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6. Oral arguments were advanced and written submissions were filed before this Court both on behalf of the petitioner-corporation and the respondent Union. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner corporation, by Sri K. Madhava Reddy the Learned Standing Counsel, that the respondent Union, which was the majority Union upto 15.10.1996, had lost its majority in the verification held on 21.09.1996 wherein the APSRTC National Mazdoor Union had secured the majority, that consequently, vide circular dated 15.10.1996, the National Mazdoor Union was acknowledged to be the recognized Union for a period of two years from 15.10.1996, that the Code of Discipline, which regulates conduct of trade unions and the management in respect of industrial relations, is applicable to the A.P.S.R.T.C and that its object is to regulate activities of the Unions including their conduct in raising industrial disputes. According to the petitioner, since the question of entitlement to enhanced ex-gratia affects all employees of the corporation, it is only the recognized Union, which has the support of a majority of the employees, that is entitled to raise an industrial dispute regarding entitlement of a section of the workmen of the corporation to be paid enhanced ex-gratia. Reliance is placed on Workmen v. Rohtak General Co. 1962(1) LLJ 634 to contend that it is only if the dispute is supported and sponsored by a majority of the workmen in the establishment, and such support is in existence prior to the reference, would it become an "industrial dispute". It is contended that the Tribunal had erroneously held that the respondent Corporation represented 7,000 to 8,000 workmen throughout the State and could raise a dispute though it was a minority Union. It is further contended that neither was a plea raised, nor was evidence adduced, to show either that the Secretary General of the respondent Union, who signed the strike notice dated 15.03.1997, or the State Committee of the Union, elected at the meeting of all the workmen, were authorised to represent the workmen with regards the dispute in question. Reliance is placed by Sri K. Madhava Reddy, Learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation, on the memorandum of settlement dated 27.03.1997 entered into between the management of the APSRTC and the recognised Union pursuant to the strike notice dated 06.03.1997. The strike notice was issued for the petitioner's failure to implement their charter of 22 demands including the demand for payment of the difference of ex-gratia for the year 1993-94 consequent to the Payment of Bonus Act being amended. Learned Counsel would contend that, after bilateral discussions on numerous occasions, the matter was admitted to conciliation and, eventually, a memorandum of settlement was entered into on 27.03.1997 and all employees of the corporation, including members of the respondent Union, had accepted the benefits conferred under the said settlement. Reference is made to Clause 2, of the terms of the said settlement whereunder it was mutually agreed to discuss and settle the demand of payment of difference of ex-gratia for the year 1993-94, consequent to the amendment made to the Payment of Bonus Act, in due course of time. Reliance is placed on National Engineering Industries Limited v. State of Rajasthan to contend that a settlement, entered into under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, was binding on all workmen of the establishment and, therefore, the respondent Union was not justified in seeking a reference with regards their entitlement for payment of the difference between the ex-gratia, as per the pre-amended and the amended Payment of Bonus Act. It is also contended that the strike notice issued by the respondent Union on 15.03.1997 was without justification as the recognized Union had already issued a strike notice for the said cause which ultimately culminated in the memorandum of settlement dated 27.03.1997 and, since there was no pending dispute, the State Government had no jurisdiction to make the reference on 18.03.1997. Learned Counsel would contend that, less than a month after the settlement was entered into on 27.03.1997, the present dispute was referred, that since the employees Union did not raise any fresh dispute thereafter, the State Government had no jurisdiction to make the reference on 18.04.1997 and that the reference itself was illegal and invalid. Learned Counsel would contend that Clause 13.2 of the settlement dated 21.10.1997 did not mean that the impugned reference was valid or that there was a dispute necessitating adjudication by the date of the reference or that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the reference. According to the Learned Counsel the dispute, in the order of reference, was not an "industrial dispute" as even if the reference was answered in the affirmative, the employees would not get anything thereby, for the reference was not whether ex-gratia was payable to them for the year 1993-94 as per the amended Payment of Bonus Act. Learned Counsel would contend that the respondent Union was not entitled to raise the dispute with regards payment of differential ex-gratia, that there was no industrial dispute in existence at the time of making the reference on 