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18. It was next urged that no reliance can be placed on the disclosure statement of the appellant [Ex.PW34/Q5], as the same is dated 23.06.2001, i.e., after the incident had taken place on 22.06.2001 and therefore the fact was not discovered pursuant to arrest of the accused and thus not protected under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

19. It was next submitted that the case of the prosecution is false, inasmuch as, the arrest and personal search memos Ex.PW34/M1 and Ex.PW34/M2 respectively and the disclosure statements Ex.PW34/Q5 are all dated 23.06.2001 while the prosecution witnesses stated that the same were prepared at the spot. Reference was also made to the testimony of PW20-Ct. G. Ganeshan, who took the photographs of the place of incident and has deposed that he received the information at about 12.00 noon. He reached B-49, Gharoli Dairy Farm along with FSL team and started taking photographs at about 3:00 pm. This run contrary to the case of the prosecution which states that the police officials came to know of the Gharoli Dairy Farm only after the arrest of the appellant at 3:45 pm. Moreover, there is no record to support the version of the police officials that the appellant was apprehended at Noida. The police officials neither took any permission nor intimated any authority in writing about their surveillance raid in Noida. Even the place of arrest of the appellant in the arrest memo has been shown as B-49, Gharoli Dairy Farm, Delhi on 23.06.2001. No site plan of the alleged place of arrest at Noida has been prepared. The prosecution has failed to prove as to from where and whom they got the information of the place of incident in light of the fact that none of the family members had ever informed the police. Six police persons were allegedly present when the appellant Jitender and Ajeet were apprehended at Noida but only three were examined as prosecution witnesses. PW16-Brij Bhushan and PW19-Satbir Singh whose houses were near B-49, Gharoli Dairy Farm where the encounter took place have not supported the case of the prosecution. This creates a serious doubt in the entire prosecution story. Further, as per the prosecution case, the victim was kidnapped on 17.06.2001 and was rescued on 22.06.2001 after the encounter. As per the evidence of PW7-Parmod Kumar, a property dealer and PW8-Rajeev Sondhi, the house was taken on rent only on 19.06.2001. That being so, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove as to where the victim was kept from 17th to 19th June, 2001.

9. The important ingredient of Section 364A is the abduction or kidnapping, as the case may be. Thereafter, a threat to the kidnapped/abducted that if the demand for ransom is not made then the victim is likely to be put to death and in the event death is caused, the offence of Section 364A is complete. There are three stages in this Section, one is the kidnapping or abduction, second is threat of death coupled with the demand of money and lastly when the demand is not made, then causing death. If the three ingredients are available, that will constitute the offence under Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code. Any of the three ingredients can take place at one place or at different places...."

"What was the object" of the kidnapping or abduction: Ultimately the question to be decided is 'What was the intention? Was it demand or ransom?"

41. The judgment in Malleshi‟s case have been followed and reiterated in Vinod v. State of Haryana, (2008) 2 SCC 246, P.Liaquat Ali Khan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 12 SCC 707 and Shyam Babu v. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 418.

42. The offence under Section 364A is not made out only upon the commission of the unlawful act of kidnapping or abduction. The essential ingredients of the statutory provision, apart from the act of kidnapping or abduction as the case may be, keeping a person in detention thereafter, a threat to cause hurt or a reasonable apprehension of such a consequence or causing death or hurt, in order to compel the payment of ransom or the doing or abstention from doing any act by the government, a foreign state, an inter governmental body or by any person. The purpose of the unlawful act is to demand ransom or to compel the doing or abstention from doing of a particular act. Kidnapping or the abduction by itself does not lead to an inference of the underlying purpose with which it was carried out. The purpose must exist at the time when the act of kidnapping or abduction takes place. Whether such a purpose existed at that time will have to be deduced from all the attendant circumstances. Events which take place prior to, at the time of and subsequent to the commission of the offence would weigh in the balance. In interpreting Section 364A the Court must be cognizant of the fact that the provision was introduced in order to deal with the serious menace posed by terrorism to the stability of civil society. Hence, while the underlying purpose, which is an ingredient of Section 364A, must demonstrably be found to exist as the foundation of the unlawful act, the Court would not be justified in abridging the parameters of the statutory provision with reference to requirements which have not been imposed by Parliament. Situations involving kidnapping or abduction for ransom are fluid. Demands which are raised by abductors may in the very nature of things evolve as the situation progresses. The law does not prescribe that the nature of the demand for ransom be precisely spelt out when the kidnapping or abduction is carried out. So long as the unlawful act of kidnapping or abduction is carried out for the propose of making a demand for ransom, the requirement of the section would be met. Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted, it may well happen that after the demand is made known to the victim, but before it is communicated to a third person, the accused may be arrested. That again would not detract from the circumstance that act of kidnapping or abduction was carried out with the object and purpose of demanding ransom. A statutory provision like Section 364A must undoubtedly, like penal legislation, be construed strictly. But while construing a provision such as Section 364A the Court must be careful not to interpret it in a manner which would denude it of its legislative efficacy. More so when the stated object of Parliament was to deal with an aggravated form of an offence, the effect of which is to seriously undermine the stability of civil society.

76. The defence taken by accused Jitender during his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. is that he was lifted from his house on 22.6.01 and taken to Crime Branch Office and was framed in this case. Almost similar is the defence taken by accused Ajeet Singh stating that he was lifted from the premises No. K-106, Krishna Park, Tilak Nagar and was framed in this case. In defence evidence both these accused has examined DW 5 Sh. Sanjay Kishore Sharma. This witness has deposed that Jitender is his neighbourer and accused Ajeet is his driver. He used to go to his office at K-106, Krishna Park Extension, Tilak Nagar at 9.30 AM daily. On 22.6.01 at about 10 AM, he noticed that two police officials in uniform and four in civil dress came and both these accused persons were taken by them. On asking accused Jitender told him that he was being taken for interrogation. Accused persons were taken in two Maruti Zens and next day he came to know through newspaper about the kidnapping case. During cross-examination DW-5 has stated that he did not lodge any complaint to any authority concerning lifting of the accused persons by the police in his presence.