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51. One more contention urged by Sri Suryanarayan is that the words 'part' and 'accessories' having not been defined either in the main part of the Act or within the scope of the entry as it occurs in the schedule and that Section 2(B) of the Act providing for supplementing the meaning of word and phrases used in this Act, but not defined to be the same as defined/attributed in the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 and therefore it is an instance of referential legislation to borrow and supplement the meaning of words and expressions which are themselves not defined in this Act by the meaning assigned to them in the KST Act and for such purpose has drawn our attention to Entry 1(iii)(a) of Part-M of Second schedule to the KST Act, reading as under:

55. This position has been distinguished by the learned government advocate by pointing out that the judgment in the case of M/S RAJA MOTORS [supra] is not an authority for referential legislation; that the judgment in the case of KENNAMETTAL WIDIA INDIA LTD [supra] has no relevance, as it was not considered the scope of a notification granting exemption under Section 8(A) of the Act and examination was in a totally different context and in so far as the decision in the case of NAGAR MAHAPALIKA, BARELLY [supra] is concerned, it is submitted that examination was in the context as to whether the product fitted into Entry 7 of the very schedule as it stood at the relevant point of time and therefore all these decisions may not be of much use for the purpose of understanding the scope of Entry 52 of first schedule to the Act.

57. Even otherwise, we find the argument of interpreting or understanding the scope of Entry 52 of first schedule to the Act by referential legislation fails on many counts. First of all, it is to be borne in mind that the understanding of a word or expression in the Act is not the same as interpreting a word or phrase which is used in a particular context in a different enactment, even when the words and expressions not specifically defined or sought to be understood in the context of definition given to such words and expressions in an analogous enactment, it cannot be totally taken out of context and it can only be in the context.

59. One should bear in mind that different taxing statures have different understandings and meanings. The subject matter for levy of tax even as it occurs in the charging section and the event on the happening of which tax is to be levied attracted are all different. Therefore, for understanding the scope and object of levy in one enactment, calling in aid the principle of referential legislation or assigning a meaning which the word in particular context has in a different enactment be the same in the present Act, is virtually not merely doing violence to the existing provisions of the Act but legislating by theory of referential legislation or any other mode, which the legislature itself has not done.