17.04.1997, that the reference made was not genuine and that the State Government had no authority to make the reference. It is also contended that the Tribunal had gone beyond the scope of the reference in holding that employees of the petitioner corporation were entitled to be paid the difference between the ex-gratia payable to them as per the amended Payment of Bonus Act, and the actual ex-gratia paid as per the pre-amended Act, when there was no reference made in that regard. According to the Learned Counsel, the question whether employees of the APSRTC were entitled to ex-gratia for the year 1993-94, and whether they were entitled to the difference between the ex-gratia payable to them as per the amended Act and the ex-gratia paid to them under the pre- amended Act, were two distinct and different subjects, each independent of the other, that the latter was not incidental to the former and, even if the reference was answered affirmatively, it did not follow that employees of the APSRTC would be entitled to the difference. It is contended that grant of enhanced ex-gratia for the year 1993-94, based on the amended Payment of Bonus Act, depended on several factors, that the Payment of Bonus Act had no application to the APSRTC, that the employees of the Corporation had no statutory right to claim ex-gratia as per the rate fixed under the Payment of Bonus Act, that the right of employees of the corporation to claim ex-gratia for any particular period could only be in accordance with the agreement/settlement entered into between the petitioner and the recognized Union under Section 12(3) of the I.D. Act, that otherwise employees of the Corporation had no legal right to claim ex-gratia at a particular rate for a particular year unless that right was conferred on them by settlements/agreements entered into between the recognized Union and the Management and that, in the instant case, there was no agreement/settlement between the parties as to the grant of ex-gratia at 8.33%. It is contended that, from the various G.Os issued by the State Government, it was evident that the corporation was not entitled to pay ex-gratia to its employees unless profits accrued, and, even if there were profits, only with the prior approval of the State Government. Reference is made to the memo dated 26.05.1994 whereunder the State Government had clarified that ex-gratia could be paid to eligible employees of public enterprises only when there were accumulated profits, that too on receipt of prior approval of the State Government. Reliance is placed on Workman of British India Corporation Limited v. British India Corporation Limited 1965 II LLJ 433, Senior Regional Manager, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad and Management of Divisional Engineer, Telecommunications v. Venkataiah 2006(5) ALT 606.

CODE OF DISCIPLINE IS NOT REFERABLE TO ANY STATUTORY PROVISION:

10. The contention of Sri K. Madhava Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner corporation, that, since the respondent union was neither the majority union nor the Union recognized under the Code of discipline, it could not raise a dispute on matters which affect all the employees of the Corporation, is only to be noted to be rejected. The Code of Discipline, which was ratified by the Central Employees and 'Workers' Organization at the 16th Session of the Indian Labour Conference held at Nainital in May, 1958, came into force from 01.06.1958. Part V of the Code of Discipline relates to Implementation and Evaluation Machinery and its functions and procedures, wherein the rights arising out of recognition of unions are found. Under Para 13 thereof, it was agreed that the Unions, granted recognition under the Code of discipline, would enjoy the right to raise issues and enter into collective agreements with the employers on general questions concerning the terms of employment and conditions of service of workers in an establishment. Appendix-I to the Code of discipline requires the management to recognise the Union in accordance with the criteria provided in Annexure-I to that Appendix, which was evolved at the 16th session of the Indian Labour Conference held in May, 1958. Under Clause 4 of Annexure-1 when a union has been recognised, there should be no change in its position for a period of two years. Under Clause 5 of the said Annexure, when there are several unions in an industry or establishment, the one with the largest membership should be recognised. Under Clause 8, only unions which observe the Code of Discipline would be entitled to recognition. (I.T.C. Employees Association v. State of Karnataka 1981(1) LLJ 431 (Karnataka High Court). The Code of discipline which provides for recognition of the Union, which represents a majority of the workmen in the establishment, as the recognized union with whom the management would negotiate, does not have statutory force. The Code of discipline is neither referable to any specific statute nor does the Industrial Disputes Act, which prescribes the procedure for resolution of Industrial Disputes either amicably by means of conciliation, settlements etc or by adjudication by the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals, place any restriction requiring an industrial dispute to be raised only by a Union recognized by the employer under the Code of discipline.

