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The age of a document, its unsuspicious character, the production from proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation for the presumption as enunciated in the above section. This rule, it is now well-settled, was founded on necessity and convenience. It is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to prove the handwriting or signature or execution of ancient documents after the lapse of many many years.

It is therefore presumed that all persons acquainted with execution of documents, if any, are dead, and proof of those facts are dispensed with. Thus, the presumption relates to the execution of the documents, that is, signature, attestation etc., in other words its genuineness, but not to the truth of its contents. Mr. Mohapatra contended that no presumption can be drawn from those documents under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, since the proper custody has not been proved and the documents have not been shown to have been executed or scribed by a particular person. Reading the contents of the documents, it would be clear that they are not genuine documents.

There is no intrinsic circumstance from which the genuineness of this document could be doubted. It also contains a seal which was unfortunately not decipherable. Under these circumstances when the final Court of fact has drawn a presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act and held it to be duly executed by the then Raja of Puri and signed on his behalf by one Kelu Karan, I do not think that there are sufficient reasons for this Court in second appeal to reverse its decision.

It was, however, urged that there was no evidence to show that this Kelu Karan was authorised to sign on behalf of the Raja of Puri. It is obvious that no such evidence can ever be forthcoming for such an ancient document. It is for this very reason, as pointed out in a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1925 All 1 (N), that Section 90 of the. Evidence Act permits a presumption to be drawn to the effect that the person who signed the document on behalf of another was duly authorised to sign for him.

"Even where an ancient document does not purport to have been signed by the executant it is open to the Court to presume that the party who signed for the executant signed it with an authority from him."

The Allahabad Full Bench decision cited above was further considered in Bhairon Prasad v. Ablak Singh, AIR 1934 All 529 (Y), and it was pointed out that the decision applied even to those documents 'bearing the name of the alleged executant by the pen of another' and that such a document would, under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, be presumed to have been executed by the executant himself. Following the decisions cited above it must be held that though there is no evidence to show that Kelu Karan had authority to make a mark on behalf of the then Raja of Puri, that document was duly executed by the Raja of Puri.