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4. Mr. Joshi submitted that in view of commencement of the CIRP, the suit against the 2nd defendant cannot proceed and by operation of law, viz. Section 14 of the Code, interim relief cannot continue and hence the 2 nd defendant has approached this court for vacating that order in view of the change in the circumstances. It is also contended that if the order is not vacated, it would adversely impact the CIRP. Mr. Joshi has therefore submitted that the Administrator proposes to make attempts at revival and those efforts cannot be frustrated on account of the injunction and hence he sought an order vacating the ad-interim stay dated 4th November 2020.

15. Dr. Saraf has invited my attention to the affidavit-in-reply filed by one Kaustubh Sudame, the Authorized Signatory of the plaintiff, and submits that the application is filed without the authority of the COC under the Code and there is not an iota of a reason or any factor that could cause prejudice to the ongoing affairs of defendant no.2. The affidavit goes on to state that the application does not disclose any change in circumstances or any need for vacating the ad-interim order. In the absence of any such pleadings, demonstrating specific change in circumstances or inability to carry on the affairs of the 2nd respondent there is no occasion to entertain the present application and modify the order, moreso, since the moratorium is already operating. It is contended that there are proceedings pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai against defendant no.2 and various interim orders continue to operate. According to Dr. Saraf, the initiation of insolvency proceedings before the NCLT and the declaration of moratorium cannot be a ground for vacating the protective orders passed by this court. Thus, apart from maintainability of the IA for want of specific permission of the NCLT or the COC, Dr. Saraf submits that the IA has no merit and deserves to be rejected. In particular, Dr. Saraf has invited my attention to the provisions of Section 12A of the Code, which empowers the NCLT to permit withdrawal of an application admitted under Section 7 or 9 or 10 with the approval of 90% of voting share of the COC. This, he fears, will result in interim protection granted in the suit to be negated without any opportunity to the plaintiff to seek restoration of an order or any preventive relief. It is not as if the interim order, if vacated, would be restored upon withdrawal of proceedings being permitted by the NCLT. In these circumstances, Dr. Saraf submits that no action requires to be taken. The court need not pass any orders staying or vacating the injunction and it is for the applicant to carry out its duties under the Code. He therefore submits that the application be rejected.

17. The instant case also is similar, inasmuch as, no further steps can be taken in execution or enforcement of orders passed by this court by virtue of the moratorium and Dr. Saraf submits that there is no warrant to vacate the order since the law does not provide for such an eventuality merely because a moratorium has come into effect. He has cited a decision of the Delhi High 10 (1987) 3 SCC 99 Court in Daiichi Sankyo Company Ltd. Vs. Malvinder Mohan Singh and Ors. 11, in which group of matters dealing with execution applications against the company which was enjoying a protection of the moratorium. An order dated 15th January 2020 records the various submissions of the parties, recognizes that a COC has been appointed and observes that due to the moratorium, no further orders needs to be passed except to state that the execution proceedings cannot be continued against the applicants during the period of moratorium. This is the correct approach inasmuch as this court is also not required to take any further steps, cannot take any further steps and need not pass any orders vacating injunction or modifying it. He therefore submits that the application is misconceived and is liable to be rejected.

22. In the present case, the injunction order has been passed on 4 th November 2020. No attempt was made to vacate or modify that order. It is only after the moratorium is being declared that the Administrator of defendant no.2 seeks to vacate that order. The corporate debtor felt no need to do so since the order is a protective order and preventing them from encumbering and frittering away assets including to defeat claims of creditors. In the present set of circumstances, I find no reason to interfere, invoke and exercise inherent powers. The decisions in the various other judgments that have been relied upon by the applicant merely record the effect of the IBC, the moratorium and the need to preserve its assets during the resolution process that is achieved by the injunction as well. The purpose of the moratorium is not in dispute and thus reliance upon P. Mohanraj and Ors. Vs. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. 12 and Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Jyoti Structures Ltd. 13 is of no assistance to the applicant. The fact that the IBC is a complete Code is also not disputed. It deals with insolvency and since it is a unified and a complete Code, the legislature would certainly have envisaged situations such as the one at hand and would have provided for vacating of injunctions and orders appointing Receivers and other orders securing claimants' / plaintiffs' interest, but that is not the case.