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Showing contexts for: setting aside decree in Vasant Jaiwantrao Mahajan vs Tukaram Mahadhaji Patil on 21 April, 1960Matching Fragments
(2) It is contended for the applicant that the view taken by the lower Court that this was not a good ground for review is wrong. He relies on Hari Sankar v. Anath Nath, AIR 1949 FC 106. He also supports the reasoning of the lower Court that in this case the original Judge who had set aside the decree should have set aside the decree against all the defendants 2 and 3 and not merely as against defendant No. 3 who had applied under O. 9 R. 13. The suit in which the decree came to be pased was filed by Tukuram against a firm defendant No. 1) consisting of its two partners defendants 2 and 3, alleging that the two partners, defendants 2 and 3, as partners of the firm defendant No. 1, had entered into a contract to plough 200 acres of plaintiff's land, and claimed damages for breach of the contract. No written statement was filed by defendant No. 1, but defendants w and 3 wwwwwwfiwled a written statement repudiating the claim of the plaintiff. Defandant No. 3 did not appear. A decree was passed for Rs. 2640/- against defendants 2 and 3. Defendant No. 2 led evidence but defendant No. 3 did not appear ont he date when the evidence was recorded. The Court passed a decree for Rs. 2640/- against defendants 2 and 3.
(4) It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that although the lower court held that the order passed by its predecessor was illegal it did not set aside the order because it thought that it had no power to revie the order, and that it this Court holds tha the order could have been reviewed the original order passed should be set aside. But this Court cannot set aside the order passed unless it agrees with the view taken by the lower Court that the original order was contrary the the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. (5) The loer Court thought that the order passed by its redecessor was contrary to law because (I) the decree in question is one and indivisible, (ii) the decree is likely to result in two inconsistent decrees if the decree is not set aside against defendants 2 and 3, and (iii) the decree proceeds on the grounds common to defendants 2 and 3 . In addition to these grounds it is also urged by the learned counsel for the applicants that in the interest of justice the whole decree should be reopened and the decree should be set aside against both defendants 2 and 3 and not merely against one of them, namely, defendant No. 3 who had applied under . 9, R. 13, to have the ex parte decree set aside. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied on Khagesh Chandra v. Chandra Kanta, AIR 1954 Assam 183 (FB), Gopala Chetti v Subbeir, ILR 26 Mad. 604, Bhura Mal v. Har Kishan Das, ILR 24 All. 383 (FB), Mohamed Hamidulla v. Tohurenissa Bibi, ILR 25 Cal. 155, Munshi Ram v. Malava Ram, AIR 1917 Lah. 194 and Meenakshi Sundaram v. Chandrakasa Naickar, .
(6) It is unnecessary to consider the Calcutta case at any great length because that was a decision under the old C. P. C. and the view taken by the Cheif Justice of the Calcutta High Court was that under Section 108 of the old Code if a decree was to be set aside the whole decree should be set aside against all the defendants and not against some only of the defendants.
(7) The Assam case deals with a different set of circumstances, because in that case the suit had been decreed ex parte against one defendant and dismissed, after the contest, against another defendant. It was held by the majority of the Full Bench of the ssam High Court that O. 9, R. 13 and the proviso to it do not confer any jurisdiction upon the Court to reverse a decree dismissing the suit of the plaintiff as against some of the defendants. In the instant case the ex parte decree had been passed against both the defendants 2 and 3 and not in favour of one of them. The case of the Assam High Court has therefore no application to the instant case But the view has been expressed that if the decree is joint and invisible or if there is a possibility of conflicting decrees, then the hole decree should be set aside under the proviso to O. 9, R. 13. In AIR 1927 Mad. 550 in a suit filed for delivery of a house and mesne profits against defendants 2 and 3 and defendant No. 1 who had purchased the house in execution of a decree against the undivided brother of defendants 2 and 3, these to defendants were ex parte and the plaintiff compromised ith the first defendant, with the result that the decree was passed against all the defendants for possession and for mesne profits. The second de4fendant who had been ex parte, got the decree set aside under O. 9, R. 13. Plaintiff filed a petition saying that if the ex parte decree is set aside against the second defendant, it should also be set aside against all the defendants. It as held that the ecree was of an indivisible character because it as for the possession of the house hich itself was indivisible, and if the share of one of the defendants is excluded, delivery in effect was impossible. The Madras High Court therefore set aside the ex parte decree against all the defendants, although the petition to do so had been filed by the plaintff. This case is an authority for the proposition that if the decree was joint and indivisible and if the setting aside of the decree against one of the detendants only ould result in an impossibility of execution, then the whole decree should be set aside. In AIR 1917 Lah. 194 a decree had been passed ex part against the principal debtor and his surety and after the ex parte decree against the principal debtor was set aside under O. 9, R. 13, it was held that the Judge was in error in setting aside the decree against the principal debtor without setting it aside against the surety.
(8) If e look at the wording of the proviso it O. 9, R. 13, it provides that here the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only, the decree may be set aside against all or any of the other defendantsalso. The proviso contemplates cases where the decee is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside against one defendant only. Such cases are, for instance, a decree for joint possession of property in the joint possession of to or more persons. It isthe nature of the decree that is the determining factor and not the reasons behind the decree. Even if the defence of two defendants is common and even if the decree proceeds on a ground common to all the defendants, the ultimate decree should not be set aside against all the defendants unless it is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against one defendant only. Two decrees may be inconsistent in the sense that the groundfs given are inconsistent. A decree against two or more defendants may be a decree for a certrain amount of money as damages for breach of a contract, and if the decfree against one of the defendants is set aside under O. 9, R. 13, and ultimately the suit is dismissed against such a defendant on the ground that he did not commit a breach of contract, then though the grounds maybe inconsistent the original decree is not of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against one defendant only. Generally in the case of a money decree the application of the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. is not attracted. In Hiralal v. Sitaram, , which was a case of money lent to two defendants carrying on business under a partnership name and in which an ex parte decree passed against defendants No. 1 and 2 and in favour of the plaintiff, as set aside against defendant No. 1 under O. 9, R. 13, it was held that the application of defendant No. 2 for setting aside the ex parte decree against him also under the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, should be rejected because the money decree was not an indivisible decree and te argument of inconsistent decrees being possible was rejected. For the application of the proviso to O. 9, R. 13, it is not sufficient that there was possibility of inconsistent decrees but what is necessaryis that the original decree, which is being set aside at the instance of only one defendant, is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against that defendant only; if there is such an infirmity in the original decree, then only action would be taken under the proviso.