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26. In Sankarlal @ Sankarayee v. State12, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court has recognized that grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to

9. (1981) Supp. SCC 84

10. 2002 (9) SCC 168

11. 2009 (6) SCC 498

12. (1989) Law Weekly (Cri.) 468 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:26759-DB Section 300 of IPC would include sustained provocation also and held as under:-

"When there is positive evidence to show that there was grave and sudden provocation at or about the time of occurrence, there would be no difficulty in applying the said principles. There are other type of cases, where there has been sustained provocation for a considerable length of time and there would not have been a real sudden provocation immediately preceding the murder. In such cases, the Courts have given the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC on the ground that the provocation which is the route cause for the commission of the offence need not arise at the spur of the moment."

27. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the matter of Suyambukkani (supra), considering the earlier English decisions and the decision in K.M. Nanavati (supra), has held that sustained provocation is undoubtedly an addition by the Courts as anticipated by the architects of the Indian Penal Code, and held in para- 20 as under:-

"20. It is clear from the opinion of the important architects of the Indian codification that Anglo- Indian Codes, which were the first experiments in English language in the art of codification, in spite of their immense value, are far from being perfect and were intended to be overhauled from time to time. Therefore, though technically the exceptions to Section 300 IPC. appear to be limitative they can no longer be considered so, after the efflux of time. In fact, Courts have added one more exception known as ''sustained provocation''. The leading decision in that field is the well known Nanavati's case, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 605. That decision is not the first one to take into consideration the situation of sustained provocation. There are previous decisions, which are reviewed in that case are:

The Empress v. Khagayi, ILR 2 Mad. 122; Boya Munigadu v. The Queen, ILR 3 Mad. 33; Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:26759-DB Murugien, In Re, (1957) 2 MLJ 9; Chervirala Narayan, In Re, 1958 (1) An.W.R. 149, Balku v. Emperor, AIR 1938 All. 532 and Babu Lal v. State, AIR 1960 All. 223. Thereafter several decisions have been pronounced and recently this Court dealt with the same subject in the following unreported cases; C.A. No. 70 of 1981, dated 15th December, 1982, Laxmi v. State; C.A. No. 417 of 1983, dated 10th February, 1986, Dharman v. State; C.A. No. 184 of 1983, dated 6th February 1983, Devanathan @ Mara v. State and C.A. No. 301 of 1984, dated 4th August, 1988, Gopal v. State. Though there has been here and there attempts in those decisions to bring the sustained provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, there is a cardinal difference between provocation as defined under Exception 1 and sustained provocation. The only word which is common is ''provocation''. What Exception 1 contemplates is a grave and sudden provocation, whereas the ingredient of sustained provocation is a series of acts more or less grave spread over a certain period of time, the last of which acting as the last straw breaking the camel's back may even be a very trifling one. We are therefore far from grave and sudden provocation contemplated under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. Sustained provocation is undoubtedly an addition by Courts, as anticipated by the architects of IPC."

29. In the backdrop of the law relating to provocation particularly, sustained provocation, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid from the statements of Arati Yadav (PW-1), Maheshwari Yadav (PW-4), Dharmendra Yadav (PW-6) & Doodhnath Yadav (PW-13 that the appellant had taken loan from the bank which he could not repay. The deceased advised the appellant that they would repay the loan amount after selling the wheat. There used to quarrel between appellant and deceased on this issue. In these circumstances, the appellant appears to have assaulted his wife Prasadi by spade, as a result of which, she suffered grievous injuries and died. All these facts constitutes it a case of sustained provocation, making the appellant to be entitled for the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC by converting his conviction under Section 302 of IPC to that of Part-I of Section 304 of IPC.