Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

7. In V.R.Nedunchezhian's case cited supra, the very same term "interlocutory order" as found in Section 19 (3) (c) of the PCA came to be considered by this Court. A learned single Judge of this Court [Hon'ble Mr.Justice M.Karpagavinayagam, as he then was] after having considered the interpretation of the term made in V.C.Shukla's case as well as in Madhu Limaye's case held that insofar as an order declining to discharge an accused under the PCA is concerned, it is an intermediate order against which revision lies under Section 397(1) of the Code. To put it otherwise, the learned Judge held that the meaning given to the said term in Madhu Limaye's case alone is applicable to the cases under the PCA and the restricted meaning given to the said term in V.C.Shukla's case cannot be imported to the Prevention of Corruption Act. The said judgement has been consistently followed by this Court.

8. In the instant case, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor relies on the judgement of the Delhi High Court in Dharambir Khattar's case cited supra wherein it has been held that the restricted meaning given to the term "interlocutory order" in V.C.Shukla's case should be made applicable to the PCA also. In other words, according to the Delhi High Court, an order declining to discharge an accused under the PCA is an interlocutory order and, therefore, it is not revisable. The learned Judge has observed that the non-obstante clause found in Section 11(2) of the SCA was taken note of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to hold that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been made inapplicable to the SCA. Similarly, according to the learned Judge, there is a non obstante clause in Section 19 (3) (c) of the PCA also, which excludes the applicability of Section 397 (3) of the Code. Thus, according to the learned Judge, both the provisions are in pari materia and, therefore, the meaning assigned to the term 'interlocutory order" in V.C.Shukla's case alone is applicable to the PCA. Therefore, according to the learned Judge, the law laid down by this Court in V.R.Nedunchezhian's case cited supra does not reflect the correct position of law.

22. Indisputably, Section 11 of the SCA is in conflict with Section 397 of the Code. The said conflict stands resolved by non-obstante clause in Section 11(2) of the SCA. As per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.M.Kokil's case cited supra, the said non-obstante clause in Section 11(2) of the Act gives over-riding effect for the SCA over the Code of Criminal Procedure. But, I find no such conflict between Section 19(3)(c) of the PCA and Section 397 of the Code. As a matter of fact, both the provisions speak of a common factor viz., they provide that no revision shall lie against an interlocutory order. Section 19(3)(c) of the PCA does not completely exclude the applicability of Section 397 of the Code as it has been done by SCA in Section 11(2) of the Act. There is no provision in PCA which provides either for an appeal or a revision; whereas there is a provision for appeal in SCA. It is because of the said exclusion of Section 397(2) of the Code, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-

"As the non obstante clause expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we cannot call into aid the provisions of s. 397(2) of the Code which would amount to frustrating the very object which S.11 seeks to advance."

23. In the PCA, since there is no such total exclusion of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of revision and since there is no conflict between Section 19(3)(c) of the PCA and Section 397 (2) of the Code, I am of the view that simply because non-obstante clause is found both in S. 11(2) of the PCA and in S. 19(3)(c) of the PCA, it cannot be held that both the provisions are in pari materia. And so, the natural meaning assigned to the expression "interlocutory order" in Section 11 of the SCA cannot be adopted to the said expression in Section 19(3)(c) of the PCA.