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7. The principles relating to grant of interlocutory injunction in matters of this type and the exercise of the power of the appellate Court are by now well-settled. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 24, the general principles relating to grant of interlocutory injunctions are stated thus in paragraph 953:

On application for an injunction in aid of a plaintiffs alleged right, the Court will usually wish to consider whether the case is so clear and free from objection on equitable grounds that it ought to interfere to preserve property without waiting for the right to be finally established. (Sounders v. Smith (1838) 3 My & Cr. 711). This depends upon a variety of circumstances, and it is impossible to lay down any general rule on the subject by which the court ought in all cases to be regulated (Sounders v. Smith (1838) 3 My & Cr. 711), but in no case will the court grant an interlocutory injunction as of course. (Potter v. Chapman. (1750) Amb 98 at 993.
An interlocutory injunction will not, however, be granted where the defendant might suffer irreparable injury from an injunction restraining him from publishing pending the trial Spottiswoode v. Clark (1846)2 Ph. 154 and the plaintiff can be properly protected by the defendant being ordered to keep an account, nor will it normally be granted where a bona fide defence of fair dealing has been pleaded (Hubbard v. Vosper (1972) 2 QB 84), or if the plaintiff "has been guilty of undue delay in coming to the court or his conduct has amounted to acquiescence in the infringement Sounders v. Smith (1838)3 My & Cr. 711, or if there is any substantial doubt as to the plaintiffs right to succeed (Walcot v. Walker (1802)7 Ves 1).It has been said that in considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction the judge must look at the whole case and that the remedy by interlocutory injunction must not be made the subject of strict rules, Hubbard v. Vosper (1972)2 Q.B 84 at 96.
Lord Justice Megaw while agreeing with the reasons given by Lord Denning MR., enunciated the law thus:
... First, I wish to say something with regard to the matter with which Lord Denning MR has dealt at the end of his judgment, in relation to interlocutory injunctions. I very much doubt whether the passage in Halsbury's Laws of England (21 Halsbury's Laws (3rd Edition), 365,366, paras 765,766), cited by Ungoed-Thomas J, in his judgment in Donmar Productions Ltd., v. Bart (1967)2 All E.R 338 at 339, was intended to state as a general proposition that different standards of proof are to be applied when the court considers, first, the question whether the plaintiff has a right, and, secondly, the question whether, if the plaintiff does have the right, that right has been infringed. It is true that in certain special cases one can approach the matter in that way. Suppose, for example, the plaintiffs claim for an interlocutory injunction is based on his contentions that he is the owner of a piece of land and that the defendant does not dispute that the piece of land belongs to the plaintiff, then it may, in some cases, require only the slightest evidence on the part of the plaintiff of the fact the defendant has gone on that land to entitle the plaintiff to an injunction. The defendant in those circumstances, if he has a defence at all, has a defence to the action only on the basis: 'I have not gone on that land.' In those circumstances, there is no reason why an interlocutory injunction should not normally be granted against him if there is some evidence that he has in fact done so. 3ut to change the example, if the plaintiffs case is: "You, the defendant, trespassed on my land," and the defendant's defence is 'true, you are the owner of that land, but you gave me a licence to walk over that land'-then, although the plaintiffs right in one sense is not disputed, in that he is the owner of the land, the question, and the whole question is: is there a licence? It may be that the onus of establishing that is on the defendant; but this is not a question of onus of proof. In such circumstances in my judgment it could not rightly be said that, once the plaintiff has established that he is the owner of the land, it only needs a mere possibility of success in connection with the assertion of the absence of a licence to entitle him as of right to an interlocutory injunction. It must be looked at on the whole of the case; the existence of the right and of any defences that are asserted in relation to the admitted existence of that right. In addition, one has to take into account the evidence of the alleged breach, the facts relating to the alleged breach, and even then there is no firm and invariable criterion which can be laid down on the basis of the prospects of success in the action because frequently one has to consider also the balance of convenience, as well as the status quo. One can readily imagine a case in which the plaintiff appears to have a 75 per cent chance of establishing his claim, but in which the damage to the defendant from the granting of the interlocutory injunction, if the 25 per cent defence proved to be right, would be so great compared with the triviality of the damage to the plaintiff if he is refused the injunction, that an interlocutory injunction should be refused. To my mind it is impossible and unworkable to lay down different standards in relation to different issues which fall to be considered in an application for an interlocutory injunction. Each case must be decided on a basis of fairness, justice and common sense in relation to the whole of the issues of fact and law which are relevant to the particular case.

11. The matter came to be considered in greater detail by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) A.C.396. Referring to the view of the Court of Appeal in that case that there was a rule of practice so well established as to constitute a rule of law that precluded them from granting any interim injunction unless upon the evidence adduced by both the parties on the hearing of the application the applicant had satisfied the court that on the balance of probabilities the acts of the other party sought to be enjoined would, if committed, violate the applicant's legal rights, Lord Diplock observed that the House of Lords gave leave to appeal only for the purpose of considering the existence of any such rule of law. It was pointed out that it was most exceptional for the House of Lords to give leave to appeal in a case which turned upon where the balance of convenience lay. After pointing out that grant of interlocutory injunctions in actions for infringement of patents is governed by the same principles as in other actions, Lord Diplock observed as follows: "My Lords, when an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a defendant from doing acts alleged to be in violation of the plaintiffs legal right is made upon contested facts, the decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when ex hypothesi the existence of the right or the violation of it, or both, is uncertain and will remain uncertain until final judgment is given in the action. It was to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved that the practice arose of granting him relief by way of interlocutory injunction; but since the middle of the 19th century this has been made subject to undertaking to pay damages to the defendant for any loss sustained by reason of the injunction if it should be held at the trial that the plaintiff had not been entitled to restrain the defendant from doing what he was threatening to do. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial; but the plaintiffs need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiffs undertaking in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant's favour at the trial. 'The court must weigh one need against another and determine where "the balance of convenience" lies.