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12. In Surendra Nath Mohanty and another Vs. State of Orissa, 1999 5 SCC 238. These decisions indicate that the effect of compromise after conviction for a non-compoundable offence has to be taken into consideration only for the purpose of reducing the sentence and not for setting aside the conviction on that count.
13. In Parameswari v. Vennila, (2000) 10 SCC 348, the appellants before Hon'ble Supreme Court had been convicted under Section 494 read with Section 109 of IPC. After that, they arrived at a settlement with the complainant, in the presence of panchayatdars of their village, and placed on record the duly signed compromise, and parties filed a joint application for permission to compound the offences. While observing that the offence involved was compoundable with the wife's consent and permission of the Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court granted permission to compound the offence, and resultantly the appellants stood acquitted of the offence for which they have been held guilty.
25. In Surat Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (Now Uttarakhand), 2012(12) SCC 772, Hon'ble Supreme Court, based on compromise, permitted the parties to compound their offences under section 354 and 506 IPC.
26. In Jeetu Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 11 SCC 489 it is the duty of the appellate Court to arrive at its own independent conclusion after examining the material on record. This exercise has however to be conducted after considering the material on record. There is no power conferred by the Code either on the appellate Court/revisional Court to acquit an accused convicted for a commission of a non-compoundable offence only on the ground that compromise has been entered into between the convict and the informant/complainant.
[33] While answering Question (A) we may observe in the light of the settled legal position as under :
At the conclusion of the criminal trial the Court on finding the evidence on record led by the prosecution to be sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused would proceed to convict the accused. The remedy of challenging the order of conviction is available to the accused by way of an appeal. Any compromise entered into post-conviction for a non-compoundable offence cannot by itself result in acquittal of the accused. Similarly, the Court has no power to compound any offence that is non-
Hence, we hold that ordinarily the contention that the convict and the informant/complainant have entered into a compromise after the judgment of conviction can be raised only before the appellate/revisional Court in proceedings challenging such conviction. It would be a sound exercise of discretion under Section 482 of the Code and in accordance with the law of the land to refuse to quash criminal proceedings post-conviction for a non- compoundable offence only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise. Instead the Court can permit the convicted party to bring to the notice of the appellate/revisional Court the aspect of compromise. Having said so, it is only in rarest of rare cases that the Court may quash the criminal proceedings post-conviction for a non-compoundable offence on settlement between the convict and the informant/complainant. To illustrate, where a jurisdictional issue going to the root of the matter is raised for challenging the conviction or in matrimonial 11 of 13 disputes where the parties have agreed to settle their differences, jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised. Such exercise of jurisdiction should be limited to the rarest of rare cases when found necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. Thus while holding that inherent power under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised for quashing criminal proceedings even at the appellate/revisional stage as held in Kiran T. Ingale[(Kiran Tulshiram Ingale vs. Anupama P. Gaikwad and Ors., 2006 2 MhLJ(Cri) 402)] such exercise of jurisdiction should be limited to the extent stated hereinabove. The ratio of the decision in Kiran T. Ingale (supra) has to be applied subject to aforesaid limitations. Further, the expression "criminal proceedings" would cover the entire journey of the proceedings commencing from its initiation till the proceedings culminate giving it seal of finality. Question (A) is answered accordingly.