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7. The accused, on being served with summons in all the cases appeared in the court below and filed an application urging that all these complaints had been filed nearly after expiry of 11 to 12 years. According to the accused, the complaints were barred by limitation under section 468(2), Criminal Procedure Code. Section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, read as :

"Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. -
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be -
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years."

8. In this case, as already indicated, the punishment prescribed under para 76(b) may extend to six months imprisonment or a fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000 or both. Therefore, the accused contended that the limitation of one year prescribed by section 468(2), Cr. P.C., would be applicable to the facts of this case. He also relied on section 469, Cr. P.C., which reads thus :

20. In the said case also, an application was filed that the complaint was barred by the period of limitation as laid down under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate held that they were all continuing offences and the question did not arise. The accused filed a petition in the Madhya Pradesh High Court. By a judgment dated 6th July, 1977, the learned Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh upheld the order of the trial court and dismissed the revision petitions. The directors of the company who, along with the company, were arraigned as the accused had filed those appeals for special leave against the judgment of the High Court and thus those matters came up before the Supreme Court. In paragraph 7 of the judgment it is stated (at p. 101) :

31. Sri Shivappa then referred me to a cyclostyled copy of an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on 17th September, 1984, in the case of Provident Fund Inspector v. Delhi Faridabad Textile Mills. It reads :

"Heard counsel for the parties. We are clearly of the opinion that section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, can have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case inasmuch as refusal to pay provident fund and to submit returns is a continuous offence and every day the breach continues, a fresh cause of action arises. We are buttressed by a decision of this Court (Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of M.P., Criminal Appeal Nos. 407-418 of 1979 and allied matters) rendered on 24th August, 1984, since reported in [1986] 68 FJR 98. The appeal is, therefore, allowed; the order of the trial court as confirmed by the High Court is set aside, and the case is sent back to the trial court for proceeding further in accordance with law, with expedition."