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3. At the outset it is considered appropriate to clarify that in line with the directions of the Supreme Court in Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors.7, the term "Child Sexual Exploitative and Abuse Material8" is to be used to refer to pictures and videos of children in sexually explicit and exploitative scenarios. The broad factual background of the case is as follows:

3.1. On 16th September, 2020, the subject FIR was registered by the CBI against one Mr. Neeraj Kumar Yadav, under Section 67-B of IT Act and Sections 14 & 15 of POCSO Act. The FIR contains allegations against him pertaining to his involvement in selling/sharing of CSEAM over the internet through social media. It is alleged that he had also been indulging in the use of children for pornographic purposes; publishing or transmitting of material depicting children in sexually explicit acts; creating text or digital images of such kind, collecting, advertising, promoting, exchanging and distributing material in electronic form depicting children in obscene or indecent or sexually explicit manner, etc. Accordingly, the subject FIR was registered and investigation was taken up.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 30/06/2025 at 02:05:38 commercial dissemination of sexually explicit content involving minors.

7. It is also relevant that the mobile phones of both the Petitioner and co- accused Neeraj Kumar Yadav were subjected to forensic analysis, the results of which substantiate the presence of the incriminating material forming the basis of the prosecution's case. In light of such findings, the contention that the Petitioner's prosecution is premised only on the co-accused's confession is plainly incorrect and contrary to the record.

8. Turning to the statutory argument raised with respect to Section 14 of the POCSO Act, the Court finds no merit in the contention that the offence for "using a child for pornographic purposes" must necessarily mean direct participation of the accused in the creation of CSEAM. Section 2(da) of the Act defines "child pornography" expansively, to mean "any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child which include photograph, video, digital or computer generated image indistinguishable from an actual child and image created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict a child." Thus, it is clear that the definition itself includes not only real depictions but also digitally altered images of a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct.