Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

3. I have heard the counsel for the appellants as well as Additional PP for the State. The trial court record has also been perused. 

4. Though several grounds have been raised in the appeal but the conviction of the appellants has been vehemently assailed on the premise that they were not afforded the right of fair trial. The counsel for the appellants argued that while relying upon the testimonies of the complainant Paras Ram (PW­1), his son Lalji (PW­2) and wife Geeta (PW­3), the trial court failed to appreciate that none of the said material witnesses had been cross examined on behalf of the appellants. He submitted that on the day of examination of the above witnesses by the prosecution, counsel for the appellants was not present and therefore, their cross­examination could not be conducted. He urged that since the appellants were not being assisted by their counsel on the relevant dates, it was the duty of the trial court to ensure that they were able to avail their right of fair trial as enshrined in Section 304 CrPC and that the failure of Ld. M. M. to do so, has not only caused prejudice to the appellants but has also vitiated the trial. He argued that in the circumstances, Rajesh & Ors. v. State      Page No.5/9       impugned judgment and order on sentence are liable to be set aside. 

"17. The prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended and encouraged. But in reaching that result, the accused charged with a serious offence must not be stripped of his valuable right of a fair and impartial trial. To do that, would be negation of concept of due process of law, regardless of the merits of the appeal. The CrPC provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to have the assistance of a counsel and the CrPC also requires the court in all the criminal cases, where the accused is unable to engage a counsel, to appoint a counsel for him at the expense of the State. However guilty the appellant upon the inquiry might have been, he is until convicted, presumed to be innocent. It was the duty of the court, having these cases incharge, to see that he is denied no necessary incident of a fair trial. In the present case, not only the accused was denied the assistance of a counsel during the trial and such designation of counsel, as was attempted at a late stage, was either so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid in that regard. The court ought to have seen to it that in the proceedings before the court, the accused was dealt with justly and fairly by keeping in view the cardinal principles that the accused of a crime is entitled to a counsel which may be necessary for his defence, as well as to facts as to law. The same yardstick may not be applicable in respect of economic offences or where offences are not punishable with substantive sentence of imprisonment but punishable with the fine only. The fact that the right involved is of such a character that it can not be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our judicial proceedings. The necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make effective process of law. It is equally true that the absence of fair and proper trial would be violation of fundamental principles of judicial procedure on account of breach of mandatory provisions of Section 304 of CrPC.