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An FIR was lodged at Police Station Narela, being FIR No.280/1999 under Section 304A IPC.

3. Mr. Siddharth Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that after the charge had been framed, the respondent No.2 filed an application under Section 468 Cr.P.C. submitting that the case was time barred. Vide order dated 2nd November, 2015, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the application as being not maintainable. The accused/respondent No.2 then filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Court. Vide the impugned order dated 17th May, 2016, the learned ASJ allowed that revision petition and held that the cognizance could not have been taken under the Delhi Bharatiya Chikitsa Parishad Act, 1998 (for short, "DBCP Act"), without a complaint from an officer empowered under the Rules framed under the DBCP Act, which was missing in the present case, and further, since cognizance has been taken later than three years from the date of the incident i.e., with a delay of more than 11 years, and there being no specific order of condonation of delay, the accused/respondent No.2 was discharged.

8. In the application filed under Section 468 Cr.P.C., the stand taken was that not only was the prosecution under Section 304A IPC but also under Section 17(5)/29/39 of the DBCP Act included on the complaint of Sh. K. Natrajan, Assistant Registrar of Central Council of Indian Medicine vide complaint dated 28th May, 2013, were time barred. Further, the filing of a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. on 22 nd July, 2010 for the offence allegedly committed on 30th June, 1999 was also time barred and the taking of cognizance by the learned MM on 23rd September, 2013 was therefore bad in law.

16. Clearly, the improper investigations by the initial I.O. cannot lead to interpretation of law in favour of the respondent No.2, at the expense of the victim. While rejecting the application under Section 468 Cr.P.C., the learned MM rightly observed, that the question of limitation could not be considered once cognizance had been taken. It is also to be noted that on 15th July, 2015, a detailed order was passed before framing of the charge. At that time also, the plea that without a complaint Section 31 of the DBCP Act barred taking cognizance, was turned down, as being relevant only at the stage of cognizance, which had already been taken. Thereafter, the charge was also framed under not only Section 304A IPC, but also under Section 30 read with Sections 17(5) and 29 of the DBCP Act. After three months of the framing of the charge, the application for discharge was moved on the grounds of limitation, which was rightly dismissed by the learned MM, whereas, the learned ASJ failed to consider all the material facts and fell into error in accepting the contention of limitation, as belatedly raised, by the respondent No.2, to discharge him. The decision of the learned ASJ has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice.