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12. The defendant denies that plaintiff is the owner of the property. He states that mutation of plaintiff's name in the municipal records and execution of conveyance deed in his name by the DDA are outcomes of misrepresentations and thus nullity in the eyes of law. He further denies that plaintiff's mother 'Phoolawanti w/o Sarjit Singh' acquired the property by way of conveyance deed dt. 20.08.1952. He states that late 'Phoolawanti w/o Surjit Singh Ghogar' owned the property and she had inducted his father as a tenant. He avers that his father's tenancy could not have been terminated vide notice dt. 11.09.1987 in view of the protection available under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 irrespective of whether his father had passed away within two months of the said notice or not. According to him, the tenancy then devolved upon his mother, who rightfully and legally continued as tenant qua the demised premises and as such question of his mother being 'allowed' to continue and occupy the tenanted premises till her demise does not arise. He also states that in terms of the settled law tenancy devolves by succession and in the instant case it devolved upon him (defendant) with the consent of the owner of the said premises/property. He denies that he has been in illegal possession of the premises and that he is liable to pay any occupation charges thereof. He states that in view of his being away from Delhi due to his employment/job, after his father's demise, his father's junior advocate Mr. P. Sinha started to look after the premises. He denies that the premises have been put to use for commercial purpose. He also denies that his landlady passed away on 01.05.1997. According to him, his landlady had passed away much earlier in year 1995. He states that plaintiff had no authority to issue the notice dt. 22.03.2007 as he had nothing to do with the property in question. He goes on to state that an employee of Mr. P. Sinha had apparently received the said notice, which was not a valid notice of termination. He states that plaintiff and his alleged sister are strangers to the property and as such there is no question of them recognizing him as their tenant. He also denies that the tenancy after 31.07.1992 became illegal. He avers that the alleged act of Indian Bank vacating a portion of the property does not prove his title. He refutes plaintiff's assertions that he is suffering loss to tune of Rs. 30,000/- per month. He seeks dismissal of the suit.

43. It was argued that by conduct and by implication a fresh tenancy came into existence in defendant's favour. It was argued that three rent receipts Ex. DW1/4, Ex. DW1/7 and Ex. DW1/9 coupled with three rent bills Ex. DW1/3, Ex. DW1/6 and Ex. DW1/10 and letter dt. 04.09.1993 Ex. DW1/1, all issued by Mr. R.P. Lakra, are consistently using the terms 'rent', 'rent receipt', 'rent bill' and 'tenant' and thus by necessary implication there was creation of fresh tenancy in defendant's favour by conduct and by implication. This Court is not inclined to accept this line of argument. Firstly, the moot question is whether Mr. R.P. Lakra, being a attorney, was authorized to transfer an interest in immovable property of the owner. I find no such evidence on record. There is no such pleading to this effect. The defendant has not led in evidence any material, much less pleaded, to show that Mr. R.P. Lakra, being the attorney, had the authority to transfer an interest in immovable property of the owner. Rather, averments in paras 4.5, 4.7 and 6.3 of the amended written statement would suggest that Mr. R.P. Lakra had the authority to 'collect' the monies described as 'rent', but not to travel to the extent of creating transfer of an interest in the immovable property. Further, para 4.8 of amended written statement would suggest that 'creation' of tenancy or transfer of interest in immovable property was within the domain of the owner and not the attorney. Assertions in defendant's evidence by way of affidavit would also show that Mr. R.P. Lakra's authority was to 'collect' monies paid as 'rent' and not to create transfer of an interest in immovable property of owner. It may be mentioned here that the defendant was given a suggestion in his cross-examination that Mr. R.P. Lakra had no authority from the owner to permit him to continue as tenant, and which suggestion he of course denied. There is another letter dt. 27.01.1996 filed on record by the defendant addressed to Ms. Phoolawanti at Thailand. In this letter, Advocate Mr. Parijat Sinha writes to Ms. Phoolawanti to clarify whether Mr. R.P. Lakra still continues as her attorney. Therein he further informs her that 'upon hearing from you in this matter, I shall be happy to further inform you about the details of the nature of representations made by said Mr. Lakra on and for your behalf'. It is apparent that by way of this letter it was being complained to the owner that her attorney was exceeding his authority, brief and limits. The inference that one gets from this is that he transgressing his authority, may be to illegally 'transfer' owner's interest in the immovable property to someone else. An attorney without a specific authority to transfer an interest in immovable property of an owner cannot do so. The point therefore is that it only goes to show that the authority of attorney Mr. R. P. Lakra was limited and not over- expansive and