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Re: Arms Act, 1959 Referring at this stage to Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 it appears that the statutory provision provides for a definite punishment for a definite offence : to wit, user of any prohibited arms, which results in the death of another person and in that event the Statute has been categorical enough to prescribe that user shall be punishable with death. There are thus two specific requirements of the Statute in order to bring home the guilt of the accused within the meaning of Section 27(3) : the requirements being (a) user of a prohibited arm; and (b) resultant death of a person by reason of such user. Incidentally, prohibited arms as defined under Section 2 (1) (i) of the Arms Act means -

Rule 3 of the Arms Rules, 1962 prescribes that for the purposes of the Arms Act, 1959 and the Rules, "arms" and "ammunition" shall be of the categories specified in Columns 2 and 3 respectively of Schedule 1.

The relevant extract of Schedule 1 stands as under:

SCHEDULE 1 Category Arms Ammunition
(a) Prohibited arms as defined Prohibited arms as defined in Section 2(1) (i) and other in Section 2(1)(h) and such arms as the Central other articles as the Central Government may, by Government may, by Notification in the official Notification in the official Gazette specify to be Gazette, specify to be prohibited arms. prohibited ammunition.

Be that as it may apropos the Statement of Objects and Reasons and having felt the necessity of considering the same by reason of the factum of introduction of deterrent punishment for offences relating to prohibited arms and ammunitions and to meet the challenges from anti-national elements, we do feel it expedient to note the same in extenso.

"Statement of Objects and Reasons of Arms (Amendment) Act, 42 of 1988 The Arms Act, 1959, had been amended to provide for enhanced escalating terrorist and anti-national activities. However, it was reported that terrorist and anti-national elements, particularly in Punjab, had in the recent past acquired automatic firearms, machine guns of various types, rockets and rocket launchers. Although the definitions of the expressions "arms", "ammunitions", "prohibited arms" and "prohibited ammunitions" included in the Act are adequate to cover the aforesaid lethal weapons in the matter of punishments for offences relating to arms, the Act did not make any distinction between offences involving ordinary arms and the more lethal prohibited arms and prohibited ammunitions. Further, while the Act provided for punishment of persons in possession of arms and ammunition with intent to use them for any unlawful purpose, it did not provide for any penalties for the actual use of illegal arms. To overcome these deficiencies, it was proposed to amend the Act by providing for deterrent punishment for offences relating to prohibited arms and ammunition and for the illegal use of firearms and ammunition so as to effectively meet the challenges from the terrorist and anti-national elements. Accordingly, the Arms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1988, was promulgated by the President on the 27th May, 1988."

The High Court on this score stated :

"On a fair interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Arms Act; the rules made thereunder; the relevant schedule and in the light of the above letter, we are of the opinion that Articles 19 and 20, seized from the accused are prohibited arms within the meaning of Arms Act, 1959 and hence Section 27(3) thereof is squarely attracted to the facts of the present case."

The submission of the State, however, has been that the note issued by the Central Government as noticed above, ought to be treated as an authorisation within the meaning of the first schedule to the Statute. Mr. Ranjit Kumar vis-a-vis the note had a two pronged attack on the score : On the first count, it has been contended that the note pertaining to the 9 mm pistol and .38 bore imported revolver stands out to be prohibited for the purposes of importation only, as such the general definition as regards the prohibited weapons would not in any way thus stand attracted and hence the note to be treated as an instruction and not a notification, thus does not authorise a punishment under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. We find, however, that there is some justification in such a contention but the second count is rather important inasmuch as the requirement of the Statute is the issuance of a notification. Notification in common English acceptation mean and imply a formal announcement of a legally relevant fact and in the event of a Statute speaking of a Notification being published in the Official Gazette, the same cannot but mean a Notification published by the authority of law in the Official Gazette. It is on formal declaration and publication of an order and shall have to be in accordance with the declared policies or in the event the requirement of the Statute then in that event in accordance therewith. It is on this score the observations of this Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Charanjit S. Gill & Ors. (2000 (5) SCC 742) may be of some relevance. This Court while dealing with the Army Act, 1950 and the Court Martials thereunder observed that the "Notes" have been issued by the authorities of the Armed Forces for the guidance of the officers connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Act and the Rules and not with the object of supplementing or superseding the statutory Rules by administrative instructions thus more or less on similar situation as is presently under consideration since the "Note" cannot but be termed to be an administrative instruction. This Court in Charanjit S. Gill (supra) on the basis of the aforesaid stated that the administrative instructions issued or the notes attached to the Rules which are not referable to any statutory authority cannot be permitted to bring about a result which may take away the rights vested in a person governed by the Act we do record our concurrence with such a statement since in our view question of issuance of an administrative order or a note pertaining to special type of weapons to bring it within the ambit of the Arms Act which was hitherto not being included therein cannot be said to be included in the manner as it has sought to have been so done. Section 27(3) of the Arms Act prescribes a death penalty in the event the arm or weapon concerned stands out to be a prohibited arm, user of which results in a death a rather stringent provision. A person, howsoever graver the offence may be, cannot be punished more than as is prescribed under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. On a comparative analysis of Section 302, there is some amount of laxity involved as regards the resultant death of a person by reason of a deliberate act of the accused it is on this score the legislature prescribes two objects, namely, imprisonment of life or death thus leaving it to the wisdom of the Court to pass the sentence in accordance with the gravity of the nature of offence and the methodology used to bring an end to the life of the assassin. It is in this perspective that the law is settled enough to record that it is only in the rarest of the rare cases that the maximum penalty, namely, the death sentence ought to be levied since that would be a barbarous act as that would run counter to the civilised notion and concept of the justice delivery system. True, a man's life comes to an end but would the justice delivery system require that he should equally be punished in the same fashion and manner. This issue has been answered in the negative with a rider that in the event, however, the methodology adopted by the accused cannot but be termed to be rarest of the rare, this court would be at liberty to punish the offender with a death penalty. The jurisprudential system has developed in the country on this backdrop and it is in this perspective this possible attraction of Section 27(3) of the Arms Act shall also have to be dealt with. The Court must use the greatest amount of caution in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 27(3) and unless, needless to record that the issue in question stands covered in all its perspective and no two opinions can be had thereon, the Court will not be justified to bring home the charge under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. Liberty is precious but life is more precious than liberty and the latter cannot possibly be taken away, if one does not cross the limits even at the cost of unforensic language in judicial phraseology on 'the drop of a hat' but one needs to bring home the attributes without any doubt as regards Section 27(3) of the Arms Act. The Statute speaks of a notification in the Official Gazette can an administrative note in relation to importation of a prohibited arm be termed to be sufficient so as to come within the ambit of the statutory requirement of a notification in the Official Gazette the answer cannot but be in the negative. Administrative instructions cannot possibly be a substitute for a notification which stands as a requirement of the Statute.