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5. It is this order of learned single Judge which is challenged before us in this writ appeal.

6. Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contended that the first respondent is precluded from questioning the Award of the Labour Court in so far as it declined to grant the relief of reinstatement, by his own conduct in accepting the amount awarded by the Labour Court as compensation, to which he would not be otherwise entitled. In the beginning of his arguments, when a question was put to him by the Court whether he rested his case on the principle of estoppel, he answered it by saying that the relief on the doctrine of accord and satisfaction and not on the principle of estoppel. However, later, after the arguments had proceeded to some extent, when the Court wanted him to state his proposition specifically, he stated thus "By accepting the amount awarded by the Labour Court as compensation, to which he would not be otherwise entitled, the first respondent is precluded from questioning the Award in so far as it declined to grant the relief of reinstatement, by his conduct." Later on, he submitted that he was not raising it as a preliminary issue or a question of jurisdiction, but he was only placing the matter before the Court so that the discretion of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be exercised in favour of the first respondent because the first respondent cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. It can be taken that learned counsel for the appellant put forward his contentions both on the basis of the doctrine of approbation and reprobation and the discretion of the Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a person who, by his own conduct, is precluded from claiming relief.

20. The doctrine of approbation and reprobation has been elucidated in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn) (Volume 16), at page 1012, paragraph 1507 thus :

"The principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate expresses two propositions, (1) that the person in question, having a choice between two courses of conduct is to be treated as having made an election from which he cannot resile, and (2) that he will not be regarded in general at any rate, as having so elected unless he has taken a benefit under or arising out of the course of conduct which he has first pursued and with which his subsequent conduct is inconsistent.
"It seems to us, however, that in the absence of some statutory provision or of a well-reorganised principle of equity, no one can be deprived of his legal rights including a statutory right of appeal. The phrase 'approbate' and 'reprobate' is borrowed from Scots Law where it is used to express the principle embodied in the English doctrine of election, namely that no party can accept and reject the same instrument (per Scrutton L.J., in Verschures Chermeries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. 1921-2 KB. 608) The House of Lords further pointed out in Lissenden v. C. A. V. Bosch Ltd. (Supra) that the equitable doctrine of election applies only when an interest is conferred as an act of bounty by some instrument. In that case they held that the withdrawal by a workman of the compensation money deposited by the employer could not take away the statutory right of appeal conferred upon him by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Lord Maugham, after pointing out the limitation of the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, observed towards the conclusion of his speech :
"It certainly cannot be suggested that the receipt of the sum tendered, in any way, injured the respondents. Neither estoppel nor release in the ordinary sense was suggested. Nothing was less served than the principles either of equity or of justice."

24. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the doctrine of approbation and reprobation in Ramesh Chandra v. Chunnilal . In that case, a suit was filed for specific performance of a contract and, in the alternative, for recovery of Rs. 7,500/- being the amount of earnest money and Rs. 15,000/- as damages together with interest. The trial Court granted a decree for return of the sum of Rs. 7,500/-. An appeal was filed in the High Court and, during the pendency of the appeal, the sum of Rs. 7,500/- was deposited by the respondents herein in satisfaction of the decree passed by the trial Court. In its judgment, the High Court had taken the view that the appellants in the appeal were disentitled to a decree for specific performance as the decree for Rs. 7,500/- was satisfied. The Supreme Court had to consider the question whether that view of the High Court was correct. The Supreme Court took the view that the High Court was wrong in applying the doctrine of approbation and reprobation. The relevant passage runs thus :