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was sound. The High Court expressed the view that question would have to be determined if and when the textile mills wanted to enforce their rights under the procedure laid down under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940). On the finding that the Government of Mysore was legally, competent to revise the rates, the four writ petitions were ;dismissed on January 29, 1958. By March 31, 1958, the four textile mills were, in heavy:

arrears with regard to the payment of the increased rates for the supply of electric energy to them, though they had paid in full according to ,the old rates. After the constitution of the Board in September, 1957, the Board made repeated demands on the basis of the increased rates and asked the textile mills; to clear all arrears due by them according to the revised rates. The textile mills having failed to do so, they were informed that the Board would cut off the supply in exercise of its power under s. 24 of the 1910 Act. The textile mills thereupon contended that a dispute had arisen between them on one side and the Boar on the other and the dispute had to be submitted to arbitration n under the provisions of s. 76 of the 1948 Act. The four textile-mills then nominated their arbitrator. On November 13, 1958, the Board filed four applications before the District judge, Bangalore, under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, in which it asked for a declaration that the dispute between the four textile mills and the Board was not liable to be referred to arbitration under s. 76 of the 1948 Act and also for a direction to restrain the four textile mills from seeking arbitration in respect of the alleged dispute. These four applications gave rise to four miscellaneous cases which were dealt with by the learned Additional District judge, ,Bangalore, by a common order. The learned Additional District judge allowed the petitions and held that the-four textile mills were not entitled to the benefit of s. 76 of the 1948 Act, because the dispute between the Board and the four textile mills as to the rates for the supply of electric energy was not liable to be referred to arbitration under that section. The order of the learned Additional District judge :by which he disposed of the four petitions was dated April 17, 1959. From that order the textile mills preferred petitions in revision to the High Court of Mysore. Four such petitions were filed in respect of the four miscellaneous cases. By a common order dated August 19, 1960, the High Court allowed the petitions in revision holding that s. 76 of the 1948 Act applied, and the respondent textile mills were entitled to call for an arbitration in respect of the dispute between them and the Board in the matter of the revised rates. The Board then asked for and obtained a certificate of fitness from the High Court and on that certificate of fitness, these four appeals have come to this court from the a fore said order of the High Court dated August 19, 1960. It may perhaps be stated here that after the constitution of the Board in 1957, another expert committee was appointed to rationalise the various tariffs prevailing in the State of Mysore with regard to the supply of electric energy and on the re-commendations of this Committee the rates were revised a third time. But these last revised rates came into effect from July 1, 1959, when presumably the revision petitions in the High Court were pending. Before we embark on a discussion of the principal question involved in these appeals, it is perhaps necessary to say a few words about the interrelation of the two Acts, the 1910 Act and the 1948 Act. Section 70 of the 1948 Act indicates that relation. It states inter alia that no provision of the 1910 Act or any rules made thereunder shall have any effect so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the 1948 Act; where, however, the provisions of the two Acts are not inconsistent, the provisions of the 1948 Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the 1910 Act. It would, therefore, be necessary for us to refer to the relevant provisions of the two Acts on two points which bear upon the principal question mooted before us. These two points are-(a) what are the powers of the Board or its predecessor Government to revise the rates for the supply of electric energy and can a dispute be raised by the textile mills with regard to such revision; and (b) what are the provisions in the two Acts for the settlement of disputes by arbitration and who are the persons who can be parties to such a dispute ? In considering the aforesaid two points, a distinction has to be kept in mind. We are concerned in this case with two periods. The first period is from 1953 to September 30, 1957, when the Board was constituted. The second period is the period of the Board commencing from September 30, 1957, till November 13, 1958, when the applications under s. 33 of the Arbitration Act were made. As we have stated earlier, the revision which is in dispute in these cases took place in the first period, that is, before the constitution of the Board. We have pointed out earlier that the third revision of rates took effect from July 1, 1959, when the revision petitions in the High Court were pending.

