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9. To determine this it is necessary to appreciate the principle on which the recognition of the privilege in Bradlaugh v. Gossett was founded and for this purpose we may briefly recapitulate the history of the conflict of jurisdiction between the Courts and the House of Commons in regard to Parliamentary privilege. May points out that in cases affecting Parliamentary privilege the tracing of a boundary between the competence of the Courts and the exclusive jurisdiction of either House is a difficult question of constitutional law which has provided many puzzling cases, particularly from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. It has been common ground between the Houses and the Courts that privilege depends on the "known laws and customs of Parliament" and not on the ipse dixit of either House. But the question in dispute was whether the law of Parliament was a "particular" law or part of the common law in its wide and extended sense and in the former case whether it was a superior law which overrode the common law. There was also another point of controversy arising out of this question and that was whether the matter of privilege should be judged solely by the House which it concerned, even when the rights of third parties were involved, or whether it might in certain cases be decided in the Court, and, if so, in what sort of cases. The points of view adopted by the Parliament and the Courts appeared to be irreconcilable. The Courts maintained that privilege was part of the law of the land and claimed the right to decide for themselves, where it became necessary to do so in proceedings before them, questions in relation to the existence or extent of these privileges whereas both the Houses, while admitting that neither acting alone could create a new privilege, claimed to be the sole and exclusive judges of their own privileges. There seemed to be thus complete antinomy or contradiction in law between two equally respectable principles urged with conviction and occasionally with heat by two co-ordinate authorities of equal jurisdiction, each supreme within its own sphere and neither of which could compel the submission of the other. But, as pointed out by Gajendragadkar, C.J. in Paragraph 85 of his opinion in the Presidential Reference, it is a tribute to the remarkable English Genius for finding pragmatic ad hoc solutions to problems which at first sight appear to be irreconcilable that for all practical purposes they resolved this deadlock "by adopting the conventional method of give and take". The two conflicting points of view were reconciled in practice and a solution was evolved by tacit consent which was acceptable to both parties. This solution which is marked out by the Courts is to insist on their right in principle to decide all questions of privilege arising in litigation before them with certain large exceptions in favour of parliamentary jurisdiction. Two of these are the exclusive jurisdiction of each House over its own internal proceedings and the rights of either House to commit and punish for contempt. May adds that while it cannot be claimed that either House has formally acquiesced in this assumption of jurisdiction by the Courts, the absence of any conflict for over a century may indicate a certain measure of tacit acceptance. It will, therefore, be seen that the privilege that the House is the absolute master of its' internal proceedings free from interference from any external authority and is the sole judge of the lawfulness of its proceedings was recognized by the Courts as a matter of practical solution with a view to resolving "dualism" arising by reason of conflicting claims of jurisdiction by "two constitutional authorities; each supreme in its own sphere and neither of which could compel the submission of the other. It was the result of a process of give and take which was tacitly acquiesced in by both parties. Stephen J., explaining in Bradlaugh v. Gossett why this privilege was conceded by the Courts to the House of Commons said: "if we were to attempt to erect ourselves into a Court of Appeal from the House of Commons, we should consult neither the public interest, nor the interests of Parliament and the Constitution, nor our own dignity. We should provoke a conflict between the House of Commons and this Court, which in itself would be a great evil; and, even upon the most improbable supposition of their acquiescence in our adverse decision, an appeal would lie from that decision to the Court of Appeal, and thence to the House of Lords, which would thus become the judge in the last resort of the powers and privilege of the House of Commons". This reasoning on which the privilege was recognised by the Courts in England can have no application under our Constitution where, as pointed out earlier, there is no scope for "dualism". We have a written Constitution under which the Courts are constituted the final interpreters of the Constitution and the laws and the entire basis on which the English Courts agreed to recognise this privilege in the House of Commons is absent in our case and we would not, therefore, be justified in holding that this privilege which the House of Commons was by tacit agreement allowed to possess as a matter of give and take in order to end an unhealthy "dualism" is vested in the House of Legislature in India. We are fortified in taking this view by the majority opinion in the Presidential Reference. There also the question was whether the privilege enjoyed by the House of Commons that a general or unspeaking warrant issued by it shall be conclusive and no Court shall go behind it was vested in the House of Legislature by reason of Article 194(3). Gajendragadkar, C.J. delivering the majority opinion pointed out: