Furthermore, in the letter dt. 28.02.1995 (Ex. P-4) the owner does not refer to the defendant as a tenant. Therein, she had made it clear that the defendant had no right, interest and/or any claim in the property and that the owner reserved her right for his ejectment. If this was the express intent of the owner in the notice dt. 11.09.1987 (Ex. P-3) and the letter dt. 28.02.1995 (Ex. P-4), then it is difficult to comprehend as to how the defendant claims that there had been creation of a fresh tenancy in his favour with the consent of the owner/landlady. Next, the statements of the defendant himself on this aspect are mutually destructive and contradictory. In para 4 of his original written statement the defendant had stated that after his father's demise, tenancy 'devolved upon his mother'. However, in para 4.2 of his amended written statement, he asserted that after his father's demise, it was he (defendant) who 'continued as a tenant' with consent of the landlady. Next, in para 6.2 of his amended written statement, he takes yet another turn and avers that the tenancy 'devolved' upon his mother and that she continued as tenant till her demise. Thereafter, in para no. 6.4A of his amended written statement he claims that he got the tenancy by way of 'succession' with the consent of the owner. In para no. 3 of his evidence by way of affidavit, he claims that after the demise of his parents he 'continued as tenant' in the property with the consent of the landlord. Therefore, it is to be noted that on the one hand the defendant claims 'continuance of tenancy' in his favour after his father's demise and in the same breathe he asserts that after his father's demise tenancy 'devolved' upon his mother. These contradictory pleas cannot go hand in hand. It only goes to show that the defendant himself is not clear as to when did he become the tenant. He is not clear as to whether the so-called fresh tenancy in his favour allegedly with owner's consent was done after his father's demise or after his mother's demise. There is one more aspect to be noted which is significant. The defendant in his averments claims 'continuance' of tenancy and also 'succession' of tenancy in his favour and not 'creation of a fresh tenancy' in his favour. Thus, in the face of his own averments in pleadings and evidence, how can the defendant possibly argue that there was creation of fresh tenancy in his favour. The crux of this is that own pleas of the defendant about creation of new tenancy in his favour are contradictory and mutually destructive. There is one more reason to turn down this plea of creation of fresh tenancy. The defendant in his original written statement and in his amended written statement claimed that the suit was 'hopelessly barred by limitation' as late Phoolawanti died 'long before 1995'. In addition, as per him, the lis was also barred by limitation for having been filed after the statutory period of limitation from the alleged date of cause of action i.e. from the date of death of Smt. Rani Sinha. The suit came to be filed on 29.09.2007. If it is the stand of the defendant that the plaintiff cannot get back possession of the property for having come to the Court after more than 12 years of 'long before 1995', then the only inference that can be drawn is that he is indirectly and impliedly taking the plea of adverse possession. If it is further the stand of the defendant that the plaintiff cannot get back possession of the property for having come to the Court after more than 12 years of demise of Smt. Rani Sinha on 31.07.1992, then the inference that can be drawn is that he is indirectly and impliedly taking the plea of adverse possession. A person who claims himself to be a tenant may not take the plea of adverse possession qua the tenanted premises. These two pleas are mutually destructive. Once, a tenant starts taking plea of ownership by adverse possession, his tenancy must be taken to be no longer existing. For these multiple reasons, it is held that defendant has miserably failed to prove creation of a fresh tenancy with the consent of the owner either express or implied or by conduct. As already observed, under the law, mere description of money as 'rent' paid and accepted for occupation of property against 'rent receipts' will not ipso facto mean creation of a new tenancy. A person claiming tenancy in his favour will have to show something more than that. He would have to show in the first place that there was a contract with the owner for transfer of an interest in his favour in the immovable property. On the given facts and the evidence, this Court holds that after the demise of successor Smt. Rani Sinha on 31.07.1992, there was no creation of any fresh tenancy in favour of the defendant.

45. The aforesaid is extract of the reply dt. 28.02.1995 of the owner through her Advocate. I have also gone the entire reply dt. 28.02.1995. Where is the admission in this entire reply on the part of the owner that the defendant was a 'tenant'? I am unable to trace any. In this entire reply dt. 28.02.1995 the defendant has nowhere been referred to as a 'tenant'. This reply nowhere says that what was paid was 'rent'. This reply nowhere says that the owner stood in the position of 'landlady' vis-à-vis the defendant. In this entire reply, the owner is nowhere described as a 'landlady'. This reply nowhere states that the premises in question was 'tenanted' or 'demised', or for that matter 'tenanted' or 'demised' in defendant's favour. On the contrary, the aforesaid extract of the reply dt. 28.02.1995 would positively show that owner had stated in clear terms that defendant had no right, interest and/or any claim in respect of the abovesaid premises and she (owner) reserved her right to take all appropriate proceedings against him for his ejectment. In the reply it was, no doubt, stated that defendant was paying 'money', but as already stated, under the law, mere payment and acceptance of money would not suffice to establish landlord-tenant relationship. Fourthly, even assuming for the sake of mere arguments that in the reply dt. 28.02.1995, tenancy of the defendant and the factum of defendant paying rent was not disputed, then in that event was it not incumbent upon him to pay the rentals. Relationship of landlord-tenant necessarily entails 'rent'. The defendant takes the stand that he stopped paying the rentals thereafter for the reason that Mr. R.P. Lakra thereafter never returned to collect or demand the rentals. If Mr. R.P. Lakra did not return to collect or demand the rentals, should the defendant not have then deposited the same with the Rent Controller under section 27, Delhi Rent Control Act? The defendant claims protection of Delhi Rent Control Act, but does not bother to fulfill the obligations upon him as enjoined by the same. He has paid not a single farthing for the last more than 23 years. Relevant would it be to mention here that defendant's Advocate Mr. Parijat Sinha in his letter dt. 16.10.1993 (Mark A), letter dt. 27.11.1993 (Mark B) and letter dt. 17.01.1993 (Mark C) wrote to Mr. R.P. Lakra that if he did not receive the rent receipt he would be 'constrained to deposit further amounts towards rent in the Court of the Rent Controller'. The defendant, after the owner's reply dt. 28.02.1995 (Ex. P-4), adopted an ostrich like approach by not paying any money for occupation of the premises in his own wisdom for the reason that that he had 'reliably learnt' that she had died long before 1995 and the reply dt. 28.02.1995 did not 'satisfy' that she was alive and further that he was of the 'unimpeachable conclusion' that she already died long before 1995.

46. Defendant's assertions in his pleadings that landlady/owner had died 'long before 1995' and the reply dt. 28.02.1995 (Ex. P-4) from her side that she was still alive did not 'satisfy' him and he was still of the 'unimpeachable conclusion' that she had already died long before 1995 is a false one and a tissue of lie. Firstly, this is false from the own document of the defendant. Defendant placed on record copy of letter dt. 27.01.1996 written by Advocate Parijat Sinha directly to Smt. Phoolawanti at Bangkok, Thailand to let him know as to whether Mr. R.P. Lakra continued to be his 'General Attorney' and further that he would happy to let her know the nature of representations which Mr. R.P. Lakra was making on and for her behalf. If indeed the owner had died long before 1995 and even the reply dt. 28.02.1995 (Ex. P-4) did not satisfy him, then why was such a letter dt. 27.01.1996 written to her, who was already a dead person in defendant's world-view. What is surprising is that a 'dead person' was being asked as to whether her General Attorney continues to be so. Secondly, letter dt. 17.02.1995 (Ex. P-1) issued to Mr. R.P. Lakra wherein such an assertion was made about her demise was based on some 'reliable information'. From where did the defendant get this 'reliable information', is not stated. Thirdly, it is a piece of hearsay evidence being barred by sections 59 and 60, Evidence Act. Fourthly, the defendant discloses no date and place of her demise. In the letter dt. 17.02.1995 (Ex. P-1) the defendant makes no mention of her date of demise. He neither states therein that he had died 'long before 1995'. Fifthly, the plaintiff comes with a positive assertion of fact that his mother passed away on 01.05.1997. And lastly, way back in 1995 how other than writing that she was still alive could she have let the defendant know. She could not have video-called the defendant in 1995 to furnish proof to him that she was still in this world. Defendant' self-serving ipse dixit which are entirely vague, false and based on some unknown 'reliable information' cannot be accepted.