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7. Shri Krishna contends that the present OA would be hopelessly barred by limitation. The statutory period of limitation as prescribed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is one year from when the final order is passed, and one and a half year if representation or appeal as envisaged under rules is not decided by the competent authority. It is urged that in the present case, 52 vacancies that were created were meant to be filled exclusively from amongst promotee quota Electrical Engineers for the recruitment year 1990, whereas the OA for filling up the said vacancies has been filed in the year 2010, more than twenty years from 1990, and would thus be patently barred by limitation. The applicants have prayed for filling up the additional 52 vacancies sanctioned over and above the 40% promotion quota to remove long standing stagnation, and in that regard, the primary plea of the applicants is that the respondents have refused to extend the benefit of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 23.09.2002, despite the fact that in other three departments the said judgment has been implemented. It may be recalled that in all four departments, vide a common order the vacancies for promotion were increased after realizing acute stagnation of promotees to occupy higher/promotional posts. In all, 463 seats were increased. In Civil Engineering and S&T department the increase of posts was to the extent of 238, whereas in Electrical Engineering, Personnel and Traffic departments, the increase was 52, 49 and 48 respectively. It is the positive case of the applicants, and not denied anywhere, even in the written arguments, that it is only as regards the Electrical Engineering department, to which the applicants belong, that the benefit of the judgment of the Apex Court has not been extended, whereas, with regard to all other departments the judgment has been followed and implemented. There could not be any occasion for the applicants to have agitated the issue till such time the Honble Supreme Court set aside the judgment passed by the Principal Bench of the Tribunal. The said Judgment came to be passed by the Supreme Court on 23.09.2002. The judgment, as mentioned above, was implemented for the other three departments only in 2007. The unrebutted pleadings that have been made in the OA would reveal that the applicants have been making representations for the respondents to redress their grievances, and on occasions, not only that the respondents were assuring them that the needful would be done in the matter, but positive notes were also being recorded. We may mention at this stage that it is the case of the applicants, and as mentioned above, not disputed by the respondents in their reply, that after the decision of the Apex Court in 2002, the applicants have been requesting the Railway administration from time to implement the ratio of the decision aforesaid, and that they were given assurances by the respondents. On 30.08.2004, a letter came to be issued by IRPOF to the Chairman, Railway Board for their immediate intervention in the process of induction for additional 93 vacancies of Electrical Department in the year 1992 of Group B officers to Group A. It is the case of the applicants that a letter was issued by IRPOF to Chairman, Railway Board requesting for conducting DPC in respect of 79 vacancies in Civil Engineering Department from Group B to Group A for the years 1992 to 1995, and the shortfall of 90 vacancies from 1989 to 2000 be also filled in view of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court dated 23.09.2002. It is further the case of the applicants that between 30.08.2004 and 07.06.2005, the issue of implementing the judgment of the Supreme Court came up for formal discussion before the Railway Board, and the Board agreed to consider the issue, and that on 10.01.2005 during the meeting of IRPOF with the Railway Board, the respondents assured to reconsider the issue of implementation of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Civil Engineering and Electrical Engineering departments as well, thereby inducting Group B officers to Group A as per rule 4 of IRSE against the 238 vacancies sanctioned by UPSC, and 52 vacancies plus vacancies of 1993 (19 vacancies) and 1995 (13 vacancies) for the Electrical Engineering department. The applicants submitted representations thereafter as well. At no stage, the respondents took a positive stand so as not to implement the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the department of the applicants. Rather, all through it was under consideration, with positive notes, as mentioned above. Last representation of the applicants appears to have been made on 22.09.2009, and when the same also brought no tangible results, nor even an adverse order was passed, the present OA came to be filed on 23.03.2010. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find the OA to be barred either by limitation or suffering from unexplained delay and laches. This Tribunal was confronted with almost a similar situation, where, even though prima facie it appeared that the OA may be barred by limitation, but when the respondents were themselves considering the case of the applicant, it was found that the OA would not be dismissed on the plea of bar of limitation. We may refer to the pertinent observations made by us in OA No.104/2008 in the matter of Dev Sharma v Government of NCT of Delhi & others, decided on 17.11.2008, thus:

9. The plea as regards non-impleadment of direct recruits has also to be repelled, as surely and admittedly, no direct recruits in consequence of the judgment passed by the Bombay Bench have been appointed. It may be recalled that when the matter came up for hearing before us on 20.01.2012, we asked the respondents to file an additional affidavit, and the undisputed position as emerges is that the interim orders passed by the Bombay Bench are only as regards adjusting the vacancies that may fall to the promotees in future as commensurate to their quota under the relevant service rules. We repeat, no direct recruitment has been made against even one vacancy that may have gone to direct recruits pursuant to orders passed by the Bombay Bench. If perhaps, such appointments had been made, things would have been different, but in absence of any appointment of direct recruits against the increased posts, non-impleadment of direct recruits would not be fatal. We are unable to understand as to how the present case would be un-settling the settled seniority. Once no direct recruits have been appointed against the increased vacancies, there is no question of fixation of their seniority vis-`-vis the applicants, nor would there be any question of un-settling the same.