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9. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the settlement deed having been effected by the respondent out of natural love and affection entertained by him towards the appellant, the transaction is valid in law, that the stipulation in the document to the effect that the appellant should have lived with him thereafter was not the object or consideration for the transaction which is a gift, pure and simple, but must be treated as a condition subsequent and that the condition being immoral will be void and the disposition by way of gifts will stand unassailed. A further point was raised in the course of arguments that, as the appellant was undoubtedly in possession of the suit house till the year 1961, the appellant is entitled, on the strength of possessory title, to succeed straightaway and is not bound to rely upon the tainted gift at all for establishing her claim to recover possession.

25. In Istak Kamu v. Ranchod Zipru A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 198 it was laid down that under Section 2(d) of the Contract Act, past illicit cohabitation can be the consideration for an agreement or a transfer of property other than a gift and that such an agreement or transfer is void and if such an agreement precedes a gift and the gift is made in discharge of that agreement, then the gift also is void; but a gift does not require consideration and past cohabitation may be its motive but cannot be its object or consideration. Hence a gift made out of gratitude for or with the idea of compensating past cohabitation is not per se void under Section 6(h) of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 23, Contract Act.

But even if that was otherwise, assuming a condition and an immoral condition, it would be the condition that is immoral and not the consideration ; and then the case would fall under the general rule of law that a gift to which an immoral condition is attached remains a good gift, while the condition is void .

54. On a fair construction of the terms of the document in question, I am of opinion that the transaction is a gift pure and simple and not an agreement for any consideration. The past illicit cohabitation between the appellant and the respondent was the motive for the settlement and future cohabitation was not intended to serve as consideration or as a condition precedent for a gift to take effect but was intended only as a condition subsequent and not the object of the transaction. It is true that the respondent had contemplated future cohabitation but the question whether future cohabitation was the consideration, object or condition must be determined only by a strict reference to the language used in the settlement deed. I have already set out the material passages of the document at an earlier stage and I am of opinion that the object of the settlement was to make provision for the future [maintenance of the appellant. The terms of the document and the language used do not suggest that future cohabitation was intended to serve as a consideration for the transaction. I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that future cohabitation was the object of the transaction. The language used by the respondent forbids such a construction. The recitals in the document show that the respondent had settled the property because of his love and affection for the appellant and of his apprehension that she would be left uncared for by her sons after his death and that he had delivered possession ; and therefore, it cannot be said that future cohabitation was intended to serve as a condition precedent. Transfer was already complete and possession had been delivered and a condition that the appellant could enjoy the property thereafter only if she continued to live with him in future was superadded. I am clear that this is a case of a condition subsequent contemplated by Section 32 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the transfer must prevail and that the condition imposed upon the bequest is void. The decision of the Privy Council in Ram Samp v. Bela (1884) I.L.R. 6 All. 313 (P.C.) : 11 I.A. 44, will apply to the facts of this case. The decision of this Court in Thayaramma v. Sitaramasami Naidu (1900) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 613 : 10 M.L.J. 214, can be clearly distinguished. It is a case of a condition precedent; the bequest was made under a will and was intended to take effect after the death of the testator only if the mistress had continued to cohabit with him down to his death.