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15. In view of the aforesaid, we have no doubt in our mind that since the scheme of selection, as made in the rules nowhere contemplates prescription of the minimum cutoff marks for viva voce/interview, in the light of the law laid- down by the Apex Court in Ramesh Kumar (supra), such a prescription in the advertisement was not permissible.

16. Reverting to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar (supra), which, in our opinion, is directly on the point. The High Court of Delhi in the advertisement issued for the selection process, as in the present case, had prescribed minimum of 50% marks for General category and 45% marks for Reserved category in the viva voce test. That prescription has been found to be norms for selection and not a procedural matter. On that finding, the Supreme court opined that the selection process must be carried forward on the basis of the norms for selection prescribed in the statutory rules in force. In absence of statutory rule on that subject/issue, the appointment process must be in conformity with the decisions of the Supreme Court (including in All India Judges' Association (3) Vs. Union of India). In para 18, the Court concluded that in absence of any statutory requirement of securing minimum marks in interview, the Delhi High Court ought to have followed the same principles as envisaged in All India Judges' Association (3) case and the argument of acquiescence can be of no avail. Notably, in that case the Court granted relief to the writ petitioners before it because, the selection to the post involved had not been completed in any subsequent years to the selection process under challenge. This is amply clear from the dictum in paragraph 18 of the said decision which is extracted in its entirety in paragraph 11 above.

17. Accordingly, even if the present set of writ petitioners before this Court would succeed on the argument that minimum cut off marks for viva voce/interview cannot be prescribed by way of advertisement inviting applications, the question is whether any relief can be granted to the petitioners. As has been pointed out earlier, the Rules before amendment expressly provided that unfilled vacancies during the concerned selection process shall not be carried forward. Indeed, after the amendment, unfilled vacancies in the given selection process can be carried forward. However, as per the Rules, those vacancies get subsumed in the following selection process. In other words, the unfilled vacancies of the selection process of the year 2007 got merged and subsumed in the vacancies notified in the year 2008. As a result, 20 vacancies were notified in the year 2008. In the selection process for the year 2008 only 9 candidates were selected and the unfilled vacancies were merged and subsumed in the vacancies notified in the year 2010. As a result, in 2010, 20 vacancies were advertised as against which only 3 candidates were selected. Indeed, the writ petitioners participated in the said selection process but the unfilled vacancies as per the Rules got subsumed in the vacancies notified for selection process of the subsequent year(s). The High Court has already notified all the vacancies in the advertisement issued in 2014. Considering the fact that the advertisement issued on 28.11.2014 for examination of Entry Level 2015, 83 vacancies/posts have been notified which include the unfilled vacancies in the examination conducted in 2010, no relief can be granted to these writ petitioners unlike in the case of Ramesh Kumar (supra), wherein the selection process to the post against which relief was claimed by the writ petitioner had not been completed in any subsequent year to the selection process under challenge. Notably, there is no challenge to the rule providing for merging or subsuming of vacant posts in relation to examination conducted in 2010 in the subsequent advertisement(s) issued for that purpose, for which reason also the petitioners cannot succeed in getting any relief.

18. To get over this position, two fold argument was canvassed before us, on behalf of the petitioners. Firstly, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar and others Vs. Jot Ram 6, it was argued that the relief claimed by the petitioner must be determined as on the date of institution of proceedings and since they had approached the Apex Court within time, only on the ground of delay or laches or because of subsequent event they cannot be denied the relief. This argument at best, in our opinion, will be available to writ petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.88/2015, 1373/2015, 1376/2015, 1381/2015 and 2531/2015 who had filed writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging the results declared by the High Court in 6 AIR 1976 SC 49 relation to selection process held in 2010. They had filed writ petitions immediately thereafter. That contention may also be available to the writ petitioner in Writ Petition No.No.1372/2015 who had immediately filed writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging the selection process of 2008, culminated with the declaration of results. As regards, other writ petitioners having filed writ petition, after the subsequent selection process had commenced cannot get any relief whatsoever. With regard to the writ petitions filed immediately after the culmination of selection process with declaration of results of the concerned year, the interim relief granted by the Court was of limited nature

19. It is not possible to overlook the vested rights of candidates who have been declared to have been selected and also appointed against the concerned vacancies for the year 2007, 2008 and 2010 respectively. The claim of the writ petitioners could be taken forward if the vacancies of the concerned year in which he (they) had appeared for examination was kept vacant and not notified in the subsequent advertisement for selection of candidates. It is, however, clear from the record that the unfilled vacancies were notified in the subsequent advertisement for selection and the selection process proceeded on that basis. None of the petitioners participated in the subsequent selection process. As the unfilled vacancies got subsumed by operation of law and also because it was notified in the subsequent selection process advertisement, no relief can be granted to these petitioners. For, no relief or challenge in that regard is found in the writ petitions though amended. Therefore, it is not possible to accommodate the writ petitioners by setting aside the selection of candidates who have already been appointed in the vacancies of the concerned year and more so when no relief in that behalf has been claimed by the petitioners. In other words, the unfilled vacancies for the examinations held in 2007, 2008 and 2010 are no more existing, having been notified in the subsequent selection process advertised for that purpose. Similarly, no direction can be issued to unseat the already appointed candidates merely because he (they) may have secured lesser aggregate marks than the aggregate marks of the writ petitioners in the concerned selection process. The candidates appointed against the vacancies of 2007, 2008 and for that matter 2010 have completed substantial service and unseating them would result in causing serious miscarriage of justice to them, as they could have otherwise been appointed against the unfilled vacancies.