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1. 1994 (2) LW 424 (S.Balasubramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others)
2. 2012 (3) CTC 449 (Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, rep. by its Secretary, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009 and another) and
3. 2007 (3) SCC 184 (Raja Ram Pal Vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and others).

30.He further submits that there is no alleged breach of privilege without the same being codified as required under Article 194(3) or by Rules under Article 228 and re-course to British Parliamentary Practice is not permissible pursuant to Constitution's 44th Amendment which did not save the law as stood on 1950 when the Constitution was enacted as per Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. For the same reason, he contends that except as a temporary provision, the reliance on the power of breach of privilege available under British Parliament cannot be relied upon either on the ground that in Britain itself, the said power is diluted or on the ground that the Supreme Court took a view that recourse to British Practice of Parliament is not available in a decision reported in 2010 (6) SCC 133 (Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and others). It is his further contention that the scope of approval is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and cannot travel outside the assembly. He also submits that suspending a member of the Legislative Assembly for six months (for more than 60 days) is ultra-virus of Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India, according to which, if for a period of 60 days, a member of House of Legislature of a State is absent without permission from the House from all meetings, the House may declare his seat vacant. He further submits that denial of salary and the other benefits of a Member is ultra-virus to Article 195 read with the Provision of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951. He also attacks the impugned order on the ground of violating Article 80(4) and 191 read with the provisions relating to Representation of People's Act, 1951. The learned Senior Counsel concludes his arguments by submitting that whenever a disqualification has to be treated on par with a privilege proceeding under Article 194, the same requires legislation or constitutional sanction. When such an enabling power is not there, no privilege proceeding can be taken against any member in violation of Article 190(4), 191, 195 and 80 respectively, even if such power is construed as an independent power.

41.Now, let me take up the above questions one by one which arose for consideration before this Court:

(b) The learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that Article 194 deals with powers, privileges and immunities of State Legislature and their Members. Article 194(3) states that powers, privileges and immunities of a House of a Legislature of a State and the Members and the Committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Legislature by law and until so defined, shall be those of that House and all its Members and committees immediately before coming into force of Section 26 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. He submits that in so far as Article 194(3) is concerned, even though the word breach of privilege is not coined there, it was originally traced to the power of British Parliament as a temporary provision until appropriate law is made by the Parliament or the State Legislature. The learned senior counsel submits that as on date there is no law codifying the power and breach of privilege under Article 194(3) and the transitory provision taking recourse to British Parliamentary Practice is not now available due to the fact that the Constitution was amended by 42nd Amendment in 1976 and further by 44th Amendment in 1978 substituting the original Article 194(3). The transitory provision of taking recourse to British Parliament Practice is not at all suffered by the 44th Constitutional Amendment as the law stands today, the learned Senior Counsel contends that is due to recourse to Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that there is no alleged breach of privilege without the same being codified as required under Article 194(3), a recourse to British Parliament Practice is not at all permissible pursuant to 44th Amendment to the Constitution which did not save the law as stood on 1950 when the Constitution was enacted as per Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. Further, he contends that the power of breach of privilege available under the British Parliament is no longer available as in Britain itself, the said power itself is very much diluted and therefore, the entire action initiated is illegal and unconstitutional warranting interference by this Court. To support his contention, he relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2010 (6) SCC 113 (Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee Punjab Vidhan Sabha and others).