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5. There is ample authority for this view. In Ellis v. Torrington [1920] 1 K. B. 399 Bankes L.J. stated that the rule that a bare right of action for damages is not assignable rested on the principle that the law will not recognise any transaction savouring of maintenance or champerty, and that there is an exception to the rule, and the exception is where the assignee can establish that he has an interest in the suit. The learned Lord Justice then referred to the observations of Best C.J. in Williams v. Protheroe (1829) 2 M. & P. 779 and observed (p. 407) :-

It was held then that the purchase of an estate conferred on the purchaser an interest sufficient to validate an assignment of a right of action for damages for breach of a covenant to repair the premises, and that the law of champerty could not be invoked to defeat his rights under the assignment.

The learned Lord Justice was of opinion that where a right to profit is appurtenant to the right to property, it is not a bare right to sue. The judgment of Scrutton L.J. is very instructive on the point under consideration, The learned Lord Justice pointed out that early in the development of the law the Courts of equity and perhaps the Courts of common law also took the view that where the right of action was not a bare right but was incident or subsidiary to a right in property, an assignment of a right of action was permissible, and did not savour of champerty or maintenance. In support of this statement the learned Lord Justice referred to Glegg v. Bromley [1912] 3 K. B. 474, Dawson v. Great Northern and City Railway [1905] 1 K. B. 260, and Dickinson v. Burrell (I860) L.R. 1 Eq. 337 All these cases emphasize the distinction between the assignment of a bare right of action for damages and the gale of property with all incidents attached to it, and upheld the validity of the latter. Warrington L.J.also took the same view.

If the decision to which I was a party is to be understood as laying down that even in cases of actual transfer of mesne profits as subsidiary to the enjoyment of the property the right cannot be enforced, I am not prepared to stand by its.

10. As far as I can see, the course of decisions in Madras does not seem to be uniform. Whatever the view of the Madras High Court may be, I am unable to agree with the view taken in Seetamma a case, and in my opinion, the word "mere" in Clause (e) of Section 6 makes the position clear. The rule, as pointed out by Bankes L.J., is based on champerty and maintenance, and these specific rules of English law against maintenance and champerty have not been adopted in British India.