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12. In the present case, the suit property was taken on rent by the father-in-law of deceased tenant-Lalita that is Hem Ram Sharma and after his death, his son Baldev (husband of Lalita) became tenant of the suit property. Upon his death, Lalita became the tenant of the suit property. Upon death of Lalita, in terms of Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, in the absence of any son or daughter of deceased Lalita, the tenancy would devolve upon the heirs of her husband. Since the appellant does not fall under the category of ‘heir’ of Lalita’s husband, the tenancy of the suit property will not devolve on him nor can he be called as an ‘heir’ under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.

16. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Ganesh Trivedi (supra), wherein this Court found, as a matter of fact, that brother was residing in the tenanted premises and, therefore, tenancy rights will devolve upon him on the death of original tenant within the meaning of Section 3(a)(g) read with Section 12(1)(b) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. This is evident from the following observation made in paras (9) and (10) of judgment which are reproduced as under:

“9. The brother of a tenant is not included in the definition of “family”. However, the present one is not a case where the tenant Suraj Prasad had during his lifetime taken up residence elsewhere and/or allowed the suit premises to be occupied by his brother. Deo Narain, being the real brother of late Suraj Prasad, the tenant, had come to stay with his brother and was residing along with him as such, even at the time of death of Suraj Prasad. It will not therefore be correct to say that applicability of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act was attracted to the suit premises during the lifetime of Suraj Prasad and a deemed vacancy had occurred. On the death of Suraj Prasad tenancy rights devolved on Deo Narain, he being the only heir. He too became a “tenant” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 3. The decision of the High Court cannot, therefore, be faulted.