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4. Shri V. S. Dabir, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that exercise of urgency power dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act is arbitrary as the right of the aforesaid affected persons to object the acquisition of the land intended to be acquired has been denied. Formation of the opinion of the existence of real urgency is mechanical and without application of mind, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in case of Narayan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183; The State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 319. Two unreported decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in Brijendra Kumar v. State of M. P., M.P No. 245 of 1978, decided on 29-10-1986 and Ahmed Khan v. Collector, East Nimar Khandwa, M. P. 114 of 1982, decided on 6-7-1982, were also relied. It was contended that the land so purchased by them were for the benefit of its members who are low paid employees and members belonging to the weaker section of the society which is also the object of the acquisition, that is, to provide housing accommodation to the members of the weaker section of the society and to the members of the lower income group. The petitioners having purchased the land and having applied for grant of exemption under Section 20 of the ULC Act, have invested the money for establishing the housing colonies. After grant of exemption under Section 20 of the ULC Act some of the petitioners have gone ahead in preparation of layout plans for construction of the houses after seeking permission from various authorities. The vendors of the land have stated before the LAO that they are not interested in the compensation since they have sold or have agreed to sell or have parted with the possession of the land to the societies. In the circumstances, in the process of purchasing the land by the respective societies the members who belonged to the lower strata and have contributed their life savings with the expectation of getting a plot and construction of house thereon as the object of the two Acts, that is, the Act and the ULC Act is almost the same, the ULC Act will have overriding effect in view of Section 42 of the said Act. Therefore, the notification so issued be quashed. The acquisition of the land for the Board is in turn has professed to make plots which are at exorbitant price as promised by the petitioner-societies to their members, that is, price fixed by the Societies after development is at the rate of Rs. 220/- per sq. meter while the price fixed by the Board is Rs. 870/- per sq. meter, which the members of the Societies cannot bear. Therefore, if notification issued under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 6 of the Act is not quashed, the Board be directed to allot the land in question to the eligible members of the respective societies at the rate fixed by the petitioner-societies and the members be permitted to carry on constructions of their house in the same manner or else the land be deleted and or released from the acquisition, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Gaziabad Shiromani Sahakari Samiti v. State of U. P., AIR 1990 SC 645. In support of the contention raised, learned counsel for the petitioners also cited the decisions reported in Bhimsingh v. Union of India and Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chouwdhaty, AIR 1979 SC 1415; State of Gujarat v. Parshottamdas, AIR 1988 SC 220; Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi (1992) 2 SCC 168; Chaitram Verma v. Land Acquisition Officer, 1993 MPLJ 572; Mohammed Shafi v. State of M. P., 1989 JLJ 501 and Dattatray v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 Bom. 326.

13. The contention that jurisdiction for applying under Section 20 of the ULC Act for grant of exemption so that surplus land of the holder beyond the ceiling limit for the purpose of forming housing society for providing housing accommodation to their members, the object of the Act and the ULC Act being the same, Section 42 will have overriding effect, and, therefore the impugned notification deserves to be quashed and the proceedings deserve to be dropped has also no merit. The object and the purpose of the two Acts are different. The primary object and the purpose of ULC Act as the long title and preamble shows that it is for the imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations for the acquisition of such land in the excess of ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to prevent the concentration of the urban land in the hands of few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bring about an equal distribution of land in urban agglomeration to subserve the common good in furtherance of Directive Principles of Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. See S. Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 923 and Union of India v. Valluri Basavali Chouwdhary, AIR 1979 SC 1415.

14. A bare look to the provisions of ULC Act and its scheme shows that it applies to vacant land as defined in Section 2(q) of the" ULC Act which is in excess of the ceiling limit on the commencement of the ULC Act. Section 15 of the ULC Act also imposes ceiling limit on future acquisition of vacant land also. Section 42 of the ULC Act provides that the provisions of the ULC Act shall have the effect, inter alia, notwithstanding anything contained in the other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or decree or order of the Court, Tribunal or other authority. Thus the ULC Act is given overriding effect in relation to vacant land which a person holds in excess of the ceiling limit, to ensure its equal distribution, while the object of the Act is different than that of the ULC Act, as is clear from the preamble of the Act, that is, primarily for the acquisition of land needed for public purpose and for determination of the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. See State of Gujarat v. Parshottamdas, AIR 1988 SC 220.

15. The proceedings under the Act cannot deal with the question whether the land in question is vacant land or not for the purpose of ULC Act. If the lands are vacant and surplus and are likely to be acquired under the ULC law by paying compensation as provided therein. If land is not surplus land under ULC Act, in that case the provisions of ULC Act would not be applicable, as in the present case is.

16. The petitioners can also not challenge the notification under Sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Act as the societies do not have locus standi. It is well settled that the agreement of sale does not convey any right, title or interest. It would create only an enforceable right in the Court of Law and parties could act thereon. The right, title and interest in the land of the holders of the land extinguished because of the notification under Sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Act as the land vested in the State. Government and there is no provision in the Act by which the land vested in the State can be reverted to the owner. At the most even if one or two sale deeds have been executed after the grant of permission under the ULC Act such societies who are the purchasers of the land subsequent to the issue of notifications under Sections 4(1) and 17(1) and Section 6 of the Act; the action under Section 17(4) of the Act cannot be challenged. See - the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dhobai Sethi, JT 1995 (6) SC 624.