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13. Several contentions have been raised on behalf of the writ petitioners which are abstractly stated hereunder :

(i) That the statutory provisions contained in Sections 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, and 37 of the Tribunals Act encroach upon the independence of judiciary violating the basic structure of the Constitution of India and as such, they arc unconstitutional;

(ii) The Supreme Court having held in Chandra Kumar's case (supra) that the power of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is the basic structure of the Constitution of India and is invoilablc and cannot be abrogated, ought not to have placed fetters on the exercise of the said powers by imposing alternative remedy principle, and that discretion vested in the High Court to exercise the jurisdiction is an incidence of Article 226 power and that no specific discretion can be given by the Supreme Court that only Division Benches of High Courts should hear matters arising under the Tribunals Act;

14. Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, the learned senior Counsel, led the arguments for the petitioners. He has reiterated the contentions that the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar 's case (supra) has tested only the validity of Section 28 of the Tribunals Act and clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B of the Constitution of India and struck down the same on the ground that the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court and High Courts is the basic structure of the Constitution of India and as such, cannot be excluded and that other provisions of the Tribunals Act have not been interpreted and as such arc open to challenge. He submits that even the finding of the Supreme Court relating to Section 5(6) of the Tribunals Act does not form the ratio decidendi, but is only an obiter and in any event, the Supreme Court cannot create the Tribunal as the 3rd constitutional Court and the Tribunals arc not so constituted to have competence to exercise the power of judicial review of legislation which in result erodes the power of the said judicial review and ultimately results in violation of the basic structure theory. He also submits that the power of appointment of the Chairman, Vicc-Chairman and Members is vested in the executive-Government and that the executive Government being the major litigant and in feet the litigant in each and every case as one of the parties, the independence of judiciary in the Administrative Tribunals cannot be maintained and as such is violative of the basic structure theory. He also submits that when the Chairman who is the Judge of High Court cannot be removed excepting by impeachment, he is vulnerable for just removal without the process of impeachment under the Constitution and that the tenure of five years fixed for the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members shakes the confidence of the said adjudicators of the Tribunal making them vulnerable for influence. The constitution of the Benches is to be made by the Government, the financial power is vested in the Government, the procedure that should be adopted in discharging the functions has to be stated by the Government, placement of restrictions on interim orders, ineffectiveness of the execution of me Tribunals' orders and vesting of rule-making power in the Central Government etc., are stated to derogatory to the independent status of the Tribunal and making the Tribunal as a body subordinate to the Government and as such violates the independence of the judiciary.

37. The Supreme Court and the High Courts are the constitutional functionaries, of which the Supreme Court is the superior. Apart from the appellate power under Article 136, the Supreme Court possesses the original jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution to issue writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is empowered to issue writs for enforcement of fundamental rights as also in other matters. We need not trace the history of the power of judicial review by referring to the pre-constitutional decisions as it is a firmly established that rule of law and judicial review are the basic features of the Constitution of India. Keshavananda Bharathi 's case (supra) is the first significant judgment on this aspect of judicial review being the basic structure of the Constitution and that it is unamendable. Several Supreme Court judgments have affirmed this. The power of judicial review over administrative and legislative actions has been exercised by the Supreme Court and High Courts in several cases. The Supreme Court has said that the power of judicial review can be exercised even for the actions inside the Legislature when it tells upon the independence of judiciary (vide hi Re under Article 143 Constitution of India Keshav Singh's case, , that the Speaker's action of disqualification of elected representatives of legislative bodies can be questioned (vide Kihoto Hollohan v. Zaehillhu, (1992) Supp(2) SCC 651, that imposition of President's rule under Article 356 of the Constitution can be tested (vide S.R. Bombay v. Union of India, ), and that impeachment of a Judge of the High Court or Supreme Court can be tested (vide Sub-committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, ) and so on. We need not multiply the decisions, for, Chandra Kumar's case (supra) decided by the Supreme Court affirms the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. In Chandra Kumar's case (supra) the decisions rendered by the Constitution Benches in Sampath Kumar's case (supra), J.B. Choprav, Union of India, , MB. Majunuiar v. Union of India, , Amulya Chandra Kalita v. Union of India, , UK. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 4SCC 119, Keshavananda Bharathi's case (supra), Keshav Singh 's case (supra) Indira Nehru Gandhi v. RajNaraian, AIR 1975 SC 2291= (1975) Supp SCC 1, Minerva Mills v. Union of India, , Kihoto's case (supra) and Dr. Mahabal Ram v. Indian Council Agricultural Research, were considered and it was held by unanimity Court of 7 Judges Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court that the power of the High Court under Article 226/227 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution are the basic features of the Constitution and the said constitutional Courts cannot be divested of the said basic features and that the said rights, which form the basic structure of the Constitution, are inviolable rights and cannot be taken away. In the said case, the Supreme Court while upholding the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, held that Tribunals cannot be called effective alternative mechanism, but at the best, they can be called as alternative mechanism and precisely what the Supreme Court said was that the Tribunal has to be treated as a Court of first instance playing a supplemental role and subject to the judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226/ 227 of the Constitution. Accepting that judicial review is the basic structure of the Constitution and the Supreme Court and the High Courts cannot be divested of the same and that the power of judicial review still vests in the Supreme Court and High Courts under Article 32 and Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India over service matters, the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar 's case (supra) has struck down Article 323-A (2)(d) and consequently, Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and as such, there need not be any multiplication of decisions on the point of power of judicial review of the Supreme Court and High Court?. But, the proposition in Chandra Kumar's case (supra ) laid down by the Supreme Court though recognises the power of judicial review of the High Court, but in view of imposition of alternative remedy, there is a metamorphosis in the nature of judicial review of the High Court. It is also the same in the case of Supreme Court under Article 32 as the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar's case (supra) has emphatically said firstly, the litigant has to approach the Tribunal, then the High Court and then as a last resort to the Supreme Court under Article 136. Article 136, as enacted originally in this Constitution, confers the ultimate power of appeal on the Supreme Court, over all matters decided by the Courts and other authorities in the entire country. Article 136 is not the original jurisdiction, while Article 32 is. That original jurisdiction is now not available because of Chandra Kumar's case (supra). The High Court cannot also exercise its extraordinary original jurisdiction. Judicial review is of three kinds viz., (i) Legislative action, (ii) administrative action and (iii) judicial decision. Basically, the judicial review of administrative action as also of legislative action is an exercise against the action of the State, as public authorities act in exercise of the above executive or legislative powers. Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a subject of public law and as such, the essence of judicial review involves collateral attach against the legislative or executive action in deciding on the said actions of the above two coordinate authorities. But, that basic feature of extraordinary original jurisdiction had undergone change by Chandra Kumar's case and in view of alternative remedy principle enunciated, the High Court can only test the judgment of the Tribunal, which in effect is the exercise of judicial review of a judicial decision of the Tribunal. It has also to be borne in mind that 42nd Constitution Amendment incorporating Article 32-A has lost its fervor of Constitutional amendment because of the striking down of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A and what is left is the ordinary legislation.

