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15. Sri P. V. Subhrahmanya Sharma, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in writ petition No.21329 of 1997 has submitted that the fetters imposed by the Supreme Court in Chandra Kumar's case (supra) on the High Courts' exercise of original jurisdiction without exhaustion of remedy before the Tribunal is unconstitutional and that the Supreme Court has failed to take note of the fact that clause (3) which was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution 42nd Amendment was done away with by Constitution 44th Amendment and from this the constitutional intent was not to place any fetters and that the Supreme Court ought not to have placed such fetters. He has also emphasised the need for independence of judiciary and reiterated the arguments advanced by Sri S. Ramachandra Rao with regard to maintaining the independence of judiciary and also the lack of such infrastructure in the Tribunal to have the power of judicial review of legislative action and that under Article 141 of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court could not make an imposition of either directing the High Courts to hear the matters only by Benches and to entertain the cases only after the exhaustion of remedy before the Tribunals. He has also given comparative instances of there being no fixed term for the members of Industrial Tribunal, Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Customs Appellate Tribunal and A.P, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and the similar need to have the same provisions without any tenure restrictions but only with maximum age restriction so as to ensure the independence of the judiciary. He was also critical of the mode of appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members on the ground that there is lot of say for the executive-Government. He also cited Government of Andhra Pradesh v. D. Siva Prasad, , stating that the appointments of three Administrative Members of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal viz., of Ch. Venkatapathi Raju, DVLN Murthy and T. Mnnivenkalappa were found to be irregular by the Division Bench of this Court. He brings to the notice of this Court that there are thousands of Original Applications and Contempt Cases pending before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal and that the A.P. Administrative Tribunal cannot be said to be effective alternative remedy to the High Court. He cited Union of India v, K.S. Subramanian, , for the proposition that in Keshavananda Bhamthi v. State of Kerala, , it was held that independence of judiciary is the basic structure of the Constitution and that if any law is made in derogation of such laws, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and even in Chandra Kumar 's case (supra) placing fetters on the jurisdiction the High Court is treated as a law under Article 141, tire said law is contrary to the larger Bench's view in Keshavananda Bharathi 's case (supra) and is, thus, unconstitutional.

38. It is true that bar of alternative remedy was created by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 and that the same was removed by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. But, by that itself, it cannot be said that the High Court has to entertain each and every case even if alternative remedy is available. Even before the fetter placed by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, there had been a line of decisions and particularly by the Supreme Court, right from the birth of the Constitution, that alternative remedy is an important circumstance to consider while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and the High Court should not exercise jurisdiction when the effective alternative remedy is available. In Baburam v. Zilla Parishad, , the Supreme Court held that when alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant he should be required pursue that remedy and not to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue prerogative writ. It was also held that exhaustion of statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ; but existence of an adequate legal remedy is to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such remedy exists, it will be sound exercise of jurisdiction to refuse to interfere with the writ jurisdiction unless there are good grounds therefor. It was also held that rule of exhausting of statutory remedy before a writ is granted, is a rule of self-imposed limitation, a rule of policy and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may, therefore, in exceptional cases issue a writ such as writ of certiorari notwithstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. In the said case the previous judgments of the Supreme Court in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kainma, and U.P, State v. Mohd Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 were relied on.