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14. The question to be considered is, as to whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC being barred by limitation as the contention of the defendants is that according to the averments made by the plaintiffs themselves the cause of action accrued to them on 29.03.1996 when the agreement to sell was executed and in any case it was stated to have arisen in their favour on 02.04.1999 on account of the death of Late Shri Joginder Nath Bharadwaj. Though reference is made to the date 2.1.2009, the day they are allegedly dispossessed and the date 5.2.2009 when they contend that the defendants were puncturing the terrace. It has been contended that as a matter of fact the plaintiffs are seeking specific performance of an agreement dated 29.03.1996 on the basis of which they are purported to have purchased the property. Supporting documents dated 11.06.1996 are relied upon by them for this purpose. It has been contended that admittedly the plaintiffs are not in possession and the suit has been filed after an expiry of 13 ½ years by camouflaging the present suit for specific performance as a suit for declaration while as they ought to have filed a suit for specific performance within 3 years of accrual of the cause of action. It has been further contended that even if it is assumed that the present suit for declaration could be filed, the suit is not maintainable because in effect they ought to have claimed the consequential relief of specific performance, as they do not have the title to the property and they will have to first perfect the same. Reference is made to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act which lays down that a suit for declaration would not be maintainable if a party omits to claim the consequential relief. It is contended that even a suit for declaration is to be filed within three years and in case the plaintiffs are claiming to have become owner on the basis of the Will made by Late Shri Joginder Nath Bharadwaj which was duly registered even then the declaration ought to have been sought within three years.

26. A reading of the aforesaid two provisions together would clearly show that no right or title or interest in any immovable property passed on to the purchaser until and unless the document is duly registered. In the instant case, the plaintiffs of their own admission have stated that they have purchased the terrace of the first floor vide agreement to sell dated 29.03.1996 which is not a registered document. First of all, the said document in question is an agreement to sell and not a sale document as is sought to be claimed by the plaintiffs. Even if it is assumed to be a sale document, as it has been contended by the plaintiffs, even then the document being an unregistered document cannot be taken cognizance of, therefore, the contention which is sought to be made by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that there is a distinction between the sale and the mode of sale may be right but the fact remain that the right or title or interest in the immovable property does not pass on to the plaintiffs until and unless they seek specific performance of the said agreement on the basis of the aforesaid documents. Further, according to Article 54 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, the said suit for specific performance is to be filed within three years from the date of accrual of cause of action or within three years from the date of refusal by the defendants to perfect the title of the plaintiffs. While as in the instant case, the suit is filed for declaration to the effect that they should be declared owners. Plaintiffs cannot be declared as owners on the basis of an inchoate title to the property. The plaintiffs are admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Even if it is assumed that the plaintiffs have not filed the suit for specific performance they ought to have claimed consequential relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act wherein they were seeking declaration by claiming that the defendants be directed to perfect their title by execution of certain documents in terms of Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act pertaining to sale and mode of sale and by getting them registered under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, 1908 but this has not been done. The plaintiffs have actually camouflaged the present suit to overcome the bar of limitation which admittedly in a suit for specific performance under Article 54 of the Limitation Act is three years. If it is taken to be a suit for declaration even then the period of limitation is three years which is to be reckoned, when the right to sue first accrues. The plaintiffs of their own admission have stated that the right to sue first accrued on 29.3.1996 and therefore, the said period of three years comes to an end in 1999. According to Section 9 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation cannot be stopped once it starts running. Therefore, the period of limitation for seeking declaration is not to be reckoned from 2.1.2009 or 5.2.2009 as claimed by the plaintiffs. So far as the question of possession is concerned, it is only a consequential relief to the declaration or specific performance which the plaintiffs have failed to claim within the period of limitation of three years, reckoning either from 29.3.1996 or 11.6.1996 or 2.4.1999 and hence the suit, on the meaningful reading of the entire plaint, is barred by limitation both under Article 54 or 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

43. I have gone through this judgment also and I do not feel that the said judgment supports the plaintiffs case in any manner. The defence of the defendants in the present case has not been considered at all. The averments made in the plaint having been taken to be correct and the question as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not has been discussed from all possible angles with reference to Article 54 for Specific performance and declaration under Article 58. So far as the question of possession is concerned, no doubt the Article 65 envisages that the same can be claimed within 12 years but the possession in the present case is only a consequential relief and admittedly the plaintiffs are not in possession as on the date of the filing of the suit according to their own averments, therefore, the period of limitation of 12 years does not help the plaintiffs so as to bring the suit for declaration within the period of limitation as is sought to be done by the plaintiffs. Similarly, I have gone through the judgments in the case title Seshumull M. Shah Vs. Saye Abdul Rashid & Ors AIR 1991 Karnataka 273 and Roop Lal Sathi Vs. Machhattar Singh Gill (1982) 3 SCC 487, the same also does not help the plaintiffs in any manner whatsoever. The plaintiff‟s plaint has not been rejected in part, it has been rejected in its entirety.

(v) The plaintiffs, themselves have stated in para 18 that the cause of action accrued to them on 29.03.1996 firstly and secondly on 02.04.1999 and if the period of limitation is to be reckoned from either of the two dates the said period of limitation has come to an end long back on 01.4.2002 in both the cases of specific performance and declaration.

(vi) It is correct that according to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for filing the suit for possession is 12 years but for filing a suit for possession the plaintiffs must have a title to the property which admittedly according to their own averments there is none as there is inchoate title. They are seeking declaration which as a matter of fact is also not sustainable as they ought to have filed a suit for specific performance.