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6. In Ext.P2 written statement, the petitioner/defendant candidly admitted the transactions between him and the plaintiff. As per the averments in Ext.P3 amendment application, it would appear that the petitioner wanted extensive amendments to the written statement and if the same were allowed, it would have resulted in projecting a new case. Court below rightly considered scope of the amendments sought for and found that except some minor corrections in the facts pleaded, no substantial change to the averments in the original written statement could be allowed as it would enable the defendant to wriggle out of the admissions clearly made. Notwithstanding the proposition that an amendment of pleadings should be liberally considered, if it is appropriately made at the appropriate  time, it is settled law that a party cannot be allowed to withdraw from an express admission made in the original pleading by resorting to an amendment. In other words, admissions consciously made shall not be allowed to be uprooted by an amendment made as an after thought.

21. Relevant facts, as revealed from the judgment, show that the 3rd respondent obtained a decree for recovery of money on 29.07.1977 against the appellant before the apex Court. In execution of the said decree, immovable property belonging to the appellant was brought to sale on 04.08.1978 and in the court sale, 3rd respondent was declared as the successful bidder. Before the sale was confirmed, on 12.08.1978 the appellant filed an application for setting aside the sale under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code on several grounds. Later he filed another application stating that the sale was liable to be set aside as the 3rd respondent, who was the decree holder, had not obtained permission from the executing court, under Order XXI Rule 72(1) of the Code, for participating in the auction. Executing court upheld the plea of the judgment debtor (appellant) and the sale was set aside on 20.02.1979. Application filed under Order  XXI Rule 90 of the Code was dismissed as not pressed. 3rd respondent, aggrieved by the decision, filed a revision before the District Court. That Court dismissed the revision petition on 13.10.1980. Against that decision, the 3rd respondent approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That petition was allowed by the High Court holding that the case was governed by Order XXI Rule 72 of the Code as it was in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh before the Amendment Act, 1976 came into force. Supreme Court noticed that both the executing court and the District Court had upheld the contention of the judgment debtor that on the commencement of the Amendment Act by virtue of Section 97 thereof the local amendment made to Order XXI Rule 72 of the Code, prior to that date, ceased to operate and Code, as amended by the Amendment Act, applied to the case. In the said factual matrix, the Supreme Court decided the case and made the following observations in paragraphs 3 and 4:

24. Decision in Pt.Rishikesh has a direct impact on the questions involved in this case, as it explicitly dealt with the principles laid down in Ganpat Giri. A batch of appeals, by certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution, arose from a judgment of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Chandra Rani v. Vikram Singh (1979 All LJ 401), were considered by the Supreme Court. The respondents laid suits in the Courts of Small Causes for recovery of arrears of rent or for rent and possession from the appellants. On their committing default in payment of rent in the  pending suits, their defences were struck off under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code as amended by the State amendment. Challenge was against the virus of Order XV Rule 5 prevailed in the State of Uttar Pradesh. On a reference, the Full Bench held that the amendment was not inconsistent with the Amendment Act, 1976 and not void under Article 254(1) of the Constitution. Based on Ganpat Giri, it was argued before the Supreme Court that object of the Central Act was that the Code should be uniform throughout India and that Uttar Pradesh Act came into force prior to the Central Act, which was brought into force on 01.02.1977. Further contention was that all the pre-existing amendments made by the appropriate State Legislature or High Court stood repealed. According to the contesting parties, Order XV Rule 5 of the Code as amended in Uttar Pradesh was one such prior amendment made by the State Legislature, which was inconsistent with the Central Act from the date of its commencement and by operation of Clause (1) of Article 254 of the Constitution, the State Act became void.

(emphasis supplied)"

In paragraph 15, the principles regarding repugnancy have been clearly mentioned:

"15. Clause (2) of Article 254 is an exception to clause (1). If law made by the State Legislature is reserved for consideration and receives assent of the President though the State law is inconsistent with the Central Act, the law made by the Legislature of the State prevails over the Central law and operates in that State as valid law. If Parliament amends the law, after the amendment made by the State Legislature has received the assent of the President, the earlier  amendment made by the State Legislature, if found inconsistent with the Central amended law, both Central law and the State law cannot coexist without colliding with each other. Repugnancy thereby arises and to the extent of the repugnancy the State law becomes void under Article 254(1) unless the State Legislature again makes law reserved for the consideration of the President and receives the assent of the President. ..........."