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24. A statement made in self-protection, i.e. a statement made by a defendant in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned, enjoys a qualified privilege and is a defence to the tort of defamation. As far back as in 1881, the full bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Chunni Lal v. Narsingh Das, 1917 SCC OnLine All 262; held that the common law principles of defamation were equally applicable in India.

25. The locus classicus on communications made in self- protection being a defence to defamation and a qualified privilege is the observation of Baron Park in the English common law decision of Toogood v Spyring, (1834) 149 ER 1044. The facts of the case were that A, the tenant of a farm, required some repairs to be done at the farm house, and B the agent of the landlord directed C to do the work. C did the work in a negligent manner and further during the progress of it, got drunk; and some circumstances occurred which induced A to believe that C had broken open his cellar door arid obtained access to his cider. Two days afterwards, A met C in the presence of D and charged him with having broken his cellar door, and with having gotten drunk and spoilt the work as well. Afterwards, A told D, in the absence of C, that he was confident that C had broken open the door. On the same day, A complained to B that C had been negligent in his work, had got drunk, and he thought he had broken open his cellar door. It was held that A's complaint to B was a privileged communication. Baron Park held as follows:

Further, Seshagiri Aiyar, J in his concurring opinion also wrote:

"In Toogood v. Spyring, Baron Parke in defining the limits of privilege uses language which has since become classical. He states at page 193:--"In general, an action lies for the malicious publication of statements which are false in fact, and injurious to the character of another (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), and the law considers such publication as malicious, unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs in matters where his interest is concerned. In such cases, the occasion prevents the inference of malice, which the law draws from unauthorised communications, and affords a qualified defence depending upon the absence of actual malice."

In London Association for Protection of Trade v. Greenlands, Ltd.(2) and in Adam v. Ward(3), this dictum of the learned Baron Was regarded as laying down the law correctly. Reference may also be made to Hamon v. Faile(4) and to Stuart v. Bell(5). The point for determination therefore is whether the words published to D'Souza come within the protection referred to in the dictum above quoted. There can be no doubt that the defendant was acting in the discharge of a private duty, and that the communication related to the conduct of his own affairs. He was under the employ Of the Saits. He had rightly or wrongly come to the conclusion that the Saits were anxious to get rid of him. Under these Circumstances, if he asked D'Souza, a subordinate of the Saits and who was also a subordinate of his, to institute enquiries regarding the truth of the suspicion, Was he not acting in the conduct of his own affairs and in respect of a matter in which his own interests were concerned? I am of opinion that the communication to D'Souza comes within the principle of Baron Parke's pronouncement, Mr. Richmond contended that the person to whom the communication is made must have an equal interest with the communicator if the privilege is to be maintained. He relied on Force v. Warren(1), which to a certain extent supports him. In Whitley v. Adams(2), Erle, C.J., said:

--"So also is the rule as to giving information concerning private individuals, when given bona fide, and to a person having an interest in making the enquiry." I do not understand the learned Chief Justice to have laid down that unless the person who receives the communication is equally interested there can be no privilege. He was only referring to one class of cases. As a matter of fact if we look into the earlier portion of the judgment, it is clear that the Lord Chief Justice was stating the law in terms identical with those employed by Baron Parke. He states:"Not only, therefore was the defendant in my judgment discharging a social and moral duty, but he was also acting with a just view to his own interest in writing that letter." Mr. Justice Byles in the same case says that the law has been well laid down in Toogood v. Spyring(3). Mr. Richmond stated that if the receiver of the communication is a friend or a police officer, the privilege would exist. I fail to see why the communication made to a subordinate with a view to starting an enquiry should stand on a different footing. In (1891) 2 Q. B. 341, communication made to a friend was considered to be within the rule enunciated by Baron Parke. The same principle governs communications made to a subordinate. In my opinion the communication made to D'Souza was privileged."