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Later on it was added that the expression " 'Conveyed in trust' is hardly the right expression to apply to gifts of lands or other property for the general purposes of a Hindu religious or pious institution." It was therefore held that the head of a mutt was not a trustee within the meaning of Article 134. 'SRINIVAS CHARIAR T. P. v. C. N. EVALAPPA MUDALIAR', 45 Mad 565 (PC), drew a distinction between the position of a dharmakartha and that of a shebait of a religious institution. At p. 581 it is stated: "The position of a dharmakartha is not that of a shebait of a religious institution, or of the head of a mutt. These functionaries have a much higher right with larger power of disposal and administration, and they have a personal interest of a beneficial character."

18. In the very learned judgments delivered in 'VIDYAPURNA TIRTHASWAMI v. VIDYANIDHI THIRTHASWAMI', 27 Mad 435, the distinction between those functionaries is explained. But a dharmakartha is literally and no more than the manager of a charity, and his rights, apart it may be in certain circumstances from the question of personal support, are never in a higher legal category than that of a mere trustee.

19. To these weighty pronouncements may be added the latest decision of the Supreme Court in 'ANGURBALA v. DEBABRATE', (1951) SCJ 394, where it had to consider the question whether the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act XVIII of 1937 as amended by Act XI of 1938, was applicable to the devolution of shebaitship. The Act would apply if the shebaitship is property. The answer given was that it was property within the meaning of that Act. Mukerjea J. at page 398 summarised the position of a shebait as follows:

"The exact legal position of a shebait may not be capable of precise definition but its implications are fairly well established. It is settled by the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in 'VIDYA VARUTHI v. BALUSWAMI', 44 Mad 831, that the relation of a shebait in regard to debutter property is not that of a trustee to trust property under the English law. In English law the legal estate in the trust property vests in the trustee who holds it for the benefit of cestui que trust. In a Hindu religious endowment on the other hand the entire ownership of the dedicated property is transferred to the deity or the institution itself as a juristic person and the Shebait or Mahant is a mere manager. But though a Shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical sense, it would not be correct to describe the shebaitship as mere office. The shebait has not only duties to discharge in connection with the endowment, but he has a beneficial interest in the debutter property. As the Judicial Committee observed in the above case, in almost all such endowments the Shebait has a share in the usufruct of the debutter property which depends upon the terms of the grant or upon custom or usage. Even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the Shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of shebaiti both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest are mixed up and blended together; and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is the presence of this personal or beneficial interest in the endowed property which invests shebaitship with the character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal incidents of property. This was elaborately discussed by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in 'MONOHAR MUKERJEA v. BHUPENDRA NATH', 60 Cal 452, and ' this decision of the Full Bench was approved of by the Judicial Committee in 'GANESH CHUNDERv.LALBEHARY',71Mad LJ 740: 63 Ind App 448 (PC), and again in 'BHABATARINI v. ASHALATA', (1943) 2 Mad LJ 70: (70 Ind App 57 P C). The effect of the first two decisions, as the Privy Council pointed out in the last case, was to emphasize the proprietary element in the shebaiti right and to show that though in some respects anomalous, it was an anomaly to be accepted as having been admitted into Hindu law from an early date."

In the judgment of Mukherjea J. in 'ANGUR-BALA v. DEBABRATA', 1951 SCJ 394, already referred to, dealing with the word "property" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, reference was made to the decision of Varadachariar J. in 'UMAYAL ACHI v. LAKSHMI ACHI', (1945) 8 FLJ 8, where the learned Judge took the view that a bare trusteeship with no beneficial or personal interest in the trust properties is not property though for certain purposes as conceded even by the learned Judge, trusteeship may be property. Mukherjea J. distinguishes shebaitship from trusteeship as shebaitship always carried with it an element of beneficial or personal interest in the properties in his charge. The learned Judge therefore distinguished the case in UMAYAL ACHI v. LAKSHMI ACHI', (1945) 8 FLJ 8, from the case before him on this ground. The learned Judge also approved of the decision of this Court in 'SURYANARAYANACHARYULU v. SESHAMMA', ILR (1950) Mad 451, where it was held that the office of archaka which is a hereditary religious office in which the holder for the time being is beneficially interested to enjoy the income of the endowed property is "property" and that therefore the decision of the Federal Court was inapplicable. On this reasoning, a Mathadhipathi's position cannot be worse than that of either a shebait or an archaka of a temple.