(b) in the case of any other Member, the age of sixty-two years."

Now, because of Chandra Kumar's case (supra) the Tribunal has the power of judicial review of administrative action, judicial decisions (arising under Section 29-A of the Tribunals Act) and also of legislative action. As stated above, since last 13 years, much time is lost only in the legal squabbles on the validity or otherwise of the Tribunals Act. But, now a situation has arisen to stabilise Service Law Justice Delivery System and to take effective steps in that direction in the light of what is stated by the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar's case (supra). In view of the important functions of the judicial review of three kinds mentioned supra and more so of the more important one i.e., judicial review of legislative action, there is a requirement for superior ability. The interpretation of Constitution is in many vital respects different from the interpretation of an ordinary statute. Not only is the task of interpretation of Constitution more onerous, but it also calls upon a wide perspective and a richer equipment on the part of the Judge because it is an organic instrument. Proper application of a Constitution requires a lot of study of law. In a judicial review of legislation, it has to be seen as to what are the legal limits on the Legislature. In the case of judicial review of administrative action, there should be a clear-cut finding of facts, for which thorough marshalling of facts is necessary and then application of judicial precedents relevant thereto. In fact, in most of the cases decided by the Administrative Tribunal, be it State or Central, in the State of Andhra Pradcsh, no clear-cut findings are being given and so also the application of relevant and binding judicial precedents. The Administrative Tribunals have to now realise that they are the Courts of first instance and discharge their functions in the light of their status as such, as stated by the Supreme Court so as to lessen the burden of the High Court relating to facts as also application of law thereto. The direction of the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar 's case (supra) to elevate the standards of the Tribunals, has to be taken in the context, apart from other elements including security of tenure, the quality of the personnel manning the Tribunals. The said Judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court on 18-3-1997. Nearly 20 months rolled by, but no steps have been taken by the Government to give effect to the said law laid down by the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar's case (supra). The role of the High Court to exercise the power of judicial review having become secondary, there is every duty cast upon the Government to see that the Administrative Tribunals be transformed into effective adjudicatory bodies. It is needless to mention that the present setup of the Administrative Tribunals cannot meet the aspirations of the litigants and the challenges in the adjudicatory process of complicated questions of constitution and law. That is the general opinion of the Bar including the learned Advocate-General, who, in fact, had openly expressed his opinion that the present set up of Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal is not up to the standard. When the Supreme Court had decided the Sampath Kumar's case (supra) the time was too short to judge the functioning of the administrative Tribunals and as such, it was held that the administrative Tribunals are the substitutes for the High Court and as such, mere was no violation of basic structure theory. But, after 1 lyears of the said judgment, the Supreme Court had acknowledged in Chandra Kumar's case (supra) that the working of the administrative Tribunals did not inspire the confidence in litigant public and as such held that the administrative Tribunals can never be called substitutes for the High Courts, but, they will play only a supplemental role and that too, as a Court of first instance. It is not that the Supreme Court was unaware of the deficiencies in the set-up of administrative Tribunals and the personnel manning the same, but the Supreme Courty strove hard to maintain balance by giving effect to 42nd Constitution Amendment and the consequent enactment of Tribunals Act and creation of Central Administrative Tribunal at Delhi and at headquarters of several States and setting-up of State Administrative Tribunals and did not want to frustrate the legislation made by the Parliament, which was with an avowed object of lessening the burden of the High Courts and leaving the latter to deal with other varied and important matters and to settle the service matters by inexpensive and speedy disposals, yet maintaining the basic structure of Constitution i.e., power of judicial review by the High Court to make a scrutiny of the decisions of the administrative tribunals. With regard to desirability of continuance of the administrative tribunals, it is apt to extract what the Supreme Court said in Chandra Kumar's case (supra):