extensive. The onus is squarely upon the defendant to show and prove by way of positive evidence that to begin with the authority of attorney Mr. R.P. Lakra was extensive and over-expansive to the point of transferring an interest in immovable property. The defendant has miserably failed to prove this. There is another reason to doubt this assertion of the defendant. It is an admitted fact that vide letter dt. 11.09.1987 (Ex. P-3) the owner had served a notice of termination upon Mr. A.N. Sinha. Given this background, it is doubtful whether the owner would have entered into a fresh contract for a fresh tenancy in favour of a new tenant in August, 1992 and that too at a measly sum of Rs. 600/- per month. Furthermore, in the letter dt. 28.02.1995 (Ex. P-4) the owner does not refer to the defendant as a tenant. Therein, she had made it clear that the defendant had no right, interest and/or any claim in the property and that the owner reserved her right for his ejectment. If this was the express intent of the owner in the notice dt. 11.09.1987 (Ex. P-3) and the letter dt. 28.02.1995 (Ex. P-4), then it is difficult to comprehend as to how the defendant claims that there had been creation of a fresh tenancy in his favour with the consent of the owner/landlady. Next, the statements of the defendant himself on this aspect are mutually destructive and contradictory. In para 4 of his original written statement the defendant had stated that after his father's demise, tenancy 'devolved upon his mother'. However, in para 4.2 of his amended written statement, he asserted that after his father's demise, it was he (defendant) who 'continued as a tenant' with consent of the landlady. Next, in para 6.2 of his amended written statement, he takes yet another turn and avers that the tenancy 'devolved' upon his mother and that she continued as tenant till her demise. Thereafter, in para no. 6.4A of his amended written statement he claims that he got the tenancy by way of 'succession' with the consent of the owner. In para no. 3 of his evidence by way of affidavit, he claims that after the demise of his parents he 'continued as tenant' in the property with the consent of the landlord. Therefore, it is to be noted that on the one hand the defendant claims 'continuance of tenancy' in his favour after his father's demise and in the same breathe he asserts that after his father's demise tenancy 'devolved' upon his mother. These contradictory pleas cannot go hand in hand. It only goes to show that the defendant himself is not clear as to when did he become the tenant. He is not clear as to whether the so-called fresh tenancy in his favour allegedly with owner's consent was done after his father's demise or after his mother's demise. There is one more aspect to be noted which is significant. The defendant in his averments claims 'continuance' of tenancy and also 'succession' of tenancy in his favour and not 'creation of a fresh tenancy' in his favour. Thus, in the face of his own averments in pleadings and evidence, how can the defendant possibly argue that there was creation of fresh tenancy in his favour. The crux of this is that own pleas of the defendant about creation of new tenancy in his favour are contradictory and mutually destructive. There is one more reason to turn down this plea of creation of fresh tenancy. The defendant in his original written statement and in his amended written statement claimed that the suit was 'hopelessly barred by limitation' as late Phoolawanti died 'long before 1995'. In addition, as per him, the lis was also barred by limitation for having been filed after the statutory period of limitation from the alleged date of cause of action i.e. from the date of death of Smt. Rani Sinha. The suit came to be filed on 29.09.2007. If it is the stand of the defendant that the plaintiff cannot get back possession of the property for having come to the Court after more than 12 years of 'long before 1995', then the only inference that can be drawn is that he is indirectly and impliedly taking the plea of adverse possession. If it is further the stand of the defendant that the plaintiff cannot get back possession of the property for having come to the Court after more than 12 years of demise of Smt. Rani Sinha on 31.07.1992, then the inference that can be drawn is that he is indirectly and impliedly taking the plea of adverse possession. A person who claims himself to be a tenant may not take the plea of adverse possession qua the tenanted premises. These two pleas are mutually destructive. Once, a tenant starts taking plea of ownership by adverse possession, his tenancy must be taken to be no longer existing. For these multiple reasons, it is held that defendant has miserably failed to prove creation of a fresh tenancy with the consent of the owner either express or implied or by conduct. As already observed, under the law, mere description of money as 'rent' paid and accepted for occupation of property against 'rent receipts' will not ipso facto mean creation of a new tenancy. A person claiming tenancy in his favour will have to show something more than that. He would have to show in the first place that there was a contract with the owner for transfer of an interest in his favour in the immovable property. On the given facts and the evidence, this Court holds that after the demise of successor Smt. Rani Sinha on 31.07.1992, there was no creation of any fresh tenancy in favour of the defendant.