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11. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the State of Bihar has not challenged the fact that a notification, as alleged by the plaintiff, was published in the Gazette on 21-5-1952, nor the facts that an order of injunction was passed bv the Court against the State of Bihar on 19-3-1951. and was served on it. The points raised in support of the appeal at the commencement of the argument were only the following:

(1) That the State of Bihar as such cannot fn law be guilty for contempt for the infringement of an order of injunction passed in a suit notwithstanding the fact that the State of Bihar itself is a party to the suit.

In that view of the matter, the case was decided on the Common admission of the parties that no injunction could be granted against the Crown. It is, therefore, of no assistance in deciding the point before us.

23. In the case of -- 'AIR 1946 Pat 47 (Y) the State was not a party. The case was confined to the disobedience by a private individual of an order of injunction passed against him in the case and so it is of no assistance in this case.

24. The decisions in the case of -- 'AIR 1938 PC 295 (W)' and in the case of -- 'AIR 1937 Pat 65 (SB) (X) refer to the same controversy. The former is the decision given in appeal by the Privy Council over the judgment in the latter by this Court. In this case three persons-- (1) the Collector of Shahabad through the Secretary of State for India in Council, (2) one S.N. Ghose described as tne manager of the Kalyanpur Lime Works Limited and (3) one S.N. Banerjee, the managing director of the said Company, were called upon to show cause why they should not be dealt with for alleged contempt of Court in respect of an injunction granted against the Secretary of State in a suit brought by the petitioners, the Kuchwar Lime and Stone Works Limited against the Secretary of State. The case was decided on the footing that the party described, as "the Collector of Shahabad through the Secretary of State" was the Government and on an elaborate discussion this Court came to the conclusion that "each of the three opposite parties has been guilty of contempt, the Government by a breach, of the injunction, and the two otner respondents by setting at defiance the authority of tne Court, there is no doubt in our minds", and ordered that "we deem it sufficient to direct that the Secretary of State do forthwith pay to tne petitioners one half of their costs and that the other respondents, Banerjee and Ghose shall also pay to the petitioners one half of their costs and shall be jointly and severally liable therefor; and we fix the hearing fee of this petition at two hundred and fifty gold mohurs. In view of the correct attitude taken on behalf of the respondents, that they had and have every intention of treating with respect the authority of the Court, we do not make any further order."

This decision of this Court therefore clearly negatives the contention put up on behalf of the appellant in this appeal. The matter, however, did not rest here. It went up in appeal to the Privy Council and there the judgment of this Court was set aside but of course not on the ground, so far as the Secretary of State was concerned, that no proceedings in contempt could be taken against the Secretary of State. In fact, in the course of the argument this question was only reserved on behalf of the Secretary of State as to "whether the proceedings were properly framed against him, firstly because he was sued in his public capacity as Secretary of State in Council and therefore as a body corporate against whom, sequestration might be invoked but no order for contempt could be made, and secondly, because in any case he could not be made responsible in contempt for the action of his officials in India", and the case was argued on the assumption that in a proper case proceedings for contempt could be taken against him -- 'AIR 1938 PC 295 (W)'. On this analysis we therefore find that at least these cases do not at all establish the proposition laid down by the learned Government Advocate. In fact, they on the whole give an indication, if at all, to the contrary that proceedings in contempt under Order 39 Rule 2 (3), Civil P. C. can be taken against the State for the disobedience of an order of injunction passed against it though not in cases of criminal contempts where the position is entirely different.

This question in the circumstances of this case resolves itself into three points: (1) whether the position of the State of Bihar in title suit No. 40 of 1950 is any way substantially different to that of any other person or corporation as a defendant provided of course that title suit is maintainable against it on the allegations made in the plaint: (2) if there is no substantial difference in the position of the State of Bihar in the suit as a defendant as compared with any other person or corporation, whether an action for contempt can lie in law against the State of Bihar for the dis-oebdience of an order of injunction passed in the suit, provided other conditions for such a step are found to have been fulfilled and (3) if there is a substantial difference between the State of Bihar and other person or corporation as a defendant in the suit, will that make the State of Bihar immune from an action of contempt for the infringement of the order of injunction passed against it in the suit and if so to what extent.