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Showing contexts for: Automatic confirmation in K N Veena vs The Principal District & Sessions Judge on 28 July, 2017Matching Fragments
3. The learned Government Advocate files statement of objections. He submits to dismiss the petition. By referring the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KAZIA MOHAMMED MUZZAMMIL v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER reported in (2010)8 SCC 155, by referring paragraph 51 of the judgment, he submits that deemed confirmation on the principle of automatic confirmation does not apply to the case on hand. Though the petitioner was permitted to continue for more than two years after the last extended period, but that does not mean that she has successfully completed the probationary period or deemed to be confirmed. He submits that by mere completion of period of probation, the petitioner is not entitled for confirmation to the post held. As per Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Rules, unless a specific order to that effect is passed, any delay in issuance of the order under Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Rules, shall not entitle the probationer to be deemed to have satisfactorily completed the period of probation. The respondent ought to have discharged the petitioner within two years from the date of appointment. However, by taking a lenient view by the High Court, she was continued for another extended period. The second extension was with a condition that she will not be permitted to continue further and she will have to be discharged from service. Within the said period, she did not improve herself and accordingly discharge was inevitable. By referring Rule 5(1)(b) of the Rules, the learned Government Advocate submits that the extension of probationary period the said rule and this extension was given only as a chance to the petitioner to improve as it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KAZIA MOHAMMED MUZZAMMIL (supra). The learned Government Advocate reiterated that what has been done by the respondent in discharging the petitioner is simpliciter in accordance with law and no right accrued to the petitioner for continuation of service. Accordingly, he supported the impugned order. He has also relied upon the judgment in the case of HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. C.G. SHARMA reported in AIR 2004 SCW 6687 and submitted that even if the period of two years expires and the probationer is allowed to continue after the period of two years, automatic confirmation cannot be claimed as a matter of right, because in terms of Rules, work has to be satisfactory which is a pre-requisite or pre-condition for confirmation. In the instant case, if the petitioner is further continued for two years after the last extended period of two years that is for technical reason and that itself cannot be a ground to claim the right. The learned Government Advocate also referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CHAITANYA PRAKASH AND ANOTHER V. H OMKARAPPA reported in (2010)1 SCC (L & S) 644 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that discharge of probationer during the period of probation for unsatisfactory services cannot be set to be stigmatic. With regard to the power to discharge the petitioner in the probationary period, the learned Government Advocate referred to the judgment in the case of H.F. SANGATI v. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA reported in AIR 2001 SC 1148.
6. Rule 5 of the Probationary Rules contemplates that the appointing authority shall consider the suitability of the petitioner to hold the post to which he/she was appointed. If the appointing authority decides that the probationer is not suitable to hold the post to which he/she was appointed or has not passed special examination or special test, if any, required to be passed during the period of probation, shall consider the suitability of the probationer to hold the post. With regard to Rule 5 of the Rules, the assessing authority or appointing authority has entered the performance of the petitioner at relevant column as "satisfactory and fit". The same was also communicated to the High Court vide communication dated 19th May 2012. These two instances are the matter for reference which prove that the petitioner has performed well and she was found to be suitable to the post for which she was appointed to. These aspects have not been gone into by the respondent as is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KAZIA MOHAMMED MUZZAMMIL (supra) wherein it is observed that "...discharge has to be simpliciter without causing a stigma upon the probationer concerned. In our view, it is difficult for the court to bring the present case within the class of the cases, where "deemed confirmation" or principle of "automatic confirmation" can be judiciously applied." In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the performance entered by the appointing authority dated 12th May 2010 for the quarterly ending report dated 31st March 2010 and the communication dated 19th May 2012 by the appointing authority to the High Court show that the performance of the petitioner is "satisfactory and fit" to hold the post. These two reports and the communication made to the High Court should have been taken into consideration before discharging the petitioner from service.