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(xi) that the respondent UCO Bank, claiming that it was entitled to the balance amount also from the Central Government, impleaded the UOI also as a party before the DRT;

(xi) that the DRT, in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court in ONGC Vs. CCE (2004) 6 SCC 437, ONGC Vs. CCE 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 541 and ONGC Vs. City & Industrial Development Corporation Maharashtra Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 39 and being of the view that the dispute was between the nationalised UCO Bank on the one hand and UOI on the other hand, referred them to the Permanent Machinery of Arbitration (PMA) for settlement of commercial disputes between public sector enterprises inter se and public sector enterprises and government departments;

(xiii) that the respondent UCO Bank filed a claim petition dated 17th November, 2011 before the PMA, showing the UOI (instead of the appellant) and the earlier owner Company as respondents thereto, for recovery of the balance amount of Rs.1,03,76,04,149.47 paise claimed to be due to it, jointly and severally from the UOI and the earlier owner Company;

(xiv). the appellant, on receiving the notice/order dated 17th October, 2011 supra, filed an application before the Arbitrator aforesaid contending that the arbitration proceedings against it were not maintainable and seeking withdrawal of the order / notice dated 17th October, 2011 and discontinuance of the arbitral proceedings pleading, a) that the appellant was under the control of an independent Board of Directors and was not a Government department; b) that the arbitral proceedings were not based on any statute or consent; c) that the PMA was constituted on the basis of the mandate of the Supreme Court in the judgments aforesaid but which mandate had been withdrawn in subsequent judgment in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2011) 3 SCC 404 of a date before the order / notice dated 17th October, 2011; d) that the arbitral proceedings were thus without jurisdiction and legal sanctity; e) that there was no arbitration agreement between the respondent UCO Bank and the appellant and which was a prerequisite for arbitration even before the PMA; f) that the said arbitration proceedings deprived the appellant from access to the ordinary Courts of the land; g) that the claim of UCO Bank related to pre-takeover dues and which as per the Act aforesaid was not the liability of the appellant; h) that the UCO Bank had already approached and obtained the amount due to it for the post-takeover period from the Commissioner of Payments under the said Act; and, i) that the appellant was a sick industrial company within the meaning of The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985;

(f) that the appellant being a Central Public Sector Enterprise, its consent was not necessary for initiation of arbitration proceedings under the PMA scheme;

(g) that the question whether the appellant was liable for the debts of "Sita Ram Mills Ltd." or not was a mixed question of fact and law and could not be determined without looking into various factual and legal aspects including interpretation of the Act aforesaid;

(h) that though the PMA mechanism excluded the applicability of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 but the principles thereof would apply and the Arbitral Tribunal under the PMA was thus entitled to ascertain both, the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement; reliance in this regard was placed on National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Bhogra Polyfab Private Limited (2009) 1 SCC 267 and SBP & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618;

23. We may notice that it is also the contention of the senior counsel for the appellant that the claim against the earlier owner Company, before the PMA is not maintainable. However, the appellant has no locus to take the said plea, particularly when we have on the basis of the provisions of the Act and admission of the respondent UCO Bank found the appellant to be not liable.

24. Though the Supreme Court as well as this Court have, in the context of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, held writ petitions to be not available but the learned Single Judge has held the arbitration before the PMA to be not governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. That finding is not challenged before us. The only alternative remedy of the appellant in such circumstances could be of a suit. However in the face of the admitted facts and the statutory provisions, it is not deemed appropriate to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 and to relegate the appellant to a civil suit. No objection to maintainability of writ petition appears to have been taken before the learned Single Judge also.