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"2. You will be on probation for a period of six months, which may be extended if considered necessary.
3. During the period of probation, your services are liable to termination without notice.
4. After probationary period your services are liable to termination with one month's notice in writing on either side.

12. The stand taken by the management and the submission made on its behalf by the learned Counsel Smt. Shubha Ananth is that the management had the power of extending the probationary period of the petitioners as there is an implied power in-built in the standing order, Clause 4(2) of the company, therefore, the incorporation of the Condition Clause No. 2 in the appointment orders issued to the petitioners retaining the power of the management to extend the probationary period after expiry of six months specified in the appointment order is legal and valid in law. Further, the learned Counsel submits, in the absence of a clause in the standing orders, prohibiting an employer to extend the probationary period originally fixed enumerating the clause regarding extension of probationary period of the petitioners after the original period of probation is expired cannot be found fault with. Thereby the said clause cannot be termed as illegal. In the background of this submission, this Court has examined the Standing Orders of the company with reference to the Clause 4(1) and 4(2), which are extracted hereunder to appreciate the said contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the management.

14. Learned Counsel for the management further submits, that the Clause 4(1) of the certified standing orders of the company should be read separately insofar as probationary employees are concerned. This submission is not tenable. Clause 4 deals with classification of the workmen in the company. Clause 4(1) deals with permanent workmen and Clause 4(2) defines probationary workers. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the management sought to be interpreted is accepted, then in the sub-clause (2) of Clause 4, there is no probationary period prescribed in the said clause, the period of probation is prescribed in the sub-clause (1) of Clause 4 of the Standing Orders while defining the probationer employee under sub-clause (2) of Clause 4 which is referred to a termination of the probationary workmen. Therefore, sub-clause (1) must be read along with sub-clause (2) of Clause 4 of the certified standing orders to find out who is a permanent workman and who is a probationer workman. What is stated in the definition of permanent workman is that "any person who has satisfactorily completed the probationary period of six months including breaks mentioned in the said clause". Whereas a probationer workman is defined as "any person who has not completed the probationary period and also the permanent workman appointed as a probationer in a new post". Further, the said clause states that a probationer workman shall be closely watched in regard to his conduct, adaptability and other aspects which are mentioned therein. By closely reading these two clauses together and the terms and conditions incorporated in the appointment orders, the contention urged by the learned Counsel for the management that the petitioners were employed provisionally against permanent posts and therefore they did not acquire any right of employment in the company cannot be accepted as the same is contrary to the clauses of the Standing Orders and the law laid down in this regard. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were appointed against permanent posts, because it has been specifically stated in the counter statement that the posts for which the petitioners were appointed as probationers after their training period was over were no longer available for their confirmation and therefore, the company had to discontinue the confirmation of probationers since there being no future prospects and therefore the petitioners have left the services on their own accord having regard to the difficulties of the management.

16. As per the standing orders, if the probationary period of six months is not satisfactorily completed, the management can exercise its power under sub-clause (2) and terminate the service of such probationer on expiry of the probationary period. Clause 4(1) and (2) contemplate that a probationer is a workman who is provisionally employed against a permanent vacancy as a probationer. By reading the said clause, there is no express power conferred upon the management to extend the probationary period, after expiry of the probationary period. Therefore, incorporation of the condition in the appointment order stating that, the probationary period is six months which shall be extended if considered necessary, the underlined portion of the condition in the appointment order is without authority of law. This condition is not only contrary to the standing orders of the company and the law laid down by the Apex Court. It is not the case of the management that the probationary period was extended because these petitioners' services during the probationary period was not satisfactory. The case of the management is that, on account of failure of contract between the management and the USSR, the petitioners' services could not be confirmed. This important material fact has not been taken into consideration by the second respondent-Labour Court at the time of interpreting the standing orders clause referred to above and the appointment orders and recorded a finding while answering the issue holding that these petitioners were continued on probation is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v Dharam Singh, Om Prakash Maurya v Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow and Others, M.K. Agarwal v Gurgaon Gramin Bank and Others, upon which the reliance is placed by the learned Counsel, Mr. Srinivasan appearing on behalf of the petitioners. The Additional Labour Court has failed to consider the aforesaid authorities and he has also not recorded his reasons in not accepting the authorities cited supra, hence this Court in exercise of its power has to hold that the findings recorded by the Court are not only erroneous in law but also suffers from error in law, hence the said findings are liable to be quashed.

17. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Srinivasan placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Western India Match Company Limited v Workmen, has laid down the law for the proposition that, an employer cannot enter into an agreement with the workmen which is inconsistent with the Standing Orders clauses of the company in such circumstances the clauses of the Standing Orders must prevail over the terms in the appointment orders and further when the standing orders are in force, it is not permissible for the employer to seek their statutory modifications so that there can be one set of standing orders in respect of certain employees and another for the rest of the workmen. In other words, the employer cannot enforce simultaneously the standing orders regulating the classification of workmen and special agreements with an individual workman settling his categorisation. The learned Counsel for the petitioners-workmen would further submit that with all fours the said judgment has got application to the facts of the workmen involved in these petitions and therefore he contends that incorporation of the terms and conditions at Serial No. 2 in the appointment order regarding the probationary period of 6 months, which can be extended, if considered necessary, the underlined portion of the terms and conditions in the appointment order is contrary to the certified standing orders of the company as there is no express power conferred on the company to extend the probationary period of the petitioners after completion of probationary period of 6 months specified in Clause 4(1) of the Standing Orders. The company has no power to incorporate the terms and conditions referred to above extending the probationary period after expiry of probationary period of six months. By reading Clause 4(1) and (2) of the Standing Orders, they would make it very clear that an employee of the company can be placed on probationary period of six months; there is no power conferred upon the employer after expiry of six months to extend the probationary period and continue them as such. But it has no power to extend the probationary period of the petitioners as has been contended by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent-company placing reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of S. Sukhbans Singh v State of Punjab, Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of Oncology, Bangalore v Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar and Another, Edwin A. Daniel and Another v Labour Court, Coimbatore and Another, K.A. Barat v State of Gujarat and Others, Samsher Singh v State of Punjab and Another and various other judgments cited and relied upon have not been referred in this judgment for the reason that the law laid down in the above said cases are based on the relevant service rules. The law laid down in the said cases has no application to the facts of the present case for the reasons assigned by this Court, The said contention of the company has been accepted by the second respondent-Labour Court, relying on the various authorities referred at paragraphs 10 and 17 of the impugned award and he has recorded the finding considering the judgments of the Supreme Court upon which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the management and he has interpreted the Clause 4(1) and 4(2) of the Standing Orders to the following effect at paragraph 10 of the award: