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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 108/ 56. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and decree dated May 27, 1953, of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 176 of 1949, against the judgment and decree dated December 20, 1948, of the District Judge, Ludhiana, arising out of the Judgment and decree dated February 6, 1948, of the Subordinate Judge, 11 Class, Ludhiana, in Suit No. 918 of 1946.

Gopal Singh, for the appellants.

C. B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the respondents. 1960. May 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J.-The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by the respondents I and 2 Sher Singh and Labh Singh, for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by the first appellant, Jai Kaur, in respect of 8 (1-10) Bighas of land which she had inherited from her husband, Dev Singh, in favour of her two daughters, the 2nd & 3rd appellants before us, " shall be null and void against the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs ", and defendant Nos. 4 to 6 after the death of defendant No. 1 (i.e., Jai Kaur) and shall not be binding upon them. The plaintiffs' case was that these lands left by Dev Singh were all ancestral lands qua the plaintiffs and according to the customary law which governs the Jats belonging to Grewal got to which these parties belong daughters do not succeed to property left by sonless fathers and so the gift by Dev Singh's widow in favour of her daughters would be null and void as against the plaintiffs and others who would be entitled on Jai Kaur's death to succeed to the estate as reversioners. In the alternative, the plaintiffs contended that even if the land in suit was not ancestral qua the plaintiffs then also the deed of gift would be null and void as against their reversionary interests inasmuch as even as regards nonancestral property daughters do not succeed among the Grewal Jats. The main contention of defendants 1 to 3 (the appellants before us) was that the suit land was not ancestral qua the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 4 to 6, and that according to the customary law governing the Jats of the Grewal got, daughters exclude collaterals as regards non-ancestral property and a widow is competent to make a gift of such property in favour of her daughters. It was pleaded on behalf of the two daughters that they being preferential heirs in respect of the land in suit as against the plaintiffs, the gift is tantamount to acceleration of succession and is valid in every way. The Trial Judge held that 2B-2B,14-B out of the land in suit was ancestral and the gift was invalid to that extent, because as regards ancestral property a daughter does not succeed in the presence of collaterals. As regards the remainder of the suit land which he held was non-ancestral, the learned Judge was of opinion that the gift was merely an acceleration of succession as under the customary law governing the parties daughters exclude collaterals as regards succession to non-ancestral property. Accordingly he gave the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for as regards 2-B-2B, 14-B out of the land in suit and dismissed it as regards the remaining portion of the land in suit. The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge, Ludhiana, against this decree and cross-objections were filed by the defendants Nos. 1 to 3. The Trial Court's finding about a portion -of the land being ancestral and the rest non- ancestral was not disputed before the appeal court. On the question of custom the learned District Judge agreed with the Trial Judge's view that among the Grewal Jats of Ludhiana the daughter excluded collaterals as regards non- ancestral property. He held, therefore, agreeing with the Trial Judge that as regards the non-ancestral property the deed of gift was merely an act of acceleration of succession and was, therefore, valid and binding. The appeal was accordingly dismissed and so also were the cross-objections which appear not to have been pressed.

Two questions arise for consideration in this appeal. The first is whether under the customary law governing the Jats of the Grewal got in Ludhiana to which the parties belong, the daughter or the collaterals are the preferential heirs as regards non-ancestral property. If the answer to this question be that daughters have preference over collaterals (the plaintiffs here), the other question which arises is whether this gift is such acceleration of succession in favour of the daughters as is permissible under the law. On the question of custom the appellants rely on the statements in paragraph 23 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law (Thirteenth Edition) that in regard to the acquired property of her father the daughter is preferred to collaterals. It is not disputed that nonancestral property is " acquired property " within the meaning of this statement by Rattigan. Against this the plaintiffs- respondents rely on the answers to question No. 43 relating to Hindu Grewal Jats of Ludhiana as appear in the Riwaji-am prepared at the revised settlement of 1882. The question and the answer are in these words:-

If there are no collaterals of the deceased, the owners of the Thulla or Patti or village would be owners of his property."

The authoritative value of Rattigan's compilation of customary law is now beyond controversy, having been recognised in the judicial decisions of the Punjab courts too numerous to mention, which have also received the approval of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Therefore it is not, and cannot be disputed that under the general customary law of the Punjab daughters exclude collaterals in succession to non-ancestral property. The value of entries in the Riwaj-i-am has, also however, been repeatedly stressed. That they are relevant evidence under s. 35 of the Evidence Act is clear and the fact that the entries therein the the result of careful research of persons who might also be considered to have become experts in these matters, after an open and public enquiry has given them a value which should not be lightly underestimated. There is ', therefore, an initial presumption of correctness as regards the entries in the Riwaj-i-am and when the custom as recorded in the Riwaj-i-am is in conflict with the general custom as recorded in Rattigan's Digest or ascertained otherwise, the entries in the Riwaj-i-am should ordinarily prevail except that as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a recent decision in Mt. Subhani v. Nawab (1), that where, as in the present case, the Riwaj-i-am affects adversely the rights of females who had no opportunity whatever of appearing before the revenue authorities, the presumption would be weak, and only a few instances would suffice to rebut it.

The Hindu Law doctrine of surrender does not, therefore, make the gift of the non-ancestral property to the daughters valid beyond the widow's lifetime.

It is not suggested that there is any customary law, by which such surrender can be made.

Though, therefore, we have found disagreeing with the learned judges of the High Court that tinder the customary law governing the Grewal got of Jats to which the parties belong, the daughters-the second and the third appellants- are preferential heirs to the non-ancestral portion of the suit land, we hold that their conclusion that this deed of gift in favour of the daughters is not valid even as regards the non-ancestral property, beyond the donor's lifetime is correct and must be maintained.