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5] The applicant- Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) is the successor in title to Standard Oil Company, which subsequently became CALTEX (India) Limited.
6] By Indenture of Lease dated 25th September 1953, the respondent-landlord, leased the suit premises to the Standard Vaccum Oil Company for a term of ten years commencing from 1st May 1953. After expiry of the term, the term of the lease was not renewed or extended. However, the lessee - Standard Vaccum Oil Company continued in possession of the suit premises, possibly, as tenant holding over. 7] The Standard Vaccum Oil Company, subsequently became CALTEX (India) Limited. The Caltex (Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex ((India) Limited), Act, 1977 (1977 Act), which was given retrospective effect from 30 th December 1976 made provisions for vesting of undertaking in Dinesh Sherla page 3 of 19 j-CRA-176-175-170-169-14 the Central Government and matters connected therewith. Section 7(3) of 1977 Act inter alia provided that on the expiry of any term of any lease, tenancy or arrangement referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), such lease or tenancy or arrangement shall, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed or continued, so far as may be, on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy or arrangement was originally granted or entered into.
8] Some time in May 1999 the respondents-landlord instituted R.A.E. Suit No. 50/90 of 1999 against HPCL seeking their eviction from the suit premises, on the basis that lease in respect of suit premises had the protection of Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947. However, the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 was repealed with effect from 31 st March 2000 and the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 came into force. For reasons which are not disputed, the lease in-question, does not enjoy the protection of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Accordingly, the respondent-landlord issued notice dated 27th May 2004 to HPCL terminating the lease by furnish of notice. Since, the HPCL failed to hand over the possession of the suit premises to the respondent-landlord, T.E.& R Suit Dinesh Sherla page 4 of 19 j-CRA-176-175-170-169-14 No.48/62 of 2004 was instituted seeking eviction of HPCL from the suit premises on 25th October 2004. 9] HPCL raised several defences, including the defence that the notice of termination was improper, since, no six months notice was issued as required under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The issues were framed in the suit and evidence was lead by both the parties. Ultimately, the Trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 31 st August 2009, decreed the suit and ordered enquiry into mesne profits. 10] HPCL, aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree dated 31st August 2009 made by the Trial Court instituted Appeal No. 240 of 2009 before the Appeal Court. By judgment and decree dated 15th November 2013, the Appeal Court has dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present petition. 11] Mr. Godbole, learned counsel for HPCL made the following submissions in support of its civil revision applications:

15] Without prejudice, Mr. Sanglikar submits that the contention now raised is entirely misconceived because, even upon receipt of notice dated 27th May 2004 for determination of the lease, HPCL, or the Central Government, chose not to Dinesh Sherla page 9 of 19 j-CRA-176-175-170-169-14 exercise any option for renewal of the term of lease. This is because both the Central Government as well as HPCL were aware, that in law, the opportunity for such exercise of such option had long expired. Mr. Sanglikar submits that in terms of 1977 Act, at the highest, the term of the lease, stood renewed for a further term of ten years with effect from 30 th December 1976. This means that, at the highest, the term of the lease stood renewed up to 30th December 1986. Mr.Sanglikar submits that there are several rulings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which clarify the position that the renewal in terms of Section 7(3) of 1977 Act or analogous provisions, applies only for one time renewal and not for renewal in perpetuity. Accordingly, Mr. Sanglikar submits that the third contention now raised by Mr. Godbole, is entirely misconceived and warrants summary rejection. 16] The rival contentions now fall for determination. 17] Insofar as the first contention is concerned, the Trial Court as well as the Appeal Court, upon examining the Deed of Lease as well as the evidence on record have rightly concluded that this was not a case of lease of immovable Dinesh Sherla page 10 of 19 j-CRA-176-175-170-169-14 property for manufacturing purposes. Accordingly, there was no obligation for issuance of six months notice for valid determination of lease. There is no error, much less, any perversity demonstrated in the matter of record of such concurrent findings of fact by the two Courts. 18] In this case, the Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence on record including, in particular, the evidence on behalf of defendant No.2, who is said to be a dealer/agent of HPCL has held that there is absolutely no material on record to suggest that the suit premises were leased out for manufacturing purposes. The Trial Court has observed that defendant No.2 has only deposed that he was carrying on business of servicing, repairing of motor vehicles and selling of petroleum products. The witness has nowhere even stated that the suit premises were being used for manufacturing purposes, much less is there any statement that the suit premises were leased out for any manufacturing purposes. The Appeal Court, has once again, evaluated the evidence and confirmed this finding of fact. Accordingly, there is no case made out to disturb such concurrent findings of fact, in the absence of any perversity. The contention as raised is not Dinesh Sherla page 11 of 19 j-CRA-176-175-170-169-14 backed either by documentary or oral evidence. Accordingly, in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, there is absolutely no case made out to interfere with the impugned orders on the first ground urged. 19] The second contention as regards renewal in perpetuity is also untenable, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the contention, as raised, cannot be sustained either on the perusal of the terms of Deed of Lease dated 25th September 1953 or on the basis of provisions of 1977 Act. There is neither any documentary nor legal evidence to sustain such a contention. Such a contention, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is not sustainable even in law. Accordingly, on the basis of such a contention, it is not possible to upset, the concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts.

28] The Central Government, at the highest, if it so desired, could have opted for renewal in 1976, when 1977 Act came into force, with effect from 1976. Had it opted for such renewal, the lease, might have stood renewed up to 1986, but not any further. The purpose for including the expression "if so desired by the Central Government" in Section 7(3) of 1977 Act, was inter alia to avoid any foisting of lease, either upon the Central Government or the undertaking which it had taken over, i.e., HPCL. In the absence of such an expression, it is possible that some landlord insists that the term of lease stands renewed on the same terms, even though, the Central Government or the HPCL, may not be desirous of such renewal. The expression also indicates that renewal in such matters is not automatic but subject to expression of desire. In this case, at no stage, whether in 1977 or for that matter in 2000 was any such option ever exercised or desired, ever expressed. There is, even otherwise therefore, no merit in the third contention raised by Mr. Godbole.