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17. Exts.P1 to P6 would show that there has been dispute between the petitioner on the one side and the predecessors in interest of the respondent on the other, regarding title to the petition schedule building and the appurtenant land. These documents further would show that there were so many police complaints between them relating to that dispute. All the same, it is important to note that Ext. R1(a) is a sale deed executed by the father of the petitioner and duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act,1908. Its execution is not in dispute. When the parties accept the recitals in a registered document, a party to it or his representative in interest is not entitled to adduce contrary extrinsic parole evidence. Under the provisions of Section 91 the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 where the terms of a contract are reduced into the form of a document, as is required in the law, no evidence can normally be adduced in proof of the terms of such contract, except the document itself. As per Section 92 of the Evidence Act, when the terms of a contract are reduced into the form of a document, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. But the position may be different if the contention is that the document was never intended to be acted upon. Here the specific contention of the petitioner is that Ext.R1(a) was executed just as a security document and it was not intended to be acted upon.

'The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Evidence Act bars the respondent from contending that there was no sale and, it is submitted, the respondent should not have been permitted to lead parole evidence in support of the contention.
xxx xxx xxx It is clear to us that the bar imposed by sub-section (1) of Section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. The sub-section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. Tyagaraja Mudaliyar v. Vedathanni [AIR 1936 PC 70]. The Trial Court was right in permitting the respondent to lead parol evidence in support of her plea that the sale deed dated January 7, 1953 was a sham document and never intended to be acted upon.'