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There is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed ; the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) become as if they had never existed ; but with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions imposed, and the duration of the provisions, are matters of construction.
In the present case there has been no repeal of the Ordinance and Section 8-A has no application, but the Ordinance is a temporary legislation and the duration of its operation is constitutionally specified. On its promulgation subject to its inherent limitations, it had all the force and effect of an Act of the Legislature. All that the Constitution says is that the Ordinance shall cease to operate after the period, Does it necessarily involves that on the expiry of its period, all that had been done is automatically undone, even when its force is not necessary to maintain the thing done. Even if it is not so universally, when the Ordinance amends laws do the amendments cease to survive the Ordinance? Can it not be said that if an amendment once effected is continued in the statute book, the Ordinance is not thereby being continuously enforced?

13. In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar , the Orissa Municipal Election Validation Ordinance cured the invalidity in the Cuttack Municipal elections. But the Ordinance lapsed after six months. And the question was whether the invalidity which was. cured by the Ordinance was revived on the expiry of the Ordinance? Gajendragadkhar, J., (as he then was), who delivered the judgment for the Court observed:

in considering the effect of the expiration of a temporary statute, it would be unsafe to lay down any flexible rule. If the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person that right cannot be taken away because the statute by which it was created has expired. If a penalty had been incurred under the statute and had been imposed upon a person, the imposition of the penalty would survive the expiration of the statute. That appears to be the true legal position in the matter.
The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires , and the provision of the General Clauses Act in relation to the fact of repeal of Acts do not apply to a temporary Act. But here what is required is not the continued operation of the temporary statute and the nature of the provision reveals that the intention of the Legislature is to effect a permanent substitution in the Act, not just for the life of the Ordinance. In my opinion having regard to the principles evolved it would not make any difference that we are here concerned with the amendment of an Act and not specific rights acquired by individuals under an amendment made by a temporary Act.
But these observations have to be weighed on the provisions of the Act the Judicial Committee was considering. Sub-section (3) which their Lordships were referring to specifically provided that on and after the first day of April, 1936, the statute of 1932 shall be read as if the temporary statutes had " never been enacted ". Even then, proceeding their Lordships observed:
Sub-section (3) docs not say that the temporary Acts are for all purposes to be treated as if they had never been enacted. It says only that the principal Act is to be read in future as if the temporary Acts had never been enacted....