76 which we have already set out earlier in this judgment. There is some difference in the scheme of s. 76 from that of s. 52. Section 76 is in two parts : the first subsection states, in general terms that all questions arising between the State Government or the Board on one side and a licensee or other person on the other shall be determined by arbitration; the second sub-section states that where any question or matter is by the 1948 Act required to be referred to arbitration, it shall be so referred to the persons specified in cls. (a) and (b); in cl, (a) the authority named by the Act shall be the arbitrator and in cl. (b) the reference shall be to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party to the dispute. Sub-section (2) to s. 76 corresponds, more or less, to s. 52 of the 1910 Act, but sub-sec. (1) of s. 76 is more general in nature. The 1948 Act also contains several provisions besides s. 76 (1) which require certain matters to be referred to arbitration. These provisions are s. 19 (4), s. 40, s. 44 (3), s. 45(3), S. 55 (2) and some clauses of the First and the Fourth Schedule. Some of these provisions constitute the Central Electricity Authority, constituted under s. 3 of the 1948 Act, as the arbitrating authority. Section 19 (4) states that if any question arises under sub-s. (1) thereof as to the reasonableness of the terms or conditions or time therein mentioned, it shall be determined as provided in s. 76. Now, s. 19 (1) deals with the powers of the Board to supply electricity to any licensee or person requiring such supply in any area in which a scheme sanctioned under Ch. V is in force. It is clear that s. 19 (4) does not apply in the present case. If it did, then the respondents might be intitled to claim an arbitration under sub-s. (2) of s. 76.

Thus, it appears from what we have stated above, that none of the provisions of the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act make the present dispute a matter directed or required to be referred to arbitration either under s. 52 of the 1910 Act or s. 76 (2) of the 1948 Act. Therefore, the respondents can call for an arbitration under s. 76 (1) of the Act, if they can establish that the dispute in the present case is a question which arises under the 1948 Act. It is indeed true that sub-s. (1) of s. 76 uses words of wide amplitude. It states that "all questions arising between the State Government or the Board and a licensee or other person shall be determined by arbitration." We, however, think that it is implicit in the sub-section that the question is one which arises under the 1948 Act. Obviously, it could not have been contemplated that any question arising between the State Government on one side and any person on the other shall be determined by arbitration. If that were the meaning of the sub-section, then all litigation between the State Government on one side and any person on the other will have to be referred to arbitration. We do not think that can be the meaning of the sub-section. When the sub- section states " all questions arising between the State Government etc.,"'it must mean questions which arise under or have relation to the 1948 Act. A dispute between the Government and a private citizen or a dispute between the Government and its employee, unrelated to the 1948 Act, cannot be subject of an arbitration under this sub-section. If that be the correct interpretation, then the respondents, before they can succeed, must establish that the dispute as to revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956 is a dispute which arises under the 1948 Act. It would be anomalous to hold that a dispute regarding revision or fixing rates of supply made by Government before the Board was constituted arises under the 1948 Act, when even a revision of rates made by the Board under s. 49 of the 1948 Act will not be referable to arbitration. We are, therefore, of the view that the dispute in these cases is not one which arises under the 1948 Act.

Under the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 the State Electricity Board has all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and under s. 26 of the 1948 Act that Act itself is deemed to be the license of the Board for the purpose of that Act. There are, however, two exceptions to this, The first exception is mentioned in the proviso to s. 26 by which certain provisions of the 1910 Act are made inapplicable to the Board and these include clauses IX to XII of the schedule which deal with charges for the supply of electrical energy. The other exception is in the definition of "licensee" in which it is said that notwithstanding the, provisions of s. 26 the term "'licensee" as used in the Supply Apt 1948, does not include the Board. In other words, though the Board carries on work as a licensee for the purposes of the 1910 Act, it is not a licensee in the true sense of the word And duties and obligations of a licensee in the matter of charges and fixing of rates for consumption of electrical energy are not applicable to the Board. It is, therefore. quite clear that no dispute between a consumer and the State Electricity Board can arise under the 1948 Act in the matter of the rates at which the Board supplies electrical energy. In the present cases, there is a still stronger reason for coming to the conclusion that there was no dispute under the Act which could be referred to arbitration because the rates 'were fixed by the State Government in 1953 and 1956 and the Board itself came into existence in 1957. When we questioned Mr. Vishwanath Sastri, how he said that this was a dispute arising under the 1948 Act, he referred us to s.60 of the Supply Act which makes the Board a successor of the State Government in respect of the matters to which the" Act applies. He said that if the State Government was incompetent to revise the rates in 1953 and 1956, the board as its successor would be the appropriate party with which the dispute can be raised. In my opinion such, a dispute between the State Government or Board on the one hand and a consumer on the other in respect of the rates of electrical energy (apart from any contract that might have been entered into) does not arise under the 1948 Act at, all. No provision of the 1948 Act has been brought to our notice which would embrace such a dispute' and as I have already pointed out above that it is only a dispute arising 'under the 1948 Act which, can be compulsorily referred to arbitration.