Document Fragment View
Fragment Information
Showing contexts for: judicial propriety in Sunil Kumar & Ors vs The State Of Bihar & Ors on 30 January, 2015Matching Fragments
26. With great respect and with all humility at my command, I am constrained to observe that the law and the judicial propriety demanded that if the second Division Bench did not agree with the order passed earlier by the first Division Bench in relation to the same matter and wanted to take a different view, then, the matter ought to have been referred by the second Division Bench to a larger Bench and as that was not done, I, being the Acting Patna High Court CWJC No.8152 of 2013 dt.30-01-2015 Chief Justice, and the facts having been brought to my notice, directed both the cases, as a whole, to be taken up by Full Bench to arrest the said conflicts. SERVICE DISPUTE VIS-À-VIS PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
A FULL BENCH, THOUGH NOT AN APPELLATE BENCH, NEVERTHELESS OWES A DUTY TO RESOLVE CONFLICT IN THE PERCEPTION OF LAW BETWEEN TWO DIVISION BENCHES AND IN THE DIRECTIONS EMANATING FROM TWO CO-
ORDINATE BENCHES
42. I remind myself, again and again, that this Full Bench is not sitting as an appellate Court over the correctness of the decision of the second Division Bench in relation to the suspension of Shri Kuldip Narayan. This Full Bench, however, has the onerous task and/or the obligation to lay the correct position of law governing the subject and adopt, with utmost respect, that course of action, which judicial propriety demands the Full Bench to adhere to by bringing consistency in the conflicting observations and such directions which are colliding with each other so as to reach certainty and consistency in the judicial Patna High Court CWJC No.8152 of 2013 dt.30-01-2015 proceedings.
44. It may be noted and noted with some concern that Shri Lalan Prasad Singh chose not to move the Court himself seeking any relief, much less in the PIL, but his son moved the said interlocutory application and sought a personal relief for his father. This, again, I find curious and not permissible. No hesitation, therefore, in holding, with, however, all humility and respect, that the said interlocutory application, in the second PIL, was wholly misconceived in law and not maintainable and I hold accordingly. I. A. No. 9094 of 2014, filed by Mr. Amitesh Chandra, is dismissed summarily. WHETHER CONSTITUTION OF THIS FULL BENCH IS CORRECT AND VALID: SHADOW OF JUDICIAL PROPRIETY
55. There are other decisions of the Supreme Court, which clearly lay down that the Chief Justice of a High Court is clearly the Master of the Roster. [See (2006) 8 SCC 294, (2008) 3 SCC 542 and (2010) 10 SCC 320]. In the present case, the Division Bench in the first PIL, clearly held that the matter of suspension of Shri Kuldip Narayan could not be made subject matter in a PIL and until the time a permanent arrangement is made by the State Government by withdrawing suspension of Shri Kuldip Narayan, functions of the Patna Municipal Corporation. Though the directions aforementioned were passed in the post lunch sessions, on 15.12.2014, in the first PIL, the Division Bench, in the second PIL, on the same very day, i.e., in the pre lunch sessions, on 15.12.2014, entertained interlocutory application of Shri Kuldip Narayan for staying and setting aside his order of suspension passed by the State Government. This was not only entertained, but the order of suspension was stayed effectively deviating from, and Patna High Court CWJC No.8152 of 2013 dt.30-01-2015 setting at naught, the order passed, in the first PIL, that until the time a permanent arrangement is made by the State Government by withdrawing suspension of Shri Kuldip Narayan, functions of the Patna Municipal Corporation. Clearly, the Division Bench, in the second PIL, chose to differ from the order passed on the same day earlier in the first PIL. Judicial propriety does not permit this. It was open to the Division Bench, while dealing with the second PIL, to take a different view of the matter, but judicial propriety and the Patna High Court Rules demanded that in latter case, there being a difference of opinion, the matter needed to have been referred by the Division Bench, which was in seisin of the second PIL, to a larger Bench instead of proceeding to decide the matter on merits and even granting stay.