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It is stated by Fairman in his "American Constitutional Decisions," p. 346:

"The Court looks to what actually happens. The denial of equal protection may lurk in the actual administration of a statute even if not required by its words."

If from the face of the Ordinance deductions as to its necessary tendency & ultimate operation can be drawn, it can be concluded that the Ordinance makes an arbitrary discrimination between person and person & contravenes the equal protection clause. See the observation of Matthews J. in the case of Yick Wo, at p. 373; in that case he did not feel "obliged to reason from the probable to the actual and pass upon the validity of the ordinances complained of, as tried merely by the opportunities which their terms afford, of unequal & unjust discrimination in their administration."

That only one person is affected is no proof of arbitrary classification or discrimination;

"a law applying only to one person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it." (Willis, at p. 580).

In the case of Gulf, G. & S. F. R Co., Gray J., in his dissenting judgment, said at p. 167 :

"The legislature of a State must be presumed to have acted from lawful motives, unless the contrary appears upon the face of the statute."

He also held that whether the facts which would justify classification existed or not, was to be determined by the Legislature. The Court is not in a position to gainsay the belief of the Legislature which necessitates the classification. If it is entertainable, the Legislature has not violated its duty to afford equal protection of its laws. The Court cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of the legislators, nor question their motives. This was laid down by Frankfurter J., in Goesaert v. Clearly, 335 U. S. 464 at p. 456 : 93 Law. Ed. 163 at p. 166. Reasonable grounds for the classification or discrimination were assumed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases cited by Willoughby at pages 1939-1941. As regards classification for the police power, it is stated by Willis at p. 580 that there is no rule for determining which classification is reasonable.

"It is a matter for judicial determination, but in determining the question of reasonableness the Courts must find some economic, political, or other social interest to be secured, and some relation of the classification to the objects sought to be accomplished."

23. The above interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court of America is illustrated by the following cases: Barbier v. Gonnolly & Soon Hing v. Crowley, (1885) 113 U. S. p. 703 : 28 Law Ed. p. 1145, dealt with an Ordinance issued by a Board of Supervisors of San Francisco containing a provision that no person owning or employed in a public laundry shall wash clothes between 10 p. m. & 6 a. m. & on any Sunday, & that no laundry shall be established by anyone without having first obtained a certificate of the Health Officer & a certificate of the Board of Fire Wardens regarding suitability & safety of the premises. This Ordinance was declared to be valid by the Supreme Court as being merely a police regulation which a Federal Tribunal cannot undertake to supervise. The justification for the Ordinance lay in the fact that San Francisco was composed largely of wooden buildings. As all persons employed in the laundry business were treated alike, there was no question of inequality of the protection of laws. In the case of Soon Hing, it was contended that the Ordinance made an arbitrary discrimination between the laundry business & other businesses; that contention was repelled because no special risk attended the other businesses. It was then pleaded that the Ordinance was aimed at the Chinese against whom the Board of Supervisors had a feeling of hostility; the Supreme Court's reply was :

27. The law that I gather from the above authorities is this. It is absurd to speak of one law for all circumstances; it is a sheer impossibility because there must be different laws to deal with different circumstances. What the equal protection clause means is simply this that the same law should govern those similarly circumstanced; it cannot & does not prohibit different laws for those differently circumstanced. The Legislature has full freedom to classify people according to circumstances & enact different laws for different lasses; but it must treat equally all similarly circumstanced or falling in one class & the difference in treatment must have some intelligible or rational connection with the differences in circumstances & not be arbitrary. Discrimination among persons in one class or similarly circumstanced, whether apparent on the face of the Statute or resulting in practice, is all that is prohibited under the clause. It is competent for the Legislature to leave it to the discretion of an authority to apply different laws to people in different circumstances but always provided that t lays down a rational standard to guide its discretion or such a standard can be presumed to exist; it cannot leave it to its arbitrary or naked discretion. A statute is presumed to be within the power of the Legislature & the onus of showing that it is not, lies on the assailant. But a Statute enacted before the Constitution cannot be presumed to be constitutional under it.