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE: FOR A DISPUTE TO BE REFERRED FOR ADJUDICATION TO THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ONLY BY A RECOGNIZED OR MAJORITY UNION:

11. It is not mandatory for an employer to negotiate only with a particular Union nor would it disentitle a registered Trade Union from raising a dispute concerning the workmen of the establishment. The code of discipline is non- statutory, is a voluntary agreement between the management and the workers and cannot be enforced by a writ of mandamus. (HMT Employees Union v. HMT Judgment of O. Chinnappa Reddy.J in W.P. No. 3174 of 1967 dated 07.08.1968; All India Reserve Bank Employees Federation v. Governor, Reserve Bank of India Order in W.P.M.P. No. 11838 of 1982 and W.P.M.P. No. 14971 of 1984 in W.P. No. 8082 of 1982 dated 25.07.1984). No reliance can, therefore, be placed on the Code of Discipline to contend that it is only the Union, recognized by the management, thereunder, which is entitled to raise a dispute in relation to the employees of the petitioner Corporation and not the minority Union, even if it be representative of a substantial number of workmen employed in the establishment. A dispute, for the purposes of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, must be connected with the employment or non-employment of a workman and, even if it be a dispute between a single workman and his employer, it must be sponsored or espoused by a Union of workmen or by a number of workmen. To fall within the ambit of "industrial dispute" under Section 2(k) of the Act, the Union to which the employee belongs may also be a Union of a minority of the workmen. Even in cases where the establishment has no Union of its own, and some of the employees join the Union of another establishment belonging to the same industry, it would be open to that Union to take up the cause of the workmen if it is sufficiently representative of those workmen, despite the fact that such Union was a minority union or was not exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. (Workmen of Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) v. Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) and J.H. Jadhav ). In Rohtak General Transport Company 1962(1) LLJ 634, the Government of Punjab had referred two items of dispute, between Rohtak General Transport Company and its employees, for industrial adjudication by the Labour Court. The items of disputes, as referred, related to the retrenchment of one driver and not permitting another employee to join duty. A preliminary objection was raised by the Company before the Labour Court that the reference was incompetent in as much as the dispute referred for adjudication was an individual dispute and not an industrial dispute. This contention was raised on the premise that the dispute in question had not been sponsored by a majority of the workmen concerned. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the case of the two workmen had been espoused only by five out of a total of 25 members and that the dispute raised, on behalf of the said two workmen, could not be said to be an industrial dispute. The Labour Court held that, unless the dispute referred for adjudication was sponsored by a substantial section of the workmen it could not be said to be an industrial dispute under the I.D. Act. When the matter came up in appeal, the Supreme Court noted that, before the reference was made, the case of the two workmen had been taken up by the Hissar District transport workers' Union and a demand notice had, in fact, been served on the company by the Union. The Supreme Court observed that if the employer had raised the argument that, even a minority of workmen had not espoused the cause before the date of reference, it would have been open to the workmen to lead evidence to show that the Union which served the demand notice was, under the Act, entitled to act on behalf of the workmen. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the reference was bad, and that the dispute was not an industrial dispute, only because a minority of workmen had espoused the dispute in question. The appeal was allowed, the findings set aside and the matter was sent back to the Labour Court for disposal in accordance with law. This judgment not only does not support the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner corporation but, in fact, goes against it. In National Engineering Industries Limited AIR 2000 SC 469, the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Amendment Act, 1958, as amended in 1970, specifically provided, under Section 9- E thereof, for registration of Unions. Section 9-E of the Rajasthan Act read thus: