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That you accused Nos. 1 to 8 with others, with the common object of dishonestly misappropriating the Dharwar Bank's resources and money, through the help of its Officers who had been entrusted with and had dominion over the same, conspired togetherand committed criminal breach of trust by allowing and facilitating by Joshi & Co. of Dharwarmisappropriation between November 16, 1930, and November 15, 1931, of the bank's money.

28. Then follow specific sections of the Code, namely Section 409 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Now, if that charge implied a general conspiracy to defraud the bank and stave off its full demand, it is easily intelligible that the series of acts committed to attain the object of the conspiracy, which under the Indian Penal Code is one offence, would form a transaction in itself, and it would be proper to say that the offences constituted by all the acts would be part of the same transaction. But the allegation of a general conspiracy was not accepted, and a restricted charge of mutual abetment by conspiracy was framed. That necessarily restricted the scope of the enquiry to the conspiracy relating to the specific act abetted. It would therefore prima facie be difficult to defend the charge on the principle applicable to a trial upon a charge of general conspiracy. It is true that there might have been a substantive charge of conspiracy for the purpose of defrauding the bank, for the complaint did indicate an offence punishable under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. But the learned Magistrate had dropped that charge because it was redundant. And the learned Additional Sessions Judge agreed with the Magistrate upon a statement of the Public Prosecutor. It might therefore be fair to infer that the Crown did not intend to proceed with the charge of general conspiracy. Consequently upon the restricted scope of the charge the evidence of the enquiry had to be narrowed down and limited to the number of acts of mutual abetment resulting from that conspiracy. The learned Government Pleader's argument, as I understand it, is that even if a charge under Section 120B of a general conspiracy to embrace all the alleged acts were not framed, the allegations in the complaint containing an accusation of that description were sufficient to validate the charge consolidating not only the acts referable to the abetment for the purpose of committing criminal breach of trust, but acts committed subsequently, namely the fabrication of the bond, as if they were part of the acts constituting abetment by conspiracy. That seems to me to be entirely ignoring the scope of the charge under Sections 408 and 409 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The word "transaction" is usually used to include the steps leading to a conclusion or resulting in action, though often transaction emphasises the fact of something done or brought to a conclusion. In that sense every embezzlement constituted by the unauthorised advance would be a transaction in itself. To ascertain whether a series of acts are parts of the same transaction it would be essential to see whether they are linked together to present a continuous whole. The expression "same transaction" as judicially interpreted signifies "related to one another in point of purpose, or as cause and effect or as principal and subsidiary acts as to denote one continuous and completed action." The idea of completion cannot be divorced from the interpretation of the expression. The question is at what stage the act alleged has been done or completed. Applying that test the joinder of charges is manifestly improper.

30. That was a case in which it was alleged that a company was formed with the object of defrauding the public in a particular manner and the promoters of the company were charged with several distinct acts of embezzlement committed in the course of several years. The ratio of the decision was approved of in Emperor v. Shapurji Sorabji (1935) 38 Bom. L.R. 105. There the accused were convicted of criminal breach of trust and cheating, and also forgery and creating false evidence. The accused were employees of the Aden Settlement Executive Committee which was constituted to supply water to the public on payment. Water tickets were printed and sold to consumers in booklets which were entrusted to the accused for sale, and they were required to pay the money received into the bank. The particulars of the book issued were entered in a register. It was found upon investigation that several unauthorised books had been printed in a private press and sold to several individuals. And it was found upon the charges framed that they were incompetent. In dealing with the tests to ascertain whether the acts were part of the same transaction Mr. Justice Broomfield made the following observations (p. 113):