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Ld. Chief PP for the State submits that he has not been supplied with the copy of the application moved on behalf of the   accused   Rambeer   Shokeen   under   Section   167(2)   of Cr.P.C.  seeking   grant   of  statutory  bail.  Ld.  Counsel   for  the accused is directed to supply the copy of the same during the course of the day against proper receipt.

Put up on 07.03.2017 for further proceedings.”

6. On   the   next   day   i.e.   2 nd  March,   2017,   the   appellant moved   another   application   for   grant   of   statutory   bail   under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. read with Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA.  

26.   Pertinent   to   mention   here   that   the   request   for interrogation   of   the   appellant   in   custody   made   by   the investigating officer on 4.3.2017, granted on the same date by   the   District   and   Sessions   Judge,   was   for   the   same reasons  and  on  the  same  grounds   as   were  set   out   by  the public prosecutor in his request submitted on 28.2.2017. 

27.   It   is   true   that   the   request   of   the   public   prosecutor submitted on 28.2.2017 is not captioned as ‘report’ nor does it specifically refer to the provision contained in the second proviso   to   Section   167   (2)   Cr.P.C.   But,   this   cannot   be construed as a deficiency. It has to be borne in mind that it is not   a   matter   of   form   but   one   of   substance.   The   request   in writing dated 28.2.2017 of the additional  public prosecutor satisfies the twin criteria of the second proviso to Section 167 (2)   Cr.P.C.   It   indicates   that   the   public   prosecutor   had subjected the investigating officer’s report as made to him to scrutiny   and   also   informed   the   court   the   progress   of   the investigation and setting out the reasons why the continued detention   of   the   appellant   in   custody   was   necessary. Therefore,   it   has   to   be   accepted   as   a   ‘report’   of   the   public prosecutor  satisfying   the  requirements  of  second  proviso  to Section   167   (2)   Cr.P.C.   Whether   or   not,   in   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   case,   as   prevailing   on   the   date   such report   was   submitted   to   the   special   court   will   have   to   be considered separately. 

28. As noted above, the appellant had moved an application under   Section   167(2)   Cr.P.C.   for   release   on   bail   by   default under   Section   167(2)   Cr.P.C.   on   28.2.2017.   It   is   fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that such application   moved   on   28.2.2017   was   premature   as   ninety days would expire only on 1.3.2017. 

29. On 28.2.2017, besides the application of the investigating officer   seeking   extension   of   the   custody   period   of   the appellant, the report of the public prosecutor for extension of the   period   of   investigation   had   come   be   submitted   to   the special court. Without doubt, the report could be considered before expiry of the period of ninety days or on the last day of such period ordinarily available which would be 1.3.2017. The   special   court,   within   its   judicial   discretion,   decided   to postpone the consideration to the following date i.e. 1.3.2017. It is reflected in the order passed on 1.3.2017 by the District and Sessions Judge, as extracted earlier, that the additional sessions   judge   presiding   over   the   special   court   was indisposed and, therefore, on leave of absence on 1.3.2017. The District and Sessions Judge, before whom the file was placed for consideration of the report of the public prosecutor and   the   application   of   the   investigating   officer,   decided   to defer   the   former   to   7.3.2017   for   it   to   be   ‘decided   by   the concerned court’ while extending the judicial custody for such period. Questions have been raised as to the competence of the District and Sessions Judge to deal with this case under MCOCA on the plea that the judicial officer presiding over the court of District and Sessions Judge was not designated as a special court in terms of Section 5 MCOCA.” 

22. The   legal   position   has   been   expounded   by   the Constitution   Bench   of   the   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of Sanjay Dutt  (supra), in particular, in paragraph 48 as under:   

“48. We have no doubt that the common stance before us of the nature of indefeasible right of the accused to be released on   bail   by   virtue   of   Section   20(4)(bb)   is   based   on   a   correct reading   of   the   principle   indicated   in   that   decision.  The indefeasible   right   accruing   to   the   accused   in   such   a situation  is  enforceable  only prior  to  the  filing  of  the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on   the   challan   being   filed,   if   already   not   availed   of. Once the challan has been filed, the question of grant of   bail   has   to   be   considered   and   decided   only   with reference to the merits of the case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after the filing of the   challan.  The   custody   of   the   accused   after   the   challan has  been filed is  not  governed by Section 167  but  different provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that right had accrued   to   the   accused   but   it   remained   unenforced   till   the filing   of   the   challan,   then   there   is   no   question   of   its enforcement   thereafter   since   it   is   extinguished   the   moment challan   is   filed   because   Section   167   CrPC   ceases   to   apply. The Division Bench also indicated that if there be such an application  of the accused  for release  on  bail  and also   a   prayer   for   extension   of   time   to   complete   the investigation according to the proviso in Section 20(4) (bb),   both  of  them  should  be considered  together.   It  is obvious that no bail can be given even in such a